500 U.S. 173 (1991)
In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a–6, authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make grants to public or nonprofit private entities for the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects offering a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.1
After eighteen years of administration, the Secretary in 1988 promulgated new regulations that prohibit Title X projects from engaging in counseling concerning, referrals for, or activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning.2 The regulations also require such projects to maintain physical and financial separation from any abortion activities.3 They further forbid the use of project funds for abortion-related activities even if separately funded.4
Petitioners, who are Title X grantees and physicians who supervise Title X funds suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, filed two separate actions in federal district court.5 The actions were later consolidated. Petitioners challenged the facial validity of the regulations and sought declaratory and injunctive relief before the regulations had been applied.6
The district court rejected petitioners' statutory and constitutional challenges and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals.9
Whether the 1988 regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services constitute a permissible construction of section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act?10
Because section 1008 is ambiguous as to the Secretary’s authority to prohibit abortion-related activities in Title X projects, the Secretary’s construction of the statute is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, so long as it is a permissible construction of the statute.11
Yes. The language of section 1008 is ambiguous because the words 'where abortion is a method of family planning' do not clearly prohibit counseling, referral, or advocacy.12 The legislative history is inconclusive on the issue.13 The Secretary's interpretation banning such activities within Title X projects and requiring physical and financial separation is a permissible construction.14
It reasonably ensures that Title X funds are not used for prohibited purposes.15
The regulations are a permissible construction of the statute.16
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Justice Stevens dissented on statutory grounds.17 He concluded that the 1970 Act did not authorize the Secretary to censor the speech of grant recipients or their employees.18 The prohibition in section 1008 is directed at conduct rather than the dissemination of information or advice by potential grant recipients.19
The original regulations promulgated in 1971 interpreted the statute as prohibiting conduct, not speech.20 This contemporaneous construction of the statute by the officials charged with setting its machinery in motion is entitled to particular respect.21 Stevens would have held the challenged regulations invalid and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this basis alone, without reaching the constitutional questions.22
Whether the regulations violate the First Amendment rights of Title X project employees and clients by imposing viewpoint-based restrictions on speech?23
The Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize the exercise of the freedom of speech.24 The regulations do not violate the First Amendment by imposing viewpoint-based restrictions on the speech of Title X project employees.25 They are reasonably related to the statute’s purpose of prohibiting the use of Title X funds for abortion-related activities and do not affirmatively restrict the project from engaging in abortion-related speech when it is separately funded.26
No. The regulations do not prohibit the project from engaging in abortion-related speech when it is separately funded.27 They merely prohibit the use of Title X funds for such speech.28 The regulations do not interfere with the doctor-patient relationship because they do not prohibit the doctor from discussing abortion in the context of a medical emergency or in response to a patient’s specific medical condition.29
The regulations do not violate the First Amendment.30
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Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented on First Amendment grounds.31 He concluded that the regulations impose viewpoint-based restrictions upon protected speech.32 The regulations suppress speech favorable to abortion while compelling antiabortion speech.33
The Government may not base its decision to fund or not to fund on ideological viewpoint.34 Such restrictions are aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.35 They go beyond narrow lobbying limitations approved in prior cases.36
Blackmun would have invalidated the regulations on this basis and reversed the divided-vote judgment of the Court of Appeals.37
Whether the regulations violate the Fifth Amendment by imposing an undue burden on a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy?38
The regulations do not violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy.39 They do not impose an undue burden on that right.40 They do not prohibit a woman from obtaining an abortion and do not place any governmental obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.41 The Government has no duty to subsidize the exercise of the right to choose abortion.42
No. The regulations do not prohibit a woman from obtaining an abortion and do not place any governmental obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.43 The regulations’ prohibition on the use of Title X funds for abortion counseling and referral does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the Government has no affirmative duty to commit resources to facilitating abortions.44
The regulations do not violate the Fifth Amendment.45
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Justice O’Connor dissented in part on statutory and constitutional grounds.46 She concluded that the regulations raise serious constitutional problems by placing content-based restrictions on speech.47
The Court should construe the statute to avoid such problems unless the construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.48 O’Connor would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on statutory grounds alone to avoid deciding the constitutional questions unnecessarily.49