380 U.S. 51 (1965)
Appellant Freedman exhibited the motion picture "Revenge at Daybreak" at his theatre in Baltimore without first submitting the film to the State Board of Censors as required by Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, § 2.1
The State concedes that the picture does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if properly submitted.2 Freedman was nevertheless convicted of the violation.3
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction in a decision reported at 233 Md. 498, 197 A. 2d 232.4 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the case.5
The Maryland statute imposes no time limit on the Board for completing its examination of a submitted film.6 Upon disapproval, the exhibitor receives notice and may appeal to the Baltimore City Court, with a further appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland; one reported appeal required four months for initial judicial determination and six months for final resolution.7
Freedman challenged the constitutionality of the statute in its entirety, arguing that the submission requirement operates within a procedural framework that risks suppressing protected expression through delay and lack of immediate judicial oversight.8
Whether an exhibitor who did not submit a film for review has standing to challenge the procedural provisions of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute?9
One has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license.10 Standing is recognized because of the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.11
Yes. Appellant Freedman exhibited the motion picture Revenge at Daybreak at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the film to the State Board of Censors as required by the statute. The State concedes that the picture does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if properly submitted, yet Freedman was convicted of the violation. Subsequently the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
The Maryland statute imposes no time limit on the Board for completing its examination of a submitted film. Upon disapproval the exhibitor may appeal to the Baltimore City Court with a further appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. One reported appeal having required four months for initial judicial determination and six months for final resolution. This concrete statutory context permits him to attack the submission requirement as part of an invalid prior restraint system even though he never applied for a license.
The exhibitor has standing to challenge the procedural provisions of the statute.12
Whether the Maryland motion picture censorship statute's procedures for prior submission of films, which lack prompt judicial review and place the burden of initiating proceedings on the exhibitor, satisfy constitutional requirements?13
A noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.14 The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.15 The exhibitor must be assured that the censor will within a specified brief period either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.16 Any restraint imposed in advance of final judicial determination must be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period.17 The procedure must assure a prompt final judicial decision.18
No. Under the Maryland statute the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and persuading the courts that the film is protected expression after the Board disapproves it.19 Exhibition is prohibited pending judicial review however protracted.20 The statute provides no assurance of prompt judicial determination as evidenced by the reported case taking four months for initial determination and six months for final resolution.21 These features fail to provide the required safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression and render the submission requirement an invalid previous restraint.22
The Maryland motion picture censorship statute's procedures do not satisfy constitutional requirements.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurs in the judgment but adheres to his view that any form of censorship is impermissible under the First Amendment.24 He maintains that movies are entitled to the same degree and kind of protection under the First Amendment as other forms of expression.25 He believes that censors should be banned from the theatre just as they are from the publishing business, from the pulpit, and from the public platform.26
He would not admit the censor even for the limited role accorded him in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.27 Any authority to obtain a temporary injunction gives the State the paralyzing power of a censor.28