427 U.S. 347 (1976)
In December 1970, the Sheriff of Cook County, a Republican, was replaced by Richard Elrod, a Democrat.1 At that time, respondents, all Republicans, were employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office.2 They were non-civil-service employees and therefore not covered by any statute, ordinance, or regulation protecting them from arbitrary discharge.3
One respondent, John Burns, was Chief Deputy of the Process Division and supervised all departments of the Sheriff's Office working on the seventh floor of the building housing that office.4 Frank Vargas was a bailiff and security guard at the Juvenile Court of Cook County.5 Fred L. Buckley was employed as a process server in the office.6 Joseph Dennard was an employee in the office.7
It has been the practice of the Sheriff of Cook County, when he assumes office from a Sheriff of a different political party, to replace non-civil-service employees of the Sheriff's Office with members of his own party when the existing employees lack or fail to obtain requisite support from, or fail to affiliate with, that party.8 Consequently, subsequent to Sheriff Elrod's assumption of office, respondents, with the exception of Buckley, were discharged from their employment solely because they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders.9 Buckley is in imminent danger of being discharged solely for the same reasons.10 Respondents allege that the discharges were ordered by Sheriff Elrod under the direction of the codefendants in this suit.11
Respondents brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against petitioners, Richard J. Elrod, Richard J. Daley, the Democratic Organization of Cook County, and the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County.12 Their complaint alleged that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party.13 They sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988.14 Finding that the respondents failed to make an adequate showing of irreparable injury, the District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, relying on Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (CA7 1972), reversed and remanded, holding that respondents' complaint stated a legally cognizable claim. The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court to enter appropriate preliminary injunctive relief.16 509 F.2d 1133 (1975). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17 423 U.S. 821.
Whether public employees who allege that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?18
The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with the right of the people to associate together for the advancement of political beliefs.19 An individual's freedom of association is a basic constitutional freedom that lies at the foundation of a free society.20 The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic freedom.21 Patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association and therefore must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.22 The government bears the burden to demonstrate that the practice furthers a vital governmental end by means least restrictive of freedom of belief and association, and that the benefit gained outweighs the loss of constitutionally protected rights.23
Yes. The respondents were non-civil-service employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office.24 They were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party.25 They had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders after a Democratic sheriff replaced a Republican incumbent.26 This practice conditions continued public employment on political affiliation and belief.27 It directly coerces respondents to pledge allegiance to the Democratic Party, work for its candidates, or contribute wages to retain their positions.28 Such coercion infringes the freedoms of belief and association protected by the First Amendment and incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.29
The established facts demonstrate that the discharges occurred without reference to job performance or cause and rested exclusively on partisan grounds, triggering the precise form of restraint the Constitution forbids.30 Less restrictive alternatives remain available, including discharge for insubordination or poor performance when those bases in fact exist.31 These alternatives render the wholesale patronage practice unnecessary to achieve governmental effectiveness or employee efficiency.32
Public employees who allege that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation therefore state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.33 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds limited to nonpolicymaking employees.35 He agreed that the First Amendment prohibits the dismissal of a public employee for partisan political reasons and that the decision is controlled by the principles announced in Perry v. Sindermann and Board of Regents v. Roth.36 A public employee may not be discharged for exercising rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.37
He would not, however, go as far as the plurality in suggesting that the practice of patronage is unconstitutional in all its applications.38 The question whether patronage hiring or other aspects of the patronage system are constitutional is not before the Court.39 He concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that a nonpolicymaking public employee may not be discharged solely because of his political beliefs.40
Chief Justice Burger dissented, viewing the decision as a significant intrusion into the area of state and local government.41 The practice of political patronage has been followed for nearly two centuries and has played an important role in the American political system.42 The Constitution does not prohibit the States from using political affiliation as a criterion for the selection and retention of public employees.43
The majority's decision will have far-reaching consequences for the operation of state and local governments.44 The patronage system has served to promote political stability and to encourage participation in the political process.45 By striking down this long-accepted practice, the Court has substituted its own judgment for that of the elected representatives of the people.46
The Illinois Legislature has pointedly decided that roughly half of the Sheriff's staff shall be made up of tenured career personnel and the balance left exclusively to the choice of the elected head of the department.47
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissented, concluding that the Court holds unconstitutional a practice as old as the Republic that has contributed significantly to the democratization of American politics.48 Patronage hiring practices have contributed to American democracy by stimulating political activity and by strengthening parties, thereby helping to make government accountable.49 It cannot be questioned seriously that these contributions promote important state interests.50
The plurality opinion disparages the contribution of patronage hiring practices in advancing these state interests without analysis.51 In many communities the sheriff's duties are as routine as process serving, and election campaigns for lesser offices usually attract little attention from the media.52 Traditional patronage practices contribute significantly to the democratic process at the local level by enabling party organizations to persist and function.53
History and long-prevailing practice across the country support the view that patronage hiring practices make a sufficiently substantial contribution to the practical functioning of our democratic system to support their relatively modest intrusion on First Amendment interests.54