Concept
Government Funding Conditions
Licenses or benefits
Government Funding Conditions
Money is where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine meets its hardest cases, because the Court has endorsed two principles that pull in opposite directions. As Matal v. Tam put it, government may not deny a benefit on a basis that infringes a person’s freedom of speech, even if the person has no entitlement to the benefit, but government is also not required to subsidize activities it does not wish to promote.1 Which principle governs a given grant “is not always self-evident.”2 A subsidy forces the two to meet, since the money is something government need not provide and is also the lever by which it might win a result that direct regulation could not.
Dependence makes the collision real. Recipients often rely on the continued flow of public money, so the threat of termination can coerce and penalize the exercise of protected freedoms. Government cannot achieve indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly, and funding can serve as a covert means of regulation, because government can “buy up rights.”3 Government nonetheless has real room to choose. It may speak for itself and may use private parties to speak its message, which explains why the Court upheld the exclusion of abortion counseling from a federally funded pregnancy-care program in Rust v. Sullivan, and the decency and respect standards for grantee artists in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. The Court has also held that Congress could not forbid government-funded legal-services lawyers from representing clients who challenge the constitutionality of welfare laws.4
The cases sort by the role government plays. They ask whether government has added its own voice, neutrally enhanced speech in some part of the private sector, or distorted the normal functioning of the “market” for speech. Distortion depends on two factors: whether the funding condition affects only the use of government funds or also hinders other speech activities by recipients, and the Court’s sense of how the forum normally functions.5 Beneath those factors runs the distinction between penalties and nonsubsidies, which is structurally parallel to the distinctions the Court has drawn for public space, public education, and public employment. Government may not use the leverage of a subsidy to induce recipients to refrain from speech they would otherwise engage in with their own resources, but it may refrain from paying for speech with which it disagrees.6 Three questions follow, one for each subsection. Does the condition merely define what the money buys? Does it reach the recipient’s own activity beyond the program? And when the money funds private speakers, does government distort what they say?
Conditions Defining the Program
Government may decide what a spending program will pay for, and Rust v. Sullivan is the leading case on that power. Regulations restricted recipients of Title X funds from engaging in abortion counseling, and the Court upheld them as a decision to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.7 The challengers called the regulations an unconstitutional condition: they made the receipt of Title X money depend on giving up the right to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling.8 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion answered that the government “is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”9
The statute’s own vocabulary carries the holding. Title X distinguishes a grantee from a project, and the grantee, normally a health-care organization, may receive funds from many sources for many purposes.10 The regulations govern the scope of the project’s activities and leave the grantee “unfettered in its other activities”: it may still perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and advocate abortion, so long as it does so through programs separate and independent from the funded project.11 The condition attaches to the project, and the recipient as a whole stays unregulated.
Two ideas support that result, and each answers a different worry. The first answers the charge that withholding money penalizes the people who go without it. Declining to fund an activity differs from penalizing it: government may refuse to pay for speech it disagrees with, though it may not use a subsidy to induce recipients to refrain from speech they would otherwise engage in with their own resources.12 Government “can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way,” and by doing so it “has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”13 The refusal to fund anything in connection with abortion fell outside what government had decided to fund, and it took nothing from the doctors, who stayed free to perform abortions and even to advocate them.14
The second idea explains why the regulations demand separation. By requiring the grantee to conduct abortion-related activity apart from funded activity, the Court said, Congress had not denied the grantee the right to engage in that activity. It had “merely refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc,” and the Secretary had “simply required a certain degree of separation from the Title X project in order to ensure the integrity of the federally funded program.”15 The Court offered a simple illustration: Congress could grant funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse and provide that none of the money be used to lobby state legislatures.16
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington applied the same reasoning to the tax code. The Court held that the Code left the organization free to receive deductible contributions for its nonlobbying work and denied it no benefit on account of its intention to lobby, because Congress “has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys.” The Court had never held that Congress must grant a benefit of that kind to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.17 Rust treated Regan and FCC v. League of Women Voters as consistent lessons about separation.18
A later decision stated the test in two clauses. In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., the Court distinguished conditions that “define the limits of the government spending program” from conditions that “seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”19 The decision qualifies Rust’s principle that government may limit the use of its funds: Congress may condition speech within a program it subsidizes, but it cannot leverage its funding to regulate expression outside that program’s limits.20 Applied back to Title X, the test shows where Rust stops. A rule that barred a grantee from abortion counseling in every office and program it runs, including those that receive no Title X money, would run to the recipient and reach protected conduct outside the funded program, whereas the separation requirement upheld in Rust stays inside the project.21
The library filtering case applied the same program-purpose reasoning to a different subsidy. In United States v. American Library Association, Inc., Congress conditioned federal subsidies to public libraries on installing software that blocks internet access to obscenity, child pornography, and indecent material harmful to minors. The libraries argued that the condition made them give up their First Amendment right to provide the public access to protected speech. A plurality of four Justices disagreed: the subsidies were meant to help libraries perform their traditional role of obtaining material of appropriate quality, and Congress may insist that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.22 Because libraries have traditionally excluded pornography from their other collections, Congress could impose a parallel limit on its internet assistance. The plurality distinguished Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, where lawyers represent clients against the government, on the ground that libraries have no comparable role that pits them against the government.23
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights reached a similar result by a different route. The Solomon Amendment denied federal funds to institutions of higher education that gave military recruiters less campus access than other employers received. The law schools objected that the condition forced them to choose between their First Amendment right not to host the recruiters’ message and forfeiting federal funds.24 A unanimous Court disagreed. Congress could have imposed the equal-access requirement directly under its Article I powers to provide for the national defense and to maintain an Army and a Navy, and “[a] funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly.”25 Chief Justice Roberts added that the statute neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything. It regulates what they must do, afford equal access, and leaves them free to express whatever views they hold about the military’s policy.26
Rust and the library case ask what the money is for and find the condition inside that purpose. The law-school case could not give that answer, because the condition reached funding for the whole institution, so it rested on Congress’s power to command the same result directly. Both fit the doctrine’s target, which is leverage: using a benefit to obtain what government could not require outright.27 Where Congress could simply require equal access, the money adds no leverage, and a rule that regulates conduct while leaving the recipient free to say what it wishes about that conduct leaves no First Amendment burden to justify.
Two cautions keep the program-definition rule from swallowing the doctrine. First, the label proves nothing by itself. The Court has acknowledged that the line is hardly clear, because the definition of a program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition, and it has insisted that Congress cannot always recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program, lest the First Amendment become a semantic exercise.28 Second, the project-level rule has contested edges. Rust itself was decided five to four.29 The dissent called the regulations viewpoint based, because they suppressed speech favorable to abortion while requiring projects to facilitate access to prenatal care and adoption services.30 It also warned that the majority’s reasoning would tolerate any restriction on an employee’s speech so long as the restriction was confined to the funded workplace, a proposition the Court has rightly rejected before.31 Even the majority recognized an exception for universities, which it described as a traditional sphere of free expression where conditions on government funds are restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.32
On an exam, the tempting question is whether the condition burdens speech, but every condition in this subsection touches expression, so the question sorts nothing. Ask instead what the condition attaches to. A restriction on how federal money is spent inside the funded project leaves the recipient free to engage in the protected activity through separate programs with its own money, and it survives. A restriction that follows the recipient into its unfunded activities uses the grant as leverage and fails unless Congress could have imposed the same requirement directly.
Conditions Reaching Beyond the Program
The funding cases put one question to every condition: does it specify what Congress will subsidize, or does it leverage the funding to regulate speech outside the program? In Alliance for Open Society, the Court said that a requirement that recipients profess a specific belief “goes beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient.”35 The two kinds of limit operate in different places. A limit on what the grant buys applies only while the money is being spent, and the recipient remains free to say and do as it pleases with its own resources. A limit on what the recipient says or believes follows it into every other setting.
Two features of funding explain why the Court polices this boundary. The first is dependence. The usual answer to an objection to a funding condition is that the objector may decline the money, but the Court has held that government may not deny a benefit on a basis that infringes freedom of speech even when the recipient has no entitlement to the benefit.36 The doctrine therefore does not stop at the observation that a recipient could refuse the grant.37 The second feature is that government has a way to protect its program without reaching beyond it. It can refuse to pay for the disfavored activity and can require that the activity be kept separate from the funded project, which leaves the recipient free to carry it on elsewhere with its own money.38 A condition on the recipient generally removes that room, because the recipient cannot comply on the funded side and still speak freely on the other.
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California shows the failure in its plainest form. The Court applied the doctrine and held that government could not condition funds on a requirement that stations relinquish their right to editorialize.39 The statute barred any noncommercial educational broadcasting station that received a Corporation for Public Broadcasting grant from editorializing, and the Court declared it unconstitutional.40 The ban reached private money because a station cannot segregate its activities by source of funding, so a station that drew only 1% of its income from federal grants was barred from editorializing even with wholly private funds.41 The majority also drew the line this section follows. Congress could decline to fund the part of a station’s budget spent on editorials or candidate endorsements, but it could not punish a station for editorializing by terminating all of its federal funding.42 A rule refusing to pay for editorials defines the program, and a rule cancelling the grant of a station that editorializes with its own money regulates the station.
The Court also identified how a limit of this kind can be written to stay inside the program. A scheme letting stations create affiliates to editorialize with nonfederal funds “would plainly be valid,” because the station could make its views known through the affiliate without losing federal grants for its noneditorializing broadcasts.43 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, defended the total ban on the ground that programming expenses cannot meaningfully be compartmentalized, so that only a ban on all on-the-air editorializing could keep public money from subsidizing management’s views.44 The affiliate is the practical answer to that worry, because separate staff, facilities, and funds give government assurance about its own dollars while leaving the recipient’s speech alone.
The facts of Alliance for Open Society show the same boundary from the compelled-belief side. Congress authorized billions of dollars for nongovernmental organizations fighting HIV/AIDS worldwide, and one condition of receiving the money was that the organization have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.45 A separate, unchallenged provision already barred use of the funds to promote prostitution or sex trafficking, so the policy requirement had to be doing something more. It governed the recipient itself, as an ongoing condition on speech and activities and a ground for terminating a grant.46 The challengers were domestic organizations working overseas against HIV/AIDS. They feared that adopting the policy would alienate host governments, make it harder to work with prostitutes in the fight against the disease, and force them to censor their privately funded publications and conferences.47
The Court held that the requirement compelled “as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.”48 The reason lies in what a belief is. A recipient can keep an activity in a separate program, but it cannot avow a belief while spending grant money and then assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when it acts with its own resources.49 The Court acknowledged that Congress wanted recipients to adopt its stance on prostitution, yet it treated the requirement as compelling a belief as a condition of funding, a different matter from enlisting organizations that already agree with the government.
The Government’s fallback was affiliates. A recipient could accept the funds and comply while an affiliate voiced contrary views, or decline the funds and create an affiliate whose only job was to administer them. Its guidelines tested separation by the totality of the circumstances, including legal separation, separate personnel, separate accounting records, separate facilities, and distinguishing signs.50 Neither arrangement sufficed. Affiliates matter in funding cases because they let a bound recipient exercise its rights outside the federal program, and they cannot do that when the condition is that the recipient espouse a belief as its own. An affiliate distinct from the recipient gives it no means of expressing its beliefs, and an affiliate closely identified with the recipient lets it express them only at the price of evident hypocrisy.51 The Court closed with Justice Jackson’s statement in West Virginia v. Barnette that no official can prescribe what is orthodox in matters of opinion or force citizens to confess their faith in it.52
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, and his objections show what the majority’s line assumes. He saw the policy requirement as a way of selecting suitable agents for the government’s chosen strategy, and he argued that government may enlist those who believe in its ideas without enlisting those who oppose them or merely do not support them.53 The inside-versus-outside distinction mattered in Rust, he said, only because the family-planning program was neutral on abortion, whereas eliminating prostitution was an objective of the AIDS program itself, so any promotion of prostitution, inside or outside the funded work, harmed the program.54 He also doubted that a requirement each organization remains free to accept or reject coerces anyone, and he warned that if government cannot demand a relevant ideological commitment, it cannot choose between applicants on a relevant ideological ground either.55 The majority treated the requirement as an attempt to make the recipient adopt the government’s view as its own, which places it on the regulatory side of the line.56 The dissent is useful because it shows why a required avowal of belief is the hardest condition to defend as a definition of the program.
The doctrine protects a rights-holder, and that point limits who can invoke it. In a later decision in the same litigation, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., the Court held 5–3 that foreign affiliates of American organizations, unlike the American organizations themselves, possess no First Amendment rights, so applying the policy requirement to them does not violate the Constitution.57 The Court observed that it has not allowed foreign citizens outside the United States to assert constitutional rights.58 The plaintiffs argued that the earlier decision had settled the question, but the Court answered that the earlier ruling concerned only the requirement’s application to American organizations, and that the affiliates were foreign organizations with no constitutional rights.59 The holding leaves the 2013 rule intact for American recipients and limits who may claim it.
A problem on this material therefore calls for locating the condition before characterizing it. Every funding condition touches expression, and a recipient can always decline the money, so neither fact sorts anything. The sorting question is where the condition operates. A condition on the funded project leaves room for separation and affiliates, so the recipient can speak elsewhere and the condition survives. A condition on the recipient itself, such as a bar on its privately funded speech or a required avowal of belief, leaves no separate place to speak and fails. The last check is whether the party challenging the condition is a recipient that holds First Amendment rights.
Subsidizing Private Speech
The first two subsections asked what the money buys. This one asks whose speech it buys. Government may speak for itself and may hire others to carry its message, but a program whose point is to let private people say what they think stands on different ground. Forum analysis, which governs restrictions on private speech on public property, drops out when the State speaks on its own behalf.62 When government acts as a patron, funding the speech of others, it may not selectively fund only the views it favors.63
The line falls there because of who answers for the message. When government speaks, the electorate can punish its choices at the polls, and government could not function if it had to carry every view. How could it run a vaccination program while also disseminating the views of those who oppose vaccination?64 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth drew the same contrast between government as speaker, accountable to the electorate and the political process, and a university that merely distributes money to facilitate students’ exchange of ideas and is not responsible for the content.65 A program that pays for many private speakers works differently. The words belong to the speakers, voters have no reason to blame government for them, and the funding decision becomes the only filter. If that filter screens out the views officials dislike, government has used its money to tilt a debate it claims to have opened. The structure of the program therefore decides the question: a subsidy that carries government’s message may carry a viewpoint, and a subsidy that facilitates diverse private views may not.
The restriction in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez barred Legal Services Corporation grantees from any representation involving an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law. As the Corporation read it, a grantee’s lawyer could argue that an agency had misapplied a welfare statute but could not argue that the statute violated a higher law, and the lawyer had to withdraw even when the problem surfaced after the representation was well under way.66 The Court, five to four, held the restriction invalid.67 The majority reasoned that government was taking an existing medium of expression, a lawyer’s advice to a client and advocacy before a court, and controlling it in ways that distort its usual functioning. It added that the restriction threatened the judicial function by insulating existing welfare laws from challenge.68
Two further points show how this rule differs from the program-definition rule. Because a funded lawyer had to withdraw whenever a challenge arose, a client could not arrange joint representation in which a private lawyer raised the challenge while the funded lawyer pressed the permitted arguments, so the advocacy Congress sought to restrict had no alternative channel. And Congress could not simply relabel the restriction as a definition of its program, because no programmatic message was at stake of the kind that let the government in Rust specify the advice it wanted.69
What separates Velazquez from Rust is whose speech the money funds. The Title X counseling carried the program’s own message, with government using private parties to speak it.70 The legal-aid lawyer speaks for a private client, often against the government itself, so the lawyer’s advice and advocacy are not governmental speech, and the program was designed to facilitate private speech rather than promote a governmental message.71 Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, dissented on exactly this point. The doctors in Rust also owed duties to their patients, he said, so if their advice was government speech it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be, and the provision merely declined to subsidize a class of litigation.72 The two cases came out opposite ways, and whether a meaningful distinction separates them is itself contested.73 The label of government speech or private speech can be argued from either side, and the label carries the outcome.
The same question decided Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. The University of Virginia paid the printing costs of independent student publications from its Student Activities Fund, but its regulations withheld funds from groups that promoted or manifested a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality, and on that ground it refused to pay for a student newspaper with a Christian perspective. The Court held the fund a limited public forum and the refusal unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, because providing funds to student publications on a neutral basis is no different than providing access to facilities.74 It set the case apart from Rust as one in which government paid doctors to speak as its agents, whereas the university here was subsidizing private speech.75 A desire to avoid an Establishment Clause problem did not justify the exclusion, since the Court consistently holds that excluding private religious speech from government property or funds for that reason is an impermissible content-based restriction.76 Where Rosenberger turned on a disfavored viewpoint’s exclusion from a fund open to others, Velazquez added that a restriction can fail because it distorts the role of the lawyer and the court.
Not every funding choice among private speakers must be viewpoint neutral, and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley shows why. A 1990 statute required that grants to artists be judged by artistic merit, “taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”77 Justice O’Connor’s opinion upheld the provision against a facial challenge. The challengers had to show a substantial risk that its application would suppress speech and made no such showing, because the provision stopped short of restricting speech and merely added considerations to the selection process.78 The Court also accepted the vague, subjective standards given the inherent difficulty of judging grant applications. It conceded that the terms were “undeniably opaque” but reasoned that when government acts as patron rather than as sovereign, “the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”79 The reason lies in the nature of the program. The Endowment chooses among competing applicants, and judging artistic merit is inherently a content-based exercise that the Court readily accepted, whereas the Virginia fund paid the printing costs of any qualifying student group.80
Finley left the underlying question divided. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that exclusion from a subsidy is not coercive and that viewpoint discrimination in funding is therefore always permissible unless government has established a public forum. Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the statute was adopted because the government disapproved of the messages of certain artists.81 Scalia’s position carries the nonsubsidy half of the penalty distinction to its end, since government may refrain from paying for speech with which it disagrees.82 A selection process can look like a quality judgment to one Justice and like viewpoint discrimination to another. The same question about whose speech is funded divided the Court in the library case: the plurality distinguished Velazquez because libraries have no role that pits them against the government, while Justice Stevens, dissenting, read Rust as reaching only governmental speech and saw the filtering condition as burdening access to private speech.83
Because so much turns on the label, government cannot manufacture the government-speech category by sponsorship or registration alone. In Matal v. Tam, the Court treated Walker, which found Texas specialty license plates to be government speech, as likely marking the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine, and it found none of the three Walker factors present.84 Those factors are whether the medium has long been used to convey government messages, whether the public closely identifies it with the State, and whether the State maintains direct control over the messages.85 A program that merely funds or registers many private messages, without shaping them, will have trouble satisfying those factors.
Two limited-forum decisions show what government may still require of the private speakers it supports. In Southworth, students objected to a mandatory activity fee that funded registered student groups, and the Court held that a public university may charge such a fee to support extracurricular speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.86 Viewpoint neutrality, the standard from the public forum cases, generally protects the objecting students, the Court said, although the student referendum feature of the program appeared inconsistent with it.87 The same standard that keeps a disfavored group from being shut out of the fund also protects the student who must pay, since a program that favors no viewpoint compels no one to support a particular one.
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez applied the idea to conditions on recognition. Hastings required student organizations to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, and the Court held that compliance with that all-comers policy was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum.”88 The Christian group asked for an exemption from a rule that bound every other group, and it had “no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.”89 The contrast with Rosenberger lies in the object of the rule. The Virginia regulation singled out groups by what they believed about a deity, so exclusion rested on viewpoint, while the Hastings condition applied to every group alike, whatever it believed.
The usual exam error is to ask whether the speaker was entitled to the money, a question the doctrine treats as irrelevant. Step one does the sorting, because the same funding choice can be valid when the speech is government’s own and invalid when government is a patron of private speakers.