Concept
Shielding Minors From Speech
Public school students
Shielding Minors From Speech
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union struck down a federal statute that criminalized transmitting "indecent" or "patently offensive" messages to minors over the Internet. The Court reasoned that, without effective age-screening "gateway" technologies, the statute operated as a total ban on that speech for adults too, and so unduly burdened their First Amendment right to receive it.
The statute named minors as its target, but its reach was wider. A speaker online cannot easily tell whether a reader is twelve or forty. An adult who posts a frank message to an open forum cannot know who will read it, so a rule keyed to what is unsuitable for a child follows the message to every recipient, including adults with a constitutional right to receive it. That gap between target and reach makes Reno the anchor for this part of the chapter, which asks how far the interest in protecting children carries a content-based restriction.
The analysis follows a pattern already visible in Barnette. West Virginia invoked national unity, an end the Court accepted as one officials may pursue by persuasion and example, and the case turned on whether compulsion was a permissible means of reaching it. Reno runs the same inquiry with a different end. Courts readily recognize the aim of shielding children from harmful material, so the analysis passes quickly over the aim and asks whether the chosen tool restricts only what the aim can justify. What the government does to the speaker also differs: Barnette involved a command to affirm a belief, Reno a criminal prohibition on communication. In both, the worthiness of the end cannot by itself excuse an intrusion on expression.
The subsections below take up that inquiry in order. The first sets out what the government legitimately claims when it invokes the interest in protecting minors, and which decisions recognize it. The next presents the Communications Decency Act and explains why it operates as a content-based ban. The two after that show why Ginsberg and Pacifica, the Government's earlier precedents, do not rescue it; the second of them also takes up Renton and the nature of the medium. The discussion then turns to the burden the Act places on adult speech, which is the core of the holding, and to the vagueness and overbreadth problems in its undefined terms. It next examines the defenses and less restrictive alternatives the Government offered. The last subsection presents the separate opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who read the Act as an attempt to zone cyberspace and so reached a partly different result.
Carry one test through all of them: a legitimate end puts the government's chosen means under examination, and those means must reach the harm the end identifies without sweeping in protected speech.
The Interest in Protecting Minors
Every statute in this part of the chapter invokes the same goal, protecting children, and the Court has repeatedly recognized that goal as a legitimate governmental interest.1 Recognition does not end the analysis. In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court paired it with a limit: the interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.2 Ginsberg v. New York and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation supply the recognition. The adult audience supplies the limit.
The limit follows from how a rule aimed at minors operates. The rule binds speakers, and a speaker’s audience usually includes adults, who keep a constitutional right to receive protected speech. If the aim of protecting children could by itself justify cutting speech down to what suits children, almost no adult communication would be safe, because almost any message can be defended as something a child should not see. Hence the Court’s insistence that the Government may not “reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”3
Sable Communications v. FCC shows the same limit at work on legislative judgment. Sable refused to defer to Congress’s view that nothing less than a total ban would keep enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent communications. It thereby made clear that enacting a speech regulation for the important purpose of protecting children from sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.4 That inquiry reflects an “overarching commitment” to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose “without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.”5 In Sable the answer turned on the record. The Court said that the congressional record contained no legislative findings that would justify concluding that no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, could achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors.6
The first question about any child-protective law is what kind of speech it reaches, because the answer sets the baseline. Obscenity is completely unprotected, while pornography, meaning sexually explicit speech that is not legally obscene, is entitled to constitutional protection.7 Reno applied the same line to indecency. Sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene is protected, and the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify suppressing it. Pacifica itself said as much when it admonished that society’s finding speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.8 Cohen v. California is the familiar illustration of that principle for offensive language. The result is a three-way sort: obscenity is unprotected, indecent or offensive expression is protected, and children enter the analysis in two ways. They can move the obscenity line for sales to minors, and they supply the interest the government invokes when it regulates protected speech.
Ginsberg illustrates the first way, because it moves the obscenity line itself. The Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited selling to minors under 17 material considered obscene as to them even if not obscene to adults.9 Ginsberg established that minors may constitutionally be denied access to material that is obscene as to minors. Under its test, material qualifies if it is patently offensive to prevailing adult standards with respect to what is suitable for minors, appeals to the prurient interest of minors, and is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.10 The statute adjusted the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech so that a definition designed for adults was not uncritically applied to children.11 It was also narrow in two respects Reno later stressed. It did not bar parents who so desired from buying the magazines for their children, and it applied only to commercial transactions. The CDA, by contrast, was not limited by parental consent or participation and contained no commercial limitation.12 A later subsection returns to this comparison.
Pacifica shows the second way, in which the interest works through the setting in which speech is delivered. The Court started from the premise that, of all forms of communication, broadcasting had received the most limited First Amendment protection. It concluded that the ease with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, “coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg,” justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting.13 The opinion was narrow and stressed broadcasting’s pervasive presence and its inability to exclude children from the audience. A broadcast that might be permissible at midnight was inappropriate in the middle of the afternoon, when children were likely to be listening.14 The FCC had framed its own approach in nuisance terms: the law “generally speaks to channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it,” and the agency aimed to channel patently offensive but non-obscene language to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed.15 Pacifica therefore stands for channeling, not for the proposition that indecency may be proscribed, even in broadcasting.16
New York v. Ferber involves a different kind of material altogether. Like obscenity, child pornography is a category of unprotected speech.17 The Court rested the category less on the low value of the speech than on the severe harm that flows from child abuse and the need to secure effective state regulatory power over it.18 That rationale takes the material outside the First Amendment altogether. It does not weaken protection for speech that merely offends or that a child might happen to see, so Ferber gives no support for suppressing protected expression addressed to adults.
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association marks the edge of the interest, in a case where the protective aim was plain and the target was minors alone. California barred the sale of violent video games to minors, and Ginsberg did not rescue the law. The Court explained that the California Act does not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. California also did not claim it could prohibit selling offensively violent works to adults.19 Without that footing, the State had to defend a new restriction on protected speech, and the Court was clear about what its protective power does not include. Minors “are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection,” and a State’s legitimate power to protect children from harm does not include a “free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”20
Because the Act restricted the content of protected speech, it could stand only if the State showed a compelling interest and a narrowly drawn means of serving it, and California did not carry that burden. Reno and Brown therefore limit the interest from two directions. Reno protects the adult audience that a children-focused rule would sweep in, and Brown protects the minors themselves, whose access to non-obscene material the State cannot cut off on its own view of which ideas are suitable for them.
The usual error is to treat the phrase “protecting children” as the end of the analysis. The phrase gets the government in the door. It does not carry the statute, which must still accomplish its purpose without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.25 The subsections that follow show how the CDA’s means reached more speech than its aim required.
The CDA as a Content-Based Ban
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union turned on a question of classification: what kind of speech law was the Communications Decency Act of 1996? Congress enacted the CDA to protect minors from “indecent” and “patently offensive” communications on the Internet, and the Court held two of its provisions, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d)(1)(B), unconstitutional.28 The preceding subsection explained why the protective aim is legitimate, but a legitimate aim does not set the level of scrutiny. The label a court attaches to the restriction does that, and the Court's label for the CDA was content-based blanket restriction. The statute's text, the record on the Internet, and the zoning cases each lead to that label.
Each challenged provision punishes a different act. The transmission provision prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18.29 The display provision prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner available to a person under 18, and it defines the covered message as one that depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.30 A speaker therefore violates the first provision by sending something to a minor, but violates the second merely by posting material where a minor could reach it. A violator “shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”31 With prison on the table, every doubt about coverage pushes a speaker away from the line, and that pressure on protected speech is why the statute's breadth matters.
The CDA softened its prohibitions with two affirmative defenses.32 One covers those who restrict access to covered material by requiring designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code.33 A defense of this kind leaves the conduct inside the statute and excuses the defendant afterward, so the speaker faces prosecution first and invokes the defense second. The Court concluded that the defenses burden speech by forcing content providers to forgo the anonymity the Internet provides and to bear significant costs of developing age verification technology; a later subsection develops that point.34
The case reached the Court as a facial challenge. A number of plaintiffs sued to challenge the provisions on their face, a second suit by 27 additional plaintiffs followed, and the two cases were consolidated before a three-judge District Court convened under § 561 of the CDA.35 After an evidentiary hearing, that court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of both provisions; each judge wrote separately, but the judgment was unanimous.36 The injunction's scope differed by provision. As to the transmission provision, it blocked enforcement only against “indecent” communications and expressly preserved the Government's right to investigate and prosecute obscenity and child pornography. The injunction against the display provision was unqualified because that provision never mentions either category.37 The preserved category is serious conduct, and a chat-room case shows what it looks like: the defendant posted a hyperlink that led to seven pictures of actual children, aged roughly 5 to 15, engaged in sexually explicit conduct.38 The Supreme Court affirmed. It discussed vagueness because vagueness bears on the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, but it affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue.39
Overbreadth supplied the doctrinal vehicle, and the CDA fit it. Under that doctrine a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. Courts treat the doctrine as strong medicine, a last resort, and demand overbreadth that is substantial both in an absolute sense and relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.40 The Court found the CDA's breadth wholly unprecedented, because the statute effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.41
The record on the medium shows how one statute could reach so far. The number of host computers grew from about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by 1996, roughly 40 million people used the Internet at the time of the trial, and the opinion describes the Internet as a democratic medium.42 Both sections applied to all commercial and noncommercial uses, including e-mail, chat rooms, and Web pages, so they covered the whole medium and not a slice of it.43 And a speaker in most of those settings could not tell who was reading, because no effective way existed to determine the age of a user of e-mail, newsgroups, or chat rooms.44 A rule keyed to the age of the audience therefore could not stay confined to minors. It fell on adults as well.
With the statute and the record in view, the classification follows. The Court held that the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech and, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.45 Each word of the label does work. A law is content-based when it regulates speech by the substance of the message, and the CDA's triggers, “indecent” and “patently offensive,” can be answered only by reading the message and judging what it says.46 Those triggers are also elastic. A speaker could not confidently assume that a serious discussion of birth control, homosexuality, or prison rape would escape them, so the statute silenced some speakers whose messages were entitled to constitutional protection.47 The ban is a blanket because it reached the entire medium and every kind of use.
The label carries a consequence. Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and receive strict scrutiny, the highest form of judicial review, while content-neutral laws receive intermediate scrutiny.48 Under strict scrutiny the government must justify the law by showing narrowly tailored or necessary means to achieve a compelling interest.49 The Court held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for content-based regulation of the Internet and that the lesser standards used for broadcasting do not apply, a point a later subsection takes up.50
The Government's best argument for a gentler standard came from the zoning cases, and those cases mark exactly where the line falls. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. upheld a city's requirement that adult theaters concentrate in designated areas, and Young v. American Mini Theatres upheld dispersal of such theaters to avoid a red-light district. Those ordinances receive lenient review because they target the secondary effects of adult businesses on a neighborhood, such as blight, which exist whether or not any patron is moved by what the films say. A zoning rule also governs where a business may operate and leaves the speech available to willing audiences. The CDA rested on the opposite justification. It applied across the whole Internet instead of one district, and its aim was to protect children from what a message does to the person who reads or views it. A law justified by the effect of content on its audience cannot borrow the secondary-effects standard, so the Court classified the CDA as a content-based blanket restriction.51 The leniency depends on that justification, not on the sexual subject matter. A rule that forced political bookstores to sit 1,000 feet apart because patrons might clash over the books' messages would rest on the messages' effect on their audience, and it would draw strict scrutiny like any other content-based rule.52
The classification fixes the burden. Because the CDA is content-based, the Government had to satisfy strict scrutiny, and the Court agreed with the District Court that the statute is unconstitutional.53 On an exam, ask what triggers liability. If liability turns on whether a message is “indecent” or “patently offensive,” the rule is content-based and draws strict scrutiny whatever its protective motive. A rule that keeps adult businesses away from schools to control blight is analyzed differently, because its justification does not depend on what the speech says. The result leaves obscenity and child pornography open to prosecution while protecting indecent speech that is not obscene.54
Ginsberg Distinguished
Consider a father who e-mails birth control information to his 17-year-old college freshman. Under the CDA he could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community found the material “indecent” or “patently offensive,” if the college town's community thought otherwise.56 The Court used that example to show how far the CDA went beyond the New York law the Government offered as its model.
The Government argued that the CDA was like the law upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, which prohibited the sale of material “harmful to minors” to persons under 17 and defined that phrase narrowly.57 The Court rejected the comparison. In four important respects, the statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA: it left parents free to buy the material for their children, it reached only commercial transactions, it confined “harmful to minors” to material utterly without redeeming social importance for minors, and it defined a minor as a person under 17.58
Ginsberg itself supplies the baseline. The New York statute prohibited selling to minors under 17 material that was considered obscene as to them even if not obscene for adults.59 A magazine was “harmful to minors” only if it was obscene as to minors. Obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment, and New York was free to adjust the definition of obscenity for minors, so the law did not invade the area of expression constitutionally secured to minors.60 Read the four differences with that justification in mind. Each marks a limit New York observed and Congress did not, and a statute that drops them stands on less of the ground that carried Ginsberg.
The first difference concerns parents. Ginsberg observed that “the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.” Under the CDA, by contrast, neither a parent's consent nor even a parent's participation in the communication would avoid the statute.61 A New York parent could buy the magazine and hand it over. The father in our example has no comparable freedom under the CDA: his own participation does not shelter him.62
The second difference concerns commerce. The New York statute applied only to commercial transactions, and the CDA contains no such limitation.63 The father's e-mail is not a sale. A commercial limit would leave a message like his outside a statute shaped like New York's, but it does nothing for him under the CDA.
The third difference goes to the logic of Ginsberg. New York cabined its definition of material harmful to minors with the requirement that the material be “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” The CDA gives no definition of “indecent” in § 223(a)(1) and omits any requirement that the “patently offensive” material covered by § 223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.64 The New York definition had three parts. The material had to be patently offensive to prevailing adult standards with respect to what is suitable for minors, it had to appeal to the prurient interest of minors, and it had to lack redeeming social importance for minors.65 Material meeting all three is obscene as to minors, so New York was regulating speech that minors have no right to receive. The CDA reached patently offensive material even if it has some redeeming value for minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interest.66 Even Justice O'Connor's separate opinion, taken up below, concedes that Congress's rejection of the Ginsberg standard means the CDA could ban some speech protected as to minors, though she argues that this universe of speech is very small.67 The majority saw a far larger one. The general, undefined terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value, and the regulated subject matter may extend to discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library.68
The fourth difference is age. New York defined a minor as a person under 17, whereas the CDA applies to everyone under 18 and so includes an additional year of those nearest majority.69 That extra year is where the Government's interest weakens. The Court observed that the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of so broad a statute, and the college freshman in our example sits at the edge of that coverage. The Court did not decide whether the First Amendment forbids a blanket prohibition on all “indecent” and “patently offensive” messages to a 17-year-old, whatever their value and regardless of parental approval.70
The Court offered the four respects as a comparison, not as a ranked list of independent requirements. Taken together, they show that the CDA is a different kind of law from the one in Ginsberg. The breadth of a content-based restriction like the CDA imposes an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective, and the Government did not carry it.71 The alternatives it proposed are taken up in a later subsection. For now, the comparison works as a checklist whenever a problem invokes Ginsberg to defend a statute that protects minors.
The usual exam error is to treat a shared protective purpose as if it made two statutes comparable. The New York law and the CDA both aimed to keep sexual material away from young people. But Ginsberg regulated sales, left the parent free, targeted material unprotected as to minors, and stopped at 17, while the CDA did none of those things. A statute that matches Ginsberg on all four points sits comfortably inside its reasoning. A statute that matches it on none, as the CDA did, gets no help from it.
Pacifica, Renton, and the Medium
The Government defended the Communications Decency Act with two precedents beyond Ginsberg: one about radio, the other about zoning. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union held that neither requires the Court to uphold the CDA and that both are consistent with applying the most stringent review to its provisions.78 The Court's method was to ask what justified lenient treatment in each precedent, then to ask whether that justification exists on the Internet. Reno recalled that each medium of expression may present its own problems, and that some cases recognize special justifications for regulating broadcast media that do not apply to other speakers.79 For both precedents the justification was missing, and the reasons carry over to any new medium an exam might describe.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, a comedian's recording that repeated “seven dirty words” aired on a Pacifica radio station one afternoon, and a father who heard it with his young child complained.80 The FCC called the monologue patently offensive, though not necessarily obscene, and defended its regulation by analogy to the law of nuisance, which speaks to channeling behavior more than prohibiting it.81 The Commission later explained that it meant to channel such words to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed.82 The Court of Appeals overturned the order, but the Supreme Court sustained it.
Justice Stevens wrote for a majority in a narrow opinion that stressed the special context of broadcasting, with its pervasive presence and its inability to exclude children from the audience. A broadcast that might be permissible at midnight was inappropriate in the middle of the afternoon, when children were likely to be in the audience.83 As Reno summarized the reasoning, the Court relied on the premise that broadcasting had received the most limited First Amendment protection of any form of communication, and it concluded that the ease with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting.84
What Pacifica upheld was channeling, not prohibition. The decision does not stand for the idea that indecency can be proscribed, even in broadcasting; it stands for the idea that indecency should be channeled to appropriate times.85 The Court said as much about its own holding. The case did not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. The Court had not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction, or that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. And the Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.86
Measured against that narrow order, the CDA differs in three ways, and Reno named each one.87 The first is scope and timing. The Commission, an agency that had regulated radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast that was a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content, and it decided when, rather than whether, such a program could air in that medium. The CDA's broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and do not depend on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.88
The second difference is punishment. The Commission's order was not punitive: the Court expressly refused to decide whether the broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution, and the CDA, unlike the order, is punitive.89 That difference changes a speaker's choices. A broadcaster told to air a program later loses a few hours of schedule, while a speaker who risks punishment for the same content at any hour has no safe time to speak.
The third difference is the medium itself. The order applied to a medium that, as a matter of history, had received the most limited First Amendment protection, in large part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected program content.90 The cases that justify special treatment of broadcasting rest on three features: a history of extensive government regulation, the scarcity of available frequencies at the medium's inception, and its “invasive” nature.91 The Internet, unlike broadcasting, does not suffer from technological scarcity, and it is not as “invasive” as radio or television.92 Reno therefore held that the lesser broadcasting standards of review are inappropriate and that strict scrutiny governs content-based regulation of the Internet.93
Sable Communications v. FCC shows what happens to a total ban on indecent speech outside broadcasting. The Court invalidated a federal statute that banned indecent “dial-a-porn” altogether.94 It emphasized that the government may not ban speech simply because it is “indecent,” noted that there is no captive-audience problem because callers will generally not be unwilling listeners, and observed that Congress's goal of protecting children could be pursued by means less restrictive of speech. Justice White added that the congressional record contained no findings that would justify concluding that no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, could serve the interest in protecting minors.95 The lesson for Pacifica is caution. Indecency is not yet an unprotected category like obscenity, nor has it been formally relegated to a category of lesser protection, and Sable counsels against assuming that the Court will create a low-value category for it.96
The zoning precedent fails for a different reason. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. upheld an ordinance regulating adult theaters because the ordinance targeted secondary effects of the theaters, such as crime and declining property values, and not the content of their films.97 Secondary effects exist whatever the films say, so a city can address them without judging any message. The Government called the CDA a form of “cyberzoning,” but the label does not fit. The CDA's purpose is to protect children from the primary effects of “indecent” and “patently offensive” speech, not from any “secondary” effect of such speech, which makes it a content-based blanket restriction that cannot properly be analyzed as time, place, and manner regulation.98 Two cases the Court cited make the same point. Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience are not analyzed under Renton (Boos v. Barry), and listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation (Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement).99
The usual exam error is to reason that because the government may restrict indecent speech on the radio, indecency is a low-value category that the government may restrict wherever children might be present. Indecency is not yet an unprotected category like obscenity, and it has not been formally relegated to lesser protection.103 Pacifica's result rested on the features of broadcasting and on an order that channeled one broadcast to appropriate times.104 A statute that borrows the broadcast rationale must therefore show that its own medium shares those features, and Reno held that the lesser broadcast standards of review are not appropriate for the Internet.105 The next subsection turns to the core of Reno's holding, which is what the CDA does to the adults who have a right to send and receive the speech it covers.
Burden on Adult Speech
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union rests its holding on means, not ends. The Court did not doubt that Congress wished to protect minors; it found only that the Communications Decency Act “lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.” To deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the Act effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another, and that burden is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in serving the statute’s legitimate purpose.108
The earlier subsections established that protecting children is a legitimate interest and that the CDA is a content-based restriction that Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Renton do not excuse. What remains is why the statute fails even so. The answer lies in whom it reaches: a speaker in an open online forum cannot separate the minors the law targets from the adults beside them.
Two principles carry the limit. First, the interest in protecting minors, however weighty, does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.109 Second, sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment, and the fact that some listeners find it offensive does not justify suppressing it.110 The first principle keeps a child-protection statute from swallowing the adult audience. A law written to protect children is enforced against speakers, and speakers often address adults and children in the same message. The second principle keeps the adult audience protected even when the material is something many people would rather not hear.
Reno stated the limit in a formula the Court had used before in Denver and Sable: the government may not “reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”111 The phrase traces back to Butler v. Michigan. Reno also took a second image from Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.: “regardless of the strength of the government’s interest” in protecting children, “[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”112 The mailbox makes the mechanism plain. Whatever is cut from the mail to suit a child is cut for every adult who opens the box.
Sable Communications v. FCC supplied the closest precedent. Congress had prohibited obscene and indecent telephone messages; the Court sustained the ban on the obscene and struck the ban on the indecent.113 Sable also refused to defer to Congress’s judgment that nothing less than a total ban would keep enterprising youngsters from indecent messages, and so made clear that a statute’s protective purpose does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.114 That inquiry, as Reno described it, embodies an “overarching commitment” to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose “without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.”115
The District Court’s findings gave this limit practical force. At the time of trial, existing technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from reaching its Internet communications without also denying access to adults, and the court found no effective way to determine the age of a user reaching material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms.116 Those findings turn an abstract limit into a chain. A statute that penalizes speech made available to minors cannot be obeyed by screening minors out, because no effective screen exists. The only dependable way to comply is to stop saying the covered thing to anyone, so adults lose what the minor was never meant to see. The same record pointed toward a less drastic tool: user-based software that, the District Court found, would soon give parents a reasonably effective way to control what their own children reach.117 A later subsection treats that finding as part of the less restrictive alternatives the Government had to answer.
The Court’s own illustration is a chat group of one hundred people. If one or more members will be minors, sending the group an indecent message becomes a crime, and that knowledge would surely burden communication among adults.118 In an open forum, then, knowledge cuts against the Government. The speaker cannot exclude the minor, and the minor’s presence turns every adult in the room into someone who must stop speaking or risk prosecution.
The two scenarios differ on the one point that decides whether adult speech is burdened: whether adults share the forum with the minor.
The Government offered three fallbacks, and the Court rejected each. The first was that a knowledge requirement protects adult communication; § 223(d) even requires that the message be sent to a “specific person . . . under 18 years of age.” The Court called the assertion untenable, because most Internet forums, including chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web, are open to all comers. Even the strongest reading of the specific-person requirement cannot save the statute, for it would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a “heckler’s veto,” upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and tell the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child would be present.119 A heckler’s veto lets a hostile listener silence a speaker merely by objecting. The chain has four links. Knowledge of one minor makes the speech criminal. Any participant can supply that knowledge by announcing it. The speakers have no effective way to verify or answer the announcement. The most intolerant person in the forum therefore decides what everyone else may say.
The second fallback pointed to the Web: speakers barred from other forums could still publish there. The Court found the argument unpersuasive because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content, which makes a time, place, and manner analysis inapplicable.120 The alternative-channels inquiry belongs to rules that regulate how or where speech occurs while leaving each message free to be said somewhere. A rule that targets particular messages suppresses them wherever it applies, and importing the alternative-channels factor from content-neutral doctrine into a content-based case is a common error. It was therefore immaterial whether the speech would be feasible on the Web, a point the Court made while noting that the Government’s own expert put the cost at up to $10,000 for a speaker whose interests no existing site accommodated, not counting data base management and age verification.121 The Court likened the Government’s position to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals remained free to publish books, and it recalled that “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”122
The third fallback was that material with scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value would necessarily fall outside the Act’s “patently offensive” and “indecent” prohibitions. The Court found no textual support for that submission.123 The undefined terms cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value. The community-standards criterion adds to the burden, since on the Internet any communication available to a nationwide audience is judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by it. The regulated subject matter also includes any of the seven “dirty words” of the Pacifica monologue, use of which the Government’s own expert acknowledged could constitute a felony.124 Each of these is protected adult speech caught by a statute that asks only whether a message is patently offensive. The next subsection returns to the vagueness and overbreadth of those terms.
The remedy draws the same line between the indecent and the unprotected. The District Court enjoined enforcement of § 223(a)(1)(B) only insofar as it reaches “indecent” communications.125 It expressly preserved the Government’s right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities that section prohibits.126 The injunction against §§ 223(d)(1) and (2) is unqualified, because those provisions contain no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography.127 The adult-burden argument therefore shelters indecent speech that adults may lawfully send and receive, and it offers no shelter to obscenity or child pornography. The principle recurs outside the CDA: in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court again refused to let a child-protection rationale silence speech that adults have a right to hear.
The first step carries the most weight, because the whole burden rests on the speaker’s inability to separate audiences. The holding relied on findings about technology at the time of trial, so a fact pattern that supplies a reliable way to admit adults and exclude minors removes the premise of the argument. A fact pattern limited to a one-to-one exchange with a known minor, with no adult audience, leaves the argument without a target.
Vagueness and Overbreadth
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union held the Communications Decency Act incompatible with the First Amendment because the statute “lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.”135 Two defects stand behind that conclusion, and they are easy to blur. Vagueness is uncertainty in a statute's terms, so that a speaker cannot tell what it forbids. Overbreadth is the excess that follows: to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.”136
The Court used the first defect as evidence of the second, and it went no further. It discussed the CDA's vagueness because of its relevance to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, then affirmed without reaching the separate Fifth Amendment claim that the statute is void for vagueness.137
The link between the two runs through the speaker's choices. When a criminal statute leaves its key terms undefined, a speaker cannot know whether a message falls inside the ban, and the safe response is to say less. The Court described the CDA in just these terms. A person could not confidently “assume that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion, or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA,” and “[g]iven the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection.”138 That danger gave the Court further reason to insist that the statute not be overly broad.139
The Government answered the vagueness charge with obscenity law. The CDA's “patently offensive” standard (and, the Court assumed for argument, its synonymous “indecent” standard) is one part of the three-part test of Miller v. California, the Government reasoned, so it cannot be unconstitutionally vague.140 The Court gave two replies.
The first reply was textual. The CDA borrows one piece of Miller's definition and drops the rest. Miller asks three questions:
- Whether the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. The CDA imposes no such limit.141
- Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct “specifically defined by the applicable state law.” The CDA omits the specific-definition requirement and also reaches beyond sexual conduct to excretory activities and to organs of both a sexual and an excretory nature.142
- Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The CDA omits this limit as well.143
The omitted specific-definition requirement matters most to the vagueness question, because it reduces the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term “patently offensive.”144 A legislature that names the covered conduct in advance gives the speaker a text to consult. A bare ban on “patently offensive” material leaves the speaker to predict how a later factfinder will react.
The second reply was logical. A definition built from three limitations can be precise even though one of them, standing alone, is vague, so borrowing a single prong does not borrow the precision of the whole.145 The prurient-interest and serious-value requirements each critically limit the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. The value requirement does particular work because, unlike the patently offensive and prurient-interest criteria, it is not judged by contemporary community standards. Appellate courts can therefore set, as a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value, which gives the definition limits and regularity.146 The Government argued that courts could supply comparable limits to the CDA. Miller's own rationale cuts against that argument, because Miller gives patent offensiveness to juries applying community standards on the ground that the question is essentially one of fact.147
The Government's other fix, reading the statute to reach only material that is patently offensive “in context,” fared no better. One District Court judge found no statutory basis for the claim that the provisions would reach only “pornographic” materials, noting that, unlike obscenity, indecency has not been defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. He also found “in context” itself vague, because the relevant context might refer to the nature of the communication as a whole, the time of day it was conveyed, the medium used, the identity of the speaker, or whether it is accompanied by appropriate warnings.148 A speaker therefore cannot treat a message's educational value as a safe harbor, because nothing in the text makes value a limit on coverage.
The community-standards criterion compounds the problem. As applied to the Internet, it means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.149 The least tolerant community thus sets the rule for every speaker who posts anywhere, and a speaker in a tolerant city cannot rely on local norms. The opinion illustrates the point with a parent who e-mails information on birth control to a 17-year-old college freshman. The parent could be incarcerated, even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community found the material “indecent” or “patently offensive,” if the college town's community thought otherwise.150
The undefined terms also reach well beyond pornography. They cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value, and the regulated subject matter includes any of the seven “dirty words” from the Pacifica monologue, which the Government's expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. It may also extend to discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library.151
A statute that tracked Miller's limits would look different at each of these points. It would have to name the sexual conduct it covers. It would reach only material that appeals to the prurient interest and lacks serious value, with value measured against a national floor and not against the tastes of the most easily offended community.152 Obscenity is an unprotected category of expression, while indecency is not. The Court had already invalidated a total federal ban on indecent “dial-a-porn” in Sable Communications v. FCC.153 A statute confined to obscenity therefore reaches only speech the First Amendment leaves unprotected, and each Miller limit shrinks the zone of uncertainty at the edge of the prohibition, leaving less reason for self-censorship.
The precision requirement also operates within the First Amendment's usual framework for burdensome speech regulation. Where strict scrutiny applies, the regulation is presumed invalid, and the government must show narrowly tailored or necessary means to a compelling interest.154 A statute whose burden on protected speech could be avoided by more careful drafting cannot make that showing, as the Court said of the CDA.155
Students often write that Reno held the CDA void for vagueness, and that misstates the disposition. The Court affirmed on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, treated the vagueness of “indecent” and “patently offensive” as part of the proof that the statute's reach was uncertain and excessive, and left the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim undecided.156
Defenses and Less Restrictive Alternatives
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, three questions remained once the Court had examined what the Communications Decency Act prohibited: whether the statute's affirmative defenses could save it, whether gentler alternatives showed it was broader than necessary, and whether a severability clause could preserve any part of it. The Court agreed with the District Court that the CDA places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech and that the defenses are not the narrow tailoring that saves an otherwise invalid provision.159 The framework was set from the start. A content-based law is presumptively unconstitutional and draws strict scrutiny,160 which demands a compelling interest and the least restrictive means.161 Because the CDA's restriction was so broad, the Government bore an especially heavy burden to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective, and it did not do so.162
The Government carries that burden because it chose the broad tool. A speaker facing prosecution cannot be asked to prove that no better statute was possible, while the legislature can explain why a narrower one would fail. Narrow tailoring means aiming at the evil itself, and the evil can be concrete: in one reported chat-room case, a user posted a link that led to seven pictures of actual children, aged roughly 5 to 15, engaged in sexually explicit conduct.163 A statute aimed at harm of that kind has a precise target, whereas the CDA reached speech labeled merely “indecent” or “patently offensive.” Each of the Government's arguments therefore had one job, which was to show that the CDA's means were the least restrictive available, and each failed in its own way. The defenses came first. An affirmative defense leaves the covered conduct inside the statute, so it narrows a criminal law only to the extent that speakers can actually use it.
The first defense turns on whether a speaker takes “effective” action to keep minors from the covered communications.164 The Government read it to allow “tagging,” in which a provider marks its material so that potential readers can screen out unwanted transmissions.165 The Court held the defense illusory. The screening software the argument assumed did not exist, and even if it did, no speaker could know whether a given recipient would use it.166 Without the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening for the tag, a transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action to be “effective.”167 The flaw follows from what a defense is for. It gives a speaker a safe harbor only if the speaker can tell in advance that the precautions will count, and a tag whose success depends on unknown recipients offers no such assurance, so the speaker is as exposed after tagging as before. The three-judge District Court reached the same conclusion, finding that the affirmative defenses were not technologically or economically feasible for most providers.168
The second defense protects a speaker who restricts access by requiring a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code.169 Commercial pornographers could use that kind of verification, so the defense would protect them. For everyone else, the District Court's findings cut the other way. It found no effective way to determine a user's age in e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms, and it found verification prohibitively expensive for noncommercial speakers and some commercial speakers with Web sites.170 The defense therefore would not significantly narrow the burden on noncommercial speech, and even for the commercial pornographers it would protect, the Government offered no evidence that verification actually keeps minors from posing as adults.171 These defenses also burden speech by forcing content providers to forgo the anonymity the Internet provides and to bear the significant cost of developing age verification technology.172
The second speaker's exposure was what the Court treated as decisive. Criminal sanctions “hover over each content provider, like the proverbial sword of Damocles,” and the District Court therefore correctly refused to rely on unproven future technology to save the statute.173 A speaker facing criminal liability decides what to say on the basis of safeguards that exist today, so a defense that waits on technology asks the speaker to stake a criminal record on a prediction. The Government thus failed to prove that the defense would significantly reduce the heavy burden that the display prohibition placed on adult speech.174
The Court recalled the remark in Sable Communications v. FCC that the ban there amounted to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig,” and it added that the CDA, “casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community.”175 Justice White's opinion for the Court in Sable struck down a federal statute that totally banned indecent “dial-a-porn” messages.176 The congressional record there contained no findings that would justify concluding that no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, could protect minors.177
The arguments before the Court also pointed to several alternatives, and the Government did not explain why any of them would be less effective than the CDA.178
- Requiring that indecent material be “tagged” in a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into the home.
- Making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value.
- Providing some tolerance for parental choice.
- Regulating some portions of the Internet, such as commercial Web sites, differently from others, such as chat rooms.
Congress had made no detailed findings and held no hearings on the CDA's special problems, and in light of that absence the Court was persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored “if that requirement has any meaning at all.”179 The alternatives share a structure that explains their appeal. Each either confines the restriction to the setting where the harm arises or leaves the decision with a household that wants the protection. Tagging shows the difference: as a statutory defense it left the speaker exposed to prosecution, but as a parental-control mechanism it puts the screening decision in the home. A filter on the family's computer blocks only where parents choose it, so the same message still reaches adults everywhere else, while the CDA's criminal ban operates at the source and silences the speaker for every audience at once. The two holdings also share a premise. The Government failed to prove that its defenses would meaningfully reduce the burden on speech, and it failed to explain why a parental-control approach would be less effective, and both failures follow from the Government's burden.180
The cable cases show what a real alternative looks like. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. the Court held that the “signal bleed” provision was not narrowly tailored, because it was not the least restrictive means available, whether measured by its effect on free expression or by its protection of children from involuntary exposure to sexually explicit content. The 1996 Act already contained a much less restrictive mechanism that let viewers block such programming individually, and the government should have promoted that voluntary alternative.181 In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC the Court contrasted a rule forcing cable operators to segregate and block indecent programming with the V-chip requirement for new television sets, a device a household can use to block sexually explicit or violent programming.182 Set beside the CDA's defenses, these examples show what separates a genuine alternative from an illusory one. In the cable and television settings the filter exists, and the work of using it falls on the household instead of on a speaker threatened with prosecution. Under the CDA the speaker carried the criminal risk, the tool did not exist, and success depended on recipients the speaker could not identify.
The Government's last fallback was severability. If the CDA was insufficiently tailored, it argued, the Court should honor the statute's severability clause, keep the valid remainder, and narrow any nonseverable terms by construction.183 The Court accepted that argument in only one respect, because a severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed and the CDA contained them in one place. Section 223(a) reaches communications that are “obscene or indecent,” and the restriction of obscene material has a textual manifestation separate from the restriction of indecent material, which the Court had held unconstitutional. Obscenity, unlike indecency, is completely unprotected by the First Amendment.184 The Court therefore severed the term “or indecent” and left the rest of § 223(a) standing, but it held that in no other respect could § 223(a) or § 223(d) be saved by such textual surgery.185
The reason this cut worked while others could not follows from what severance does. A court that severs can only delete words already in the statute, because writing new ones is the legislature's job. Striking “or indecent” leaves a complete and constitutional rule, a prohibition on obscene transmissions, so the court has made no policy choice that Congress did not make. The patently offensive display provision in § 223(d) offers no comparable textual unit to isolate, and saving it would require a court to write limits into the statute instead of deleting words. The Government therefore keeps its power to prosecute obscene transmissions, while indecent and patently offensive speech among adults remains protected.
The second step does the most work on an exam, because it is where a defense that looks protective on paper is compared with the speakers who must actually use it. The fourth step rarely succeeds, and the CDA is a statute where it succeeded for exactly one phrase.
Justice O'Connor's Zoning View
Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union because she saw the Communications Decency Act as little more than an attempt by Congress to create “adult zones” on the Internet.192 Precedent, she said, indicates that such zones can be constitutionally sound. Portions of the CDA were unconstitutional because they strayed from the blueprint that prior cases supply for a valid zoning law.193 She agreed with the Court that the display provision fails. She dissented from the Court's refusal to sustain the other provisions as applied to communications between an adult and minors alone.194 Hers is therefore a partial concurrence and partial dissent, not the holding. It earns study because it states the conditions under which a law shielding minors can succeed, and it explains why those conditions went unmet on the Internet of 1997.
The zoning idea is familiar. States have long denied minors access to establishments that adults frequent, and to speech deemed “harmful to minors.” The Court has sustained such laws, but only when they respect the First Amendment rights of adults and minors alike.195 From that condition she drew two limiting principles. A zoning law is valid if it does not unduly restrict adult access to the material, and if minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the banned material.196 Each principle protects a different audience.
The first principle protects adults. A zoning law is valid only if adults can still obtain the regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more than keep children from speech they have no right to obtain. It interferes with adults' rights and “reduce[s] the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children,” a result the First Amendment does not tolerate.197 Ginsberg v. New York shows the principle satisfied. New York barred store owners from selling pornographic magazines to minors, and the Court sustained the law in part because adults could still buy those magazines.198
Ginsberg satisfied the second principle as well. The New York statute barred sales to minors under 17 of material considered obscene as to them.199 A magazine counted as “harmful to minors” only if it was obscene as to minors. Because obscene speech is unprotected, and New York was free to adjust the definition of obscenity for minors, the law did not invade expression the Constitution secures to them.200 Material is obscene as to minors if it is patently offensive to prevailing adult-community standards about what is suitable for minors, appeals to the prurient interest of minors, and is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.201
The Internet strained the first principle because of identity. Cyberspace reflects some form of geography, since chat rooms and Web sites exist at fixed “locations.” But users can send and receive messages without revealing anything about their identities or ages, so it was not possible to exclude persons from certain messages on the basis of identity.202 A zone, in other words, needs more than a place. It needs a way to tell who may enter, and cyberspace had the place without the means.
The technology was advancing but incomplete. Gateway technology had been available on the World Wide Web for some time, yet it was not available to all Web speakers, and the transformation of cyberspace was not complete.203 Until gateway technology is available throughout cyberspace, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that displayed speech will reach only adults, because it is impossible to confine speech to an “adult zone.”204 The only way to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain completely from indecent speech, and that forced silence impinges on the right of adults to make and obtain it.205 On that reasoning she agreed that the display provision cannot pass muster, and her route to the result was the first limiting principle.206
The indecency transmission and specific-person provisions fare differently, because they are not invalid in every application. The trouble arises when a minor enters a chat room otherwise occupied by adults. The CDA then effectively requires the adults to stop using indecent speech, since anything they say to the group is an indecent message to specific persons, one of whom is a minor.207 She compared that result to a law making it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic magazines to anyone once a minor enters the store. Such a law might be constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative to excluding minors completely. Chat rooms offer no means of excluding minors, however, so the rule restricts the rights of adults to engage in indecent speech there.208
A conversation among one adult and minors alone has the opposite structure. When an adult e-mails someone known to be a minor, or converses with minors by themselves in a chat room, the provisions are no different from the law sustained in Ginsberg. Restricting what the adult may say to the minors does not restrict the adult's ability to communicate with other adults.209 She would reach that result by reading a knowledge requirement into the provision, as the Government urged. The canon she invoked directs a court to construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional problems unless the construction is plainly contrary to congressional intent.210
The two opinions part ways on remedy. The challengers argued that the CDA is facially invalid because it is substantially overbroad: it sweeps too broadly and penalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. She agreed with the Court that the provisions are overbroad because they cover any and all communications between adults and minors, regardless of how many adults are in the audience.211 But she would invalidate the CDA only to the extent it infringes adults' rights. That means the display provision, plus the other two provisions as applied to communications involving more than one adult.212 She would sustain the transmission and specific-person provisions where the initiator knows that all of the recipients are minors.213 The Court reached the contrary conclusion on that point, and she dissented.214 Both opinions find overbreadth. They differ over whether a narrow, valid core survives.
The second principle posed a closer question. By rejecting Ginsberg's “harmful to minors” standard, Congress denied minors the right to obtain any “patently offensive” material, even material with some redeeming value for minors and even material that does not appeal to their prurient interests. The CDA could therefore ban some indecent speech that falls outside Ginsberg's standard.215 Her conclusion nonetheless puts the decisive question elsewhere. The constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults.216
A common exam error is to read her opinion as a holding that rescues the CDA. She would have struck the display provision and every application reaching an audience of more than one adult, and she would have sustained only the narrow applications to known minors.221 The Court rejected even that, and its holding states the law.