511 U.S. 661 (1994)
Cheryl Churchill worked as a nurse in the obstetrics department at McDonough District Hospital, which was operated by petitioners including the State of Illinois and hospital officials Cynthia Waters, Kathleen Davis, and Stephen Hopper.1 On January 16, 1987, during a dinner break at work, Churchill spoke with Melanie Perkins-Graham, another nurse considering a transfer to the obstetrics department, and the conversation was partially overheard by nurses Mary Lou Ballew and Jean Welty and by Dr. Thomas Koch, the clinical head of obstetrics.2
A few days later, Ballew reported to Waters that Churchill had taken Perkins-Graham aside for at least twenty minutes to criticize Waters and describe how bad things were in obstetrics, causing Perkins-Graham to lose interest in the transfer, after which Waters and Davis interviewed Perkins-Graham, who confirmed that Churchill had made unkind and inappropriate negative comments about Waters and Davis, and they also interviewed Ballew a second time for confirmation.3
Churchill's account differed because she stated that the conversation had primarily concerned the hospital's cross-training policy, which she believed was designed only to cover staff shortages and threatened patient care, and she had defended Waters while encouraging Perkins-Graham to transfer; Koch's and Welty's recollections matched Churchill's version, although Churchill had previously complained about the cross-training policy to Davis and Waters.4 Waters and Davis never spoke with Koch or Welty, and after receiving the reports the hospital discharged Churchill.5
Churchill filed an internal grievance, Hopper met with Churchill to hear her side of the story, reviewed the written reports from Waters and Davis, and directed Bernice Magin to interview Ballew one more time before denying the grievance.6 Churchill then sued petitioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.7 The district court granted summary judgment to petitioners.8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether the Connick test for determining whether a public employee's speech is protected must be applied to the speech as the government employer reasonably believed it to be, rather than to what the trier of fact ultimately determines was actually said?11
The Connick/Pickering balancing test is applied to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be after a reasonable investigation.12 The government's interest in efficient operation as employer receives greater weight than when acting as sovereign, allowing discipline based on a reasonable belief that speech was disruptive even if the actual speech differed.13
Yes. Waters and Davis interviewed Ballew and Perkins-Graham and reasonably believed Churchill's speech consisted of disruptive criticism of management and the cross-training policy that caused Perkins-Graham to lose interest in transferring and undermined authority.14 The hospital's interest in preventing such disruption in the obstetrics department outweighs Churchill's interest in the speech as reasonably believed.15 Hopper reviewed the reports and met with Churchill before denying the grievance, confirming the belief was reasonable.16
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the inquiry as to the protected status of Churchill's speech must turn on what her speech actually was, as determined by a jury.17
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded because the hospital could properly act on its reasonable belief that the speech was unprotected.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Souter joins the plurality but emphasizes that the employer must actually believe the third-party report after a reasonable investigation.19 A public employer violates the Free Speech Clause by invoking a third-party report to penalize an employee when the employer believes or genuinely suspects that the employee's speech was protected.20 This respects the balance between the employer's interest in accomplishing its mission and the employee's interest in speaking on matters of public concern.21
The threat of dismissal from public employment is a potent means of inhibiting speech.22 An employer who doubts the report's accuracy or uses it as pretext for disciplining believed protected speech cannot assert a legitimate interest strong enough to justify chilling protected expression.23
Joined by Kennedy And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment but disagrees with the plurality's reasoning that the Pickering balance should be applied to the speech the employer reasonably believed the employee uttered.24 In his view, this approach is unworkable and provides insufficient protection for public employees' speech. The proper approach is to determine first whether the speech that the employee actually uttered is protected under Pickering.25 If it is, then the employee cannot be disciplined for it.26 The plurality's approach would allow the government to escape liability by claiming a reasonable belief that the speech was unprotected even if the speech was in fact protected.27 This would chill protected speech.28
He would hold that the First Amendment protects the employee if the speech that she actually made was on a matter of public concern and the Pickering balance favors the employee.29 The question of what the employee actually said should be a question for the jury. He concurs in the judgment because even on the facts as alleged by Churchill, her speech was not protected under Pickering. The statements were made in the workplace, were disruptive, and did not address a matter of public concern in the manner required by Connick.
Whether the factual question of what the employee actually said must be submitted to a jury for decision?30
No. The only factual dispute concerned what Churchill actually said during the dinner break conversation with Perkins-Graham.33 The hospital's reasonable belief based on Ballew's and Perkins-Graham's reports is what matters for applying the Connick test and conducting the Pickering balance.34 The court decides the balance as a matter of law once the reasonable belief is established.35
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that the question whether Churchill's speech was protected must be submitted to a jury.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Kennedy And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment but disagrees with the plurality's reasoning that the Pickering balance should be applied to the speech the employer reasonably believed the employee uttered. In his view this approach is unworkable and provides insufficient protection for public employees' speech because the proper approach is to determine first whether the speech that the employee actually uttered is protected under Pickering.37 If it is, then the employee cannot be disciplined for it.
The plurality's approach would allow the government to escape liability by claiming a reasonable belief that the speech was unprotected even if the speech was in fact protected. This would chill protected speech. He would hold that the First Amendment protects the employee if the speech that she actually made was on a matter of public concern and the Pickering balance favors the employee.
The question of what the employee actually said should be a question for the jury, and the Court of Appeals was correct to remand for a jury determination of what Churchill actually said.38 However, he concurs in the judgment because even on the facts as alleged by Churchill her speech was not protected under Pickering since the statements were made in the workplace, were disruptive, and did not address a matter of public concern in the manner required by Connick.39
Whether a public employer must conduct a particular form of investigation before disciplining an employee on the basis of speech?40
A public employer must reach its conclusion about the speech in good faith and reasonably rather than as pretext, but no particular investigative procedure such as interviewing every witness or following evidentiary rules is constitutionally required.41 The employer need only exercise the care a reasonable manager would use before making the employment decision.42
No. Waters and Davis interviewed Perkins-Graham and Ballew twice.43 Hopper met with Churchill during the grievance process.44 Magin re-interviewed Ballew.45 This process produced a reasonable belief that the speech was disruptive without requiring further interviews of Koch or Welty.46 The First Amendment does not mandate procedures that mirror judicial evidentiary rules or require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.47
A public employer is not required to conduct any particular form of investigation before disciplining an employee on the basis of speech.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Blackmun, J.
Justice Stevens dissents and would require the government to make a reasonable investigation into what the employee actually said before disciplining for speech.49 He argues that the plurality's approach permits punishment of protected speech based on a mistaken but reasonable belief.50 The First Amendment protects the right of public employees to speak on matters of public concern without fear of retaliation.51
The plurality's approach would allow government employers to insulate themselves from liability by conducting a cursory investigation and then claiming a reasonable belief that the speech was disruptive.52 This will have a chilling effect on employee speech.53 The proper rule is that the government must make a reasonable investigation into what the employee actually said before it can discipline the employee for speech.54 If the speech was protected, the employee cannot be fired for it.55 The plurality's balancing test further erodes employee rights by giving great deference to the government's prediction of disruption without demanding actual disruption.56