Concept
Trademarks and Viewpoint Bias
Content-based regulation of protected expression
Trademarks and Viewpoint Bias
Matal v. Tam tests the idea of viewpoint discrimination against a rule that treats every group alike. The Lanham Act’s disparagement clause bars federal registration of a trademark that disparages “persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,”1 or that brings them “into contempt, or disrepute.”2 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) applied the clause to refuse registration of the name of an Asian-American rock band, The Slants, and the Supreme Court unanimously held the clause invalid on its face under the Free Speech Clause.3
The clause began with a presumption against it. Content-based restrictions on speech are presumed invalid, and the government bears the burden of showing that they are constitutional.4 The Government tried to carry that burden with three arguments: that registering a mark is itself government speech, that refusing registration merely declines to subsidize, and that registration is a government program in which some speech restrictions are permissible. Justice Alito’s opinion dismissed all three.5
The Justices agreed on the result but not on the route. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined in part by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer, while Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurred in part and treated the clause as a straightforward example of viewpoint discrimination that triggers strict scrutiny.6 The subsections below follow the order of the analysis. They ask first whether registration is government speech, then why giving offense counts as a viewpoint, and finally why neither interest the Government offered could save the clause.
Private Speech, Not Government Speech
A message the government conveys in its own voice falls outside the Free Speech Clause, so the label “government speech” ends a challenge before it begins. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court held that permanent monuments in a public park were government speech and that the clause therefore had no application; Justice Alito explained that favoring one point of view and disfavoring another is the very business of government.7 The city had been selective about the messages on the monuments it approved.8 Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. applied the same idea to specialty license plates, and Shurtleff v. City of Boston later held that a city flagpole open to private groups did not carry government speech.
The label’s power explains why the classification matters. If every program that registers private expression counted as government speech, the government could silence a disfavored viewpoint by taking credit for the rest. A government remains free to speak for itself: officials may express hostility toward an idea, but they may not impose unique limitations on private speakers who disagree.9
Trademark registration does not fit the pattern. Justice Alito’s opinion reasoned that trademarks have not traditionally conveyed government messages and that the public does not ordinarily identify them with the government.10 Justice Kennedy added a reason drawn from the program’s purpose. Registration exists to identify the source of goods, and the Government extends its benefits to millions of marks for every type of product and cause, through a wide diversity of words, symbols, and messages; whether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible relation to that goal.11 The marketplace in which marks operate exists as a matter of state law and common-law tradition, quite without regard to the Federal Government.12
Compare the city in Summum, which chose which monuments to display. The PTO registers the marks applicants devise, and if registration were government speech, the Government would be endorsing millions of marks, including marks that contradict one another.
The subsidy argument fails because no money flows from the government to the applicant. The funding cases involved cash subsidies or their equivalent, such as funds to private parties for family planning services in Rust v. Sullivan and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. The PTO pays applicants nothing; it charges fees to file an application and to maintain a registration.13 Rust rested on the government’s power to fund one activity to the exclusion of another without discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, since a decision not to subsidize the exercise of a right does not infringe it.14 The Government answered that registration confers valuable non-monetary benefits traceable to government resources, but nearly every government service requires government funds, from police and fire protection to the adjudication of private lawsuits and the use of public parks.15 Accepting that answer would turn every service into a subsidy.
The third argument, that registration is a government program in which some speech restrictions are permissible, fared no better.16 The program cases the Government invoked, such as the union-dues decision in Davenport v. Washington Education Association, belong to a distinct line of authority, not to trademark registration. Both the subsidy and the program arguments also resemble a greater-includes-the-lesser claim: because government need not register trademarks at all, it may attach any condition it likes to registration. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions answers that claim. It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose conditions on its receipt.17
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence states the consequence. The Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.18 A registry that accepts whatever marks private applicants devise is neither. The disparagement clause therefore regulates private speech, and the remaining question is whether it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.
Giving Offense Is a Viewpoint
The disparagement clause fell because it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, even though it treats every group alike. The plurality observed that the Court uses the term viewpoint discrimination in a broad sense, and in that sense the clause qualifies.21 It then conceded the Government’s best fact. The clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups, reaching marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue, and it denies registration to any mark that offends a substantial percentage of the members of any group.22 The concession changed nothing, because the plurality answered it in one sentence: “Giving offense is a viewpoint.”23
The test explains why. Viewpoint discrimination occurs when, within the relevant subject category, the government singles out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed. The clause defines its subject as persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, and within that subject an applicant may register a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one.24 A message offends a group because of what it says about the group, so the offensive marks form a set of opinions: that some person, institution, or belief deserves contempt. A rule that removes that set while leaving the favorable opinions in place has taken a side on every topic it covers. Its even spread across Democrats, Republicans, capitalists, and socialists shows only that on each topic the disfavored side is the critical one. Neutrality among speakers says nothing about neutrality among the views those speakers express.
The plurality tied that conclusion to a principle the Court has repeated for generations: the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. The sentence comes from Street v. New York, and the Court has applied it in decisions running from De Jonge v. Oregon to Texas v. Johnson, which gives the most quoted version: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”25 Offensiveness is accordingly not a category of unprotected speech, a point familiar from Cohen v. California. The Court has likewise refused to measure speech by its effect on listeners. In public debate, citizens must tolerate insulting and even outrageous speech to give the First Amendment’s freedoms breathing space, and a dignity standard is so inherently subjective that it conflicts with the refusal to punish speech for its adverse emotional impact on the audience.26
R.A.V. v. St. Paul sharpens the point. Even among categories of speech the government may proscribe entirely, a state may single out the obscenity that is most patently offensive in its prurience, but it may not single out only the obscenity that includes offensive political messages.27 The question is whether the distinction carries a realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot; a ban on only those obscene films with blue-eyed actresses would raise no such worry.28 Trademarks are not a proscribable class at all, so a clause that sorts them by whether they offend starts from weaker ground than the lines R.A.V. already condemns.
The principle has a reason that also explains why evenhandedness is no defense. Offense is a reaction, and which messages provoke it depends on who is listening. Ideas that challenge what a large audience believes are the likeliest to offend it, and those are often the ideas of dissenters and minorities. Justice Kennedy drew the consequence: a law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all, and the First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence.29
Government cannot cure the problem by pointing to the audience’s reaction. Justice Kennedy explained that a speech burden based on audience reactions is government hostility and intervention in a different guise: the speech is targeted because the government disapproves of the speaker’s message, and the government itself decides whether the audience would take offense. For that reason the Court’s cases have long prohibited the government from justifying a burden on speech by pointing to the speech’s offensiveness.30 The Slants case shows how little the speaker’s purpose matters. On the band’s account, the name turned a slur into a statement of pride, while the Government insisted on its own, opposite, negative reading. Justice Kennedy found the constitutional vice in that dissonance between the mark’s potential to teach and the Government’s interpretation.31
The plurality and the concurrence reach the same classification by different routes. Four Justices relied on the broad sense of viewpoint and the principle that offense cannot justify suppression, while Justice Kennedy and three others applied the subject-category test.32 Either line supports the label, and the label carries its consequence in both: viewpoint-based discrimination invokes heightened scrutiny whether or not trademarks are commercial speech.33
The same rule leaves room for a different kind of refusal. To the extent a trademark is confusing or misleading, the law can protect consumers and trademark owners, and those considerations do not alter the speech principles that bar viewpoint discrimination.34 The duplicate-name refusal in the hypothetical rests on a harm that exists whatever the name says, while the refusals of insulting names rest on what the names say about the mayor. What remains is whether any interest the Government asserted can carry a viewpoint-based clause through heightened scrutiny.
Offense as a Government Interest
The Government defended the disparagement clause with two interests, and the plurality tested both under the commercial-speech standard of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. The parties disputed whether trademarks are commercial speech and so deserve relaxed review, and the plurality sidestepped the dispute. According to Justice Alito’s opinion, the bar would fail even relaxed scrutiny, which requires that a restriction be narrowly drawn to serve a substantial interest.37 Strict scrutiny asks more, namely whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.38 A clause that fails the easier test cannot pass the harder one, so the classification question drops out. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reached the same result by treating the clause as viewpoint discrimination that triggers heightened scrutiny whatever the label on the speech.39
The third part turns on evidence, not intuition. In a challenge to Rhode Island’s ban on liquor price advertising, the district court found that the ban had no significant impact on alcohol consumption, while the court of appeals found inherent merit in the argument that competitive price advertising would lower prices and so increase sales.41 The disparagement clause never reached that debate. The offense interest fails at the second part, and the commerce interest fails at the fourth, as the next subsection shows. The second failure is the more decisive. A clause aimed at an interest the Court treats as illegitimate cannot be rescued by better drafting, whereas a clause that pursues a legitimate interest can in principle be redrafted until it fits.
The Government described its first interest as preventing “underrepresented groups” from being “bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising,” and an amicus described an interest in “encouraging racial tolerance and protecting the privacy and welfare of individuals.” The Court rejected both interests as illegitimate under the First Amendment.42 The two phrasings describe one interest. Bombardment, demeaning treatment, and intolerance are harms that exist only because listeners receive a message and dislike what it says, so a registry can reduce them only by keeping the message out. Courts distrust such rationales because a stated interest can be a facade for content-based suppression: a sign ban defended on aesthetic grounds, for example, may aim at eliminating the messages the signs typically carry.43
The Court had said as much before. In Reno v. ACLU it repeated that the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it, and that where obscenity is not involved, the fact that protected speech may offend some does not justify its suppression.44 Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or similar grounds is hateful, yet the principle protects even speech of that kind. Justice Holmes put the point in United States v. Schwimmer as protecting “freedom for the thought that we hate.” Because the Government’s asserted interests concerned the impact of demeaning speech on minority groups, Tam has potentially broad implications for other efforts to restrict hate speech.45
A different interest would have been analyzed differently. To the extent a trademark is confusing or misleading, the law can protect consumers and trademark owners.46 That harm arises from falsity: a buyer misled about a product suffers the same loss whatever idea the label expresses. Such an interest enters Central Hudson at the first part, where a deceptive message earns no protection,47 whereas the offense interest concedes that the speech is protected and asks the Court to suppress it for its message. A mark can mislead no one and still disparage.
Calling the speech commercial does not dilute the objection. Trademarks make up part of the expression of everyday life, as with the names of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, designer clothing, newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, and toys, and in that setting the metaphorical marketplace of ideas becomes a tangible, powerful reality.48 Regardless of whether trademarks are commercial speech, viewpoint-based discrimination invokes heightened scrutiny.49 A registry that screens that marketplace for offense therefore screens ideas, and a commercial label on the registration does not change what is being screened. When you apply the case to a new problem, ask one question: does the asserted harm consist of the audience’s offense at the idea expressed, or of an injury, such as deception about the goods, that the speech inflicts whatever its viewpoint?
Orderly Commerce and Tailoring
The Government’s second interest, keeping commerce free of invidious discrimination, drew a different answer, because it does not announce a wish to suppress ideas. The Court tested it at the fourth part of Central Hudson, which asks whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.52 Justice Alito concluded that the bar was not narrowly drawn to suppress invidious discrimination and described it as a “happy talk” clause.53
The mismatch shows in what the clause’s text reaches. A rule matched to a worry about invidious discrimination would target marks that promote discrimination. The clause instead bars any mark that disparages persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.54 A mark reading “Down with racists” disparages persons and falls within that text, yet it opposes the very discrimination the interest concerns. The line the clause draws falls between marks that praise and marks that criticize, so criticism of a bigot lands on the refused side exactly as bigotry does. A restriction that burdens speech on both sides of the interest it invokes reaches much further than that interest requires.
The clause overreaches in a second direction, because it protects every person, living or dead. A mark saying that a long-dead president was a disaster disparages a person, yet it involves no discriminatory practice, no refused sale, and no interrupted transaction, so the commerce interest has nothing to attach to. The Court has refused before to let a legitimate interest justify unnecessarily broad suppression. In Reno v. ACLU the interest in protecting children from harmful materials was real, but it did not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.55
That rule fits because the harm it targets arises from the mark’s falsity, and the first Central Hudson question already treats false and misleading messages as carrying no informational value and so no protection.56 The registry asks one question of every applicant, whether buyers will be misled, and never ranks one opinion above another. The disparagement clause has no comparable anchor, because whether a mark disparages turns on what it says about someone.
The Government could not rescue the clause by pointing to the commercial setting. A rule treating political or social volatility as a commercial harm would let the government restore the offense rationale under an economic name, since almost any controversial message can be said to provoke volatility. Offensiveness to some listeners is no more sufficient a reason for suppression when the speech is sold than when it is spoken.57 Lawful commercial speech that is not misleading remains protected, and a restriction on it must still be narrowly drawn.58
Do not confuse this tailoring defect with overbreadth. In Virginia v. Black, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that a law is not overbroad merely because people engaged in protected speech might be arrested and prosecuted; overbreadth, he said, turns on whether such persons can be convicted under the law.59 Tam asked a different question. The Court held the clause invalid on its face because it discriminated by viewpoint and was not narrowly drawn to serve a substantial interest.60
No participating Justice dissented. Justice Alito’s opinion supplied the relaxed-scrutiny analysis, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by three others, reached the same result by treating the clause as viewpoint discrimination that triggers heightened scrutiny.61 When a government defends a speech rule by pointing to commerce, compare what the rule reaches with what the interest needs. Marks that criticize discrimination, or that have nothing to do with commerce, show that the fit is missing.