142 S. Ct. 1583 (2022)
Boston City Hall Plaza features three 83-foot flagpoles near the entrance to the raw concrete brutalist building constructed in the late 1960s.1 Boston normally flies the American flag from the first pole, the Massachusetts flag from the second, and its own city flag from the third.2
Since at least 2005 the city has made the plaza available for public events. The city has permitted private groups to conduct flag-raising ceremonies.3 During these events a group may hoist a flag of its choosing on the third pole in place of the city's flag for the duration of the event, typically a couple of hours.4
Between 2005 and 2017 Boston approved roughly 50 unique flags for 284 such ceremonies, most of them national flags marking the holidays of Bostonians' countries of origin, along with others associated with causes such as Pride Week and emergency medical service workers.5 The city maintained no written policies or internal guidance on flag content and had no record of denying any request before 2017.6
In July 2017 Harold Shurtleff, director of Camp Constitution, applied to hold a September ceremony on the plaza commemorating the civic and social contributions of the Christian community and to raise what he described as the Christian flag, attaching a photograph of a red cross on a blue field against a white background.7 The commissioner of Boston's Property Management Department denied permission to raise the Christian flag.8 The commissioner explained that the objection was not to the content but to the fact that it was a religious flag and that no prior instance existed of the city raising such a flag.9
Shurtleff and Camp Constitution sued the City of Boston and the commissioner in federal district court, claiming among other things that the denial violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.10 The parties agreed to all relevant facts and submitted a joint statement setting them out.11 The district court denied a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for Boston.12 The First Circuit affirmed.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether Boston's flag-raising program on City Hall Plaza constitutes government speech?15
When the government invites private participation in a program, courts conduct a holistic inquiry into whether the government intends to speak for itself or to regulate private expression, looking to the history of the expression, the public's likely perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression.16
No. Although the history of flag flying at government seats supports Boston, the public perception evidence is inconclusive, and Boston exercised no meaningful control over the content or meaning of the flags raised by private groups.17 The city had no written policies, approved every request without reviewing the flags, and described the plaza as a public forum open to all applicants.18 This lack of control distinguishes the program from the monument selection in Summum and the license plate review in Walker, aligning it instead with the hands-off trademark registration in Matal.19
Boston's flag-raising program does not constitute government speech but rather creates a forum for private expression.20
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Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but rejected the Court's reliance on the Walker factors as a rigid test applicable in every government-speech case.21 He argued that the proper inquiry must focus on whether the government is purposefully expressing its own message through persons authorized to speak on its behalf without relying on a means that abridges private speech.22 Historical practice and public perception are relevant only insofar as they illuminate speaker identity. Government control alone cannot distinguish speech from censorship.23
Applying this framework, the City's come-one-come-all policy with no content criteria or review showed it was facilitating private speech in a public forum rather than speaking itself, rendering viewpoint discrimination impermissible.24
Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment and traced Boston's error directly to its reliance on the Lemon test to justify excluding religious speech out of unfounded Establishment Clause fears.25 He explained that Lemon's abstract and ahistoric approach had long produced confusion and led officials to discriminate against religion to avoid imagined violations, only to invite Free Speech Clause liability instead.26 Proper analysis looks to historical practices and understandings.
These confirm that the Establishment Clause does not require excluding religious viewpoints from public forums open to secular ones and that equal treatment of religious speech is consistent with founding-era principles.27
Whether Boston's refusal to allow petitioners to raise their flag violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?28
When the government does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on religious viewpoint, as that constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause.29
Yes. Because the flag-raising program is private speech, Boston's denial of the Christian flag solely because it promoted a specific religion amounted to viewpoint discrimination.30 The city conceded the denial was based on Establishment Clause concerns about flying a religious flag, but that premise was rejected, leaving the exclusion unconstitutional.31
Boston's refusal violated the Free Speech Clause.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kavanaugh concurred, explaining that the dispute arose only because of a government official's mistaken understanding of the Establishment Clause.33 A Boston official believed the City would violate the Establishment Clause if it allowed a religious flag to briefly fly outside of City Hall as part of the flag-raising program that the City had opened to the public. He stressed that governments violate the Constitution when they exclude religious persons, organizations, or speech from public programs, benefits, and facilities because of religion.34
Under the Constitution a government may not treat religious persons, organizations, or speech as second-class but must treat them equally with secular counterparts.35