492 U.S. 115 (1989)
In August 1983, Sable Communications of California, Inc., a Los Angeles-based affiliate of Carlin Communications, Inc., began offering sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages through the Pacific Bell telephone network using special lines designed for high call volumes.1 Callers paid a special fee collected by Pacific Bell and shared with the message provider, and callers outside the Los Angeles area could reach the service via long-distance toll calls to the Los Angeles area code.2
Congress first addressed dial-a-porn in 1983 by adding subsection 223(b) to the Communications Act, which criminalized commercial transmission of obscene or indecent messages to minors and required the FCC to promulgate regulations for screening access.3 The FCC issued successive regulations permitting defenses based on time channeling, credit card payments, access codes, and message scrambling.4 The Second Circuit reviewed these regulations in three Carlin Communications cases between 1984 and 1988, setting aside the first two sets and upholding the third while addressing the statute's constitutionality in Carlin III.5
In April 1988, Congress amended § 223(b) to impose a blanket prohibition on both obscene and indecent interstate commercial telephone messages regardless of the recipient's age, effective July 1, 1988, and eliminated the requirement for FCC access-restriction regulations.6 This version of the statute was in effect when Sable filed suit.7
In 1988, Sable brought suit in the District Court for the Central District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement by the FCC and the Justice Department, challenging both the obscenity and indecency provisions of the amended statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8 The District Court denied a preliminary injunction against the obscenity ban but issued one against the indecency ban after finding the latter overbroad.9
Sable appealed the District Court's obscenity ruling to the Ninth Circuit while the federal parties cross-appealed the indecency ruling. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on both appeals in January 1989.10
Whether 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) creates an impermissible national standard of obscenity by prohibiting obscene interstate commercial telephone messages?11
Federal statutes prohibiting the interstate transmission of obscene materials do not establish an impermissible national standard of obscenity. Varying community standards may apply across federal judicial districts without rendering the statute unconstitutional under the Miller v. California test.12
No. The Court applied precedents holding that federal obscenity statutes need not impose uniform national standards.13 Applying this rule to the established facts, Sable's Los Angeles-based dial-a-porn service using Pacific Bell lines for interstate calls could tailor messages to local standards or implement screening systems, and any resulting costs did not violate the First Amendment.14
The statute does not create an impermissible national standard of obscenity.15
Whether Congress may prohibit the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone communications?16
Congress possesses the power to prohibit the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone communications. The First Amendment does not extend protection to obscene speech.17
Yes. The Court relied on the established principle that obscene speech receives no First Amendment protection.18 Applying this rule to the established facts, the 1988 amendment's ban on obscene dial-a-porn messages transmitted via interstate calls through Pacific Bell was constitutional even though the messages reached willing adult callers.19
Congress may prohibit the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone communications.20
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Joined by Justices Marshall And Stevens
Justice Brennan dissented from the upholding of the obscenity ban. He argued that criminal penalties for distributing obscene materials to consenting adults violate the First Amendment because the concept of obscenity cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity.21 This lack of clarity fails to provide fair notice to creators and distributors of sexually oriented materials.22
It also risks substantial erosion of protected speech during attempts to suppress unprotected speech and imposes costly institutional harms on the judicial system.23 Brennan noted that less restrictive alternatives existed to protect minors.
Whether the 1988 amendment to 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) banning indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in protecting minors?24
A total ban on indecent but non-obscene commercial telephone messages is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest in protecting minors when less restrictive means such as credit card payments, access codes, and message scrambling are available and feasible.25
No. The Court held that the government must use the least restrictive means to further its interest.26 Applying this rule to the established facts, the FCC's prior regulations upheld in Carlin III provided feasible and effective screening, yet Congress enacted a blanket prohibition without legislative findings demonstrating that those alternatives would fail to protect minors from Sable's prerecorded messages.27
The 1988 amendment is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in protecting minors.28
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Justice Scalia joined the majority's conclusion striking down the indecency ban. He emphasized that a wholesale prohibition on adult access to indecent speech cannot rest merely on the possibility that a few children might circumvent technological restrictions.29 Scalia observed that the precise line in this balancing process depends in part on how narrowly one defines indecency as opposed to obscenity.30
He agreed that the FCC's technological approach would be adequate even if some enterprising minors could still gain access.31 Scalia clarified that the legislative history examination merely confirmed the absence of data showing infeasibility of alternatives.32
Joined by Justices Marshall And Stevens
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment invalidating the indecency ban. He agreed that the total prohibition on indecent commercial messages was patently unconstitutional because less restrictive measures such as access codes, credit card verification, and scrambling had been found feasible and effective by the FCC and the Second Circuit.33 Brennan stressed that the evidence showing the indecency ban was overbroad for protecting minors also illustrated why a complete ban on obscene messages was unduly heavyhanded.
No contrary evidence supported the need for a total prohibition.34