390 U.S. 676 (1968)
Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette in Bellmore, Long Island, New York.1 The store included a lunch counter and sold magazines, including so-called girlie magazines.2 In October 1965, Ginsberg personally sold a 16-year-old boy two girlie magazines on each of two dates in violation of New York Penal Law § 484-h.3 One of the magazines was an issue of Sir containing photographs of nude women.4 The 16-year-old boy had been enlisted by his mother to make the purchases so that Ginsberg could be prosecuted.5
Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court.6 The judge found that the magazines contained pictures depicting female nudity as defined in the statute.7 The judge also found that the pictures were harmful to minors under the three-part test of predominant appeal to the prurient interest of minors, patent offensiveness to prevailing adult community standards regarding suitability for minors, and utter lack of redeeming social importance for minors.8 Ginsberg was convicted on both counts and sentenced to pay a $100 fine, with the sentence suspended.9
The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, affirmed the conviction without opinion.10 Ginsberg was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
The magazines involved were not obscene for adults.13 Section 484-h does not bar stocking or selling the magazines to persons 17 years of age or older.14 The statute requires that any prohibited sale be made knowingly and includes a defense of honest mistake as to the minor's age if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age.15
Whether New York Penal Law § 484-h violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by prohibiting the sale to minors under 17 of material defined as obscene on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults?16
No. The rule recognizes that the well-being of children falls within the State's constitutional power to regulate and that two interests justify limitations on sex material for minors under 17.19 First, parents hold primary authority in the household to direct the rearing of their children, and the legislature could conclude that laws aiding that responsibility are proper.20 Second, the State possesses an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.21 Applying these elements to the established facts, Ginsberg operated Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette and personally sold two girlie magazines containing photographs of nude women to a 16-year-old boy on each of two dates in October 1965.22
The trial court found that the pictures depicted female nudity and satisfied the three-part statutory test for material harmful to minors.23 Because the magazines were not obscene for adults yet met the definition for minors, the conviction under the statute is consistent with the State's authority to adjust the definition of obscenity to the sexual interests of minors.24
The statute does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25
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Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment. He stated that the New York Legislature has determined that the material proscribed by the statute is harmful to minors.26 He concluded that the State may constitutionally make such a determination.27
He emphasized that the First Amendment protects a society of free choice presupposing the capacity of its members to choose.28 A child is not possessed of that full capacity in some precisely delineated areas.29 Government regulation may therefore coexist with First Amendment guarantees in those areas.30
Whether the statutory definition of material harmful to minors is unconstitutionally vague?31
No. The rule requires that the definition supply fair notice so that an honest distributor can know when a sale might violate the statute.34 Applying the rule to the established facts, the trial court applied the three-part test of predominant appeal to the prurient interest of minors, patent offensiveness to prevailing adult community standards regarding suitability for minors, and utter lack of redeeming social importance for minors.35 The trial court found that the photographs in the magazines Ginsberg sold to the 16-year-old boy satisfied every element.36 The New York Court of Appeals construed the definition as virtually identical to the Memoirs formulation, confirming that the statute provided constitutionally sufficient notice.37
The statutory definition of material harmful to minors is not unconstitutionally vague.38
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Justice Black dissented from the affirmance of this conviction.39 He argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the definition of material harmful to minors is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.40 The statute is therefore void for vagueness under the principles of many of our decisions.41
He saw the lack of precision in the statutory language as fatal to its validity under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Whether the statute is invalid because it prohibits the sale to minors of material that is not obscene for adults?43
No. The rule permits the State to draw the line at age 17 and to define obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors even when the same material would not be obscene for adults.46 Applying the rule to the established facts, the girlie magazines Ginsberg sold were not obscene for adults under Redrup, yet the trial court determined that the photographs of nude women met the statutory criteria for harm to minors.47 The statute leaves Ginsberg free to stock and sell the magazines to persons 17 and older, confirming that the regulation targets only distribution to the protected class of minors.48
The statute is not invalid because it prohibits the sale to minors of material that is not obscene for adults.49
Whether the limitation on freedom of speech and press imposed by the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad?50
No. The rule requires that any restriction on expression be narrowly drawn to the evil the legislature seeks to prevent.53 Applying the rule to the established facts, Ginsberg was convicted solely for knowingly selling the magazines to a minor under 17.54 The statute expressly permits sales of the same magazines to adults.55 The regulation therefore reaches only the targeted class of transactions and leaves untouched the broader adult market for the material.56
The limitation on freedom of speech and press imposed by the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.57
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Joined by Justice Black
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Black. He maintained that the First Amendment protects the right of all persons, including minors, to have access to material that is not obscene.58 He argued that the State has no power to dictate what material is suitable for minors.59
The statute constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of the freedom of speech and press.60 He viewed the law as an impermissible form of censorship that the Constitution does not authorize, drawing on historical examples like Anthony Comstock to illustrate the dangers of such regulation.61 His dissent emphasized that the First Amendment keeps the state off the printing presses and distribution systems.62
Justice Fortas dissented. He contended that the Court cannot properly avoid its duty to define obscenity for purposes of censorship of material sold to youths.63 He argued that the conviction of a passive luncheonette operator for the sale of magazines that are not obscene for adults, without proof of pushing or pandering and without any standard distinguishing the magazines' characteristics, constitutes a serious invasion of freedom.64
The decision gives the State an undefined and unlimited role in the rearing of children contrary to tradition and family responsibility.65