Concept
Job-Related Exceptions
Licenses or benefits
Job-Related Exceptions
The rule from the previous section protects a teacher refused a job for belonging to a lawful party, and it stops where government's interest as an employer begins. Public employment may not be conditioned on relinquishing speech or association rights.1 The question in any given case is how far the state's needs as an employer reach, and Pickering v. Board of Education framed it as a balance between the employee's interest, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the government's interest, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.2
Two exceptions apply that balance to political activity and political affiliation, and both ask the same thing: does what government points to bear on how the job is done? If it does, government is managing its workforce. If it does not, government is punishing belief. That question keeps the exceptions narrow. The first lets government require civil servants to choose between their jobs and active partisan campaigning, the setting of the federal Hatch Act. The second lets government fill some positions on the basis of party affiliation, because affiliation can be an appropriate requirement for doing them well.3
Neither exception governs what employees say in the course of their work. Statements made pursuant to official duties are not citizen speech, and the First Amendment does not protect the employee from discipline for them. Garcetti v. Ceballos.4 That inquiry looks at what the employee said and in what capacity. The exceptions below look at whether partisan activity or party affiliation bears on the job itself.
Partisan Political Activity
The federal Hatch Act prohibits federal employees from taking an active role in political campaigns, and in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers the Court found an obvious and compelling governmental interest behind that prohibition.5 The interest is preserving a nonpartisan government work force, and Letter Carriers indicates that certain modes of actively expressing partisan political belief may be banned to protect it.6 A civil servant may therefore be required to choose between the job and active campaigning, which is the result of the Hatch Act line of decisions that includes United Public Workers v. Mitchell as well as Letter Carriers.
That result looks at first like a departure from the previous section, because campaigning for a party is lawful expression and association. The difference lies in the capacity in which government acts. A private citizen who campaigns is not part of the government's work force, so the interest that justifies the ban has nothing to attach to. A civil servant is part of that work force, and the ban is a condition on holding the job.
The same reasoning marks the exception's limit. Letter Carriers permits banning certain modes of actively expressing partisan belief, while Pickering and Elrod v. Burns establish that political beliefs, and their reasonable expression, are not subject to the dictates of the government employer.7 Regulations of employee speech must also be narrowly drawn to serve the objectives of effective government without intruding unnecessarily into the private associations and beliefs of employees.8 An employee keeps the vote, the party membership, and the opinions, and gives up only the active campaign role.
Speech on public issues sits on the protected side of the line when it is not active campaigning. A public employee has a First Amendment right, in certain circumstances, to speak out as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Compare Connick v. Myers, where the firing was valid because the employee had been insubordinate, with Rankin v. McPherson, where the firing was invalid because the employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern.9 The Hatch Act employee faces the job-or-campaign choice because of what she does, taking an active role in a partisan campaign. The speaker's claim is analyzed under the Pickering balance, and the employee prevails when the employer cannot show that the speech undermines the efficiency of the service.10 Students often treat everything political that an employee does as a single category. The first question is whether the conduct is active participation in a partisan campaign, which the employer may make the employee choose against, or the holding and expression of views, which the employer must justify under that balance.
Patronage Appointments
The general rule runs against patronage, the practice of filling public jobs with supporters of the party in power. One may not be excluded from public employment on the basis of political affiliation unless the proscribed organization is truly subversive, and the Court, without a majority opinion, emphasized that rule in Elrod v. Burns. The case invalidated political patronage dismissals by the Democratic sheriff of Cook County. The respondents were Republicans discharged or threatened with discharge because they were Republicans, and their discharge had nothing to do with membership in any subversive organization.13
Branti v. Finkel supplies the test for when affiliation may matter. The Court held that a state official may not terminate a public defender for purely political grounds. Any policymaking role the defender has is unrelated to partisan political interests, the confidential information he holds comes from the attorney-client relationship and has no partisan dimension, and making his tenure depend on affiliation would not advance the effective performance of his duties.14 The question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."15 The burden sits on the official, and the inquiry looks to what the job demands. A label does not settle it. Branti explained that a state's election laws could require two election judges, each representing one of the two main parties, even though election supervision involves neither policymaking nor confidential information.16 The public defender shows the reverse: a job with some policymaking content is not open to patronage when affiliation has no bearing on how it is performed.
The mechanism is straightforward. An elected official's interest in loyal subordinates is an interest in having his program carried out and voiced as the voters chose it. Where the employee's work consists of shaping or voicing that program, affiliation bears on performance, and a governor's speech-writer is the standard example of a position for which the government may demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate and necessary requirement.17 Where the work is the same whichever party holds office, affiliation has no connection to performance, and a patronage rule accomplishes nothing except penalizing association.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois decided whether the rule stops at dismissals. Justice Brennan, for the Court, held that related patronage practices involving low-level public employees (hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall after layoff) also may not constitutionally be based on party affiliation and support. "Unless these patronage practices are narrowly tailored to further vital government interests, we must conclude that they impermissibly encroach on First Amendment freedoms."18 The principle thus covers hiring, promotion, transfer, and reinstatement of most regular government employees.19 A governor who reserves clerical posts for his own party's supporters falls within it, whether the decision is called hiring, promotion, transfer, or recall.
The rule does not give public employees tenure. A public employee cannot secure tenure by undermining and criticizing her superiors and disrupting office morale.20 The exception for policymaking and confidential positions also remains available where affiliation is an appropriate requirement.21
The same reasoning reaches contractors outside the payroll. In O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, the Court observed that if the plaintiff towing operator had been a public employee whose job was to perform tow truck operations, the city could not have discharged him for refusing to contribute to the mayor's campaign or for supporting his opponent. It refused to accept that those who perform the government's work outside the formal employment relationship are subject to that abridgment of First Amendment rights.22 Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr is read with the same caution. Litigants should not read these cases too broadly, because case-by-case adjudication leaves government appropriate discretion in awarding contracts. There is no First Amendment violation if the government ends its affiliation with a contractor for reasons unrelated to free speech, such as unreliability, so long as the justification is not a pretext or the contractor's affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the job.23
A patronage problem on an exam therefore starts from the work the position involves. If the work is shaping or voicing the official's own program, affiliation may be an appropriate requirement. If the work is the same under either party, the job may not be reserved for the party in power, whether the decision is to hire, promote, transfer, recall, or dismiss.