Concept
Employment and Constitutional Rights
Public employment
Public Employee Speech and Oaths
Employment and Constitutional Rights
A State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. Connick v. Myers called that rule settled and cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents, Pickering v. Board of Education, Perry v. Sindermann, and Branti v. Finkel in support.1 The rest of this chapter rests on that premise, which is newer and harder won than it looks. No one has a free-standing right to a government job, and the government may decline to hire or may dismiss for a great many reasons. What the modern rule takes away is a short list of those reasons, and punishing protected expression is on the list.
The premise once ran the other way. Holmes, then sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, supplied the epigram in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford: a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."2 The reasoning is short. The government controls the job, so it sets the terms on which the job is offered, and a person with no right to the position cannot object when the terms include silence. That reasoning expressed the Court's own law for many years, in decisions such as Adler v. Board of Education and Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works.3
The Court wore the dogma down in a series of loyalty-oath decisions, among them Wieman v. Updegraff. By the time of Sherbert v. Verner, it was "too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." It was therefore no surprise when Keyishian invalidated New York statutes that barred public employment on the basis of membership in "subversive" organizations. The Court observed that the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, had been uniformly rejected.4
The obvious reply to all of this is that an employee who dislikes a condition can resign. A dissent in Rust v. Sullivan shows why the reply fails. It has never been sufficient to justify an otherwise unconstitutional condition on public employment that the employee may escape the condition by relinquishing the job, and a government "may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment."5 The reply proves too much. Every employee can resign, so if resignation cured a condition, no condition on employment could ever be challenged, and Holmes's epigram would return under a new name. Because the passage comes from a dissent, it is not a holding. Its value is that it quotes Abood, a majority opinion, for the principle.
Two practical facts reinforce the doctrine. The public workforce, whether federal, state, or local, is now enormous, and a hands-off judicial policy would leave too large a slice of the population with no constitutional protection.6 The public also has its own stake. As the Court put it in San Diego v. Roe, if public employees could not speak about the operation of their employers, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues, and the interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's right to disseminate it.7
None of this strips the government of its authority as an employer. A citizen who enters government service must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom, because, as a plurality said in Waters v. Churchill, "the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign."8 The reason is practical. Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions, and without it there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services. Government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter. Public employees also often hold trusted positions, and when they speak out they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the performance of governmental functions. Against those needs stands the recognition that a citizen who works for the government is still a citizen, who must face only those speech restrictions necessary for the employer to operate efficiently and effectively when speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.9 The First Amendment therefore invests public employees with certain rights, but it does not empower them to "constitutionalize the employee grievance."10
Connick described the resulting task, as Pickering had defined it, as seeking a balance between the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.11
The two scenes differ in the basis for the State's action. The pledge reaches an employee because of expression, and the dismissal reaches an employee because of absences. The employee's lack of a right to the job is irrelevant to both, and the question that matters is what the State is penalizing. The employer's need for control enters the analysis at the next step, as a weight in the balance, and it is no reason to skip the inquiry.
Two questions follow from the premise. The first is when an employer may discipline an employee for speech. The answer begins with the Pickering balance and then asks whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, whether the speech was made pursuant to official duties, and how retaliatory motive is proved. The second is when a State may demand a loyalty oath as a condition of hire.