Concept
Accommodation of Religion
Establishment
Accommodation of Religion
A neutral government may still take religion into account. Justice Souter, concurring in Lee v. Weisman, wrote that the State may “accommodate” the free exercise of religion by relieving people from generally applicable rules that interfere with their religious callings, and that such accommodation does not necessarily signify an official endorsement of religious observance over disbelief.1 The principle sits awkwardly beside the preceding sections, which treated favoritism toward religion as the danger, because an exemption written for believers alone looks like favoritism. This unit explains why it usually is not and when it becomes so. It starts with the collision between the Religion Clauses, then takes up three limits on accommodation (a real burden, no delegation or sect preference, and no override of other people’s interests), and ends with the room the clauses leave to legislatures.
Accommodation Versus Endorsement
Deference to every law that claims to facilitate free exercise would erase the Establishment Clause. Justice O’Connor, concurring in Wallace v. Jaffree, observed that any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an “accommodation” of free exercise rights. Even the statute at issue in Lemon, which gave Pennsylvania parochial schools salary supplements, textbooks, and instructional materials, can be described as accommodating the beliefs of parents who choose religious schools.2
“Neutrality” cannot settle the matter either. O’Connor located the solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses not in neutrality but in identifying workable limits to the government’s license to promote the free exercise of religion, and she began from the text of the Free Exercise Clause, which speaks of laws that prohibit free exercise.3 The Court has not clearly accepted the argument that free exercise takes primacy when the clauses conflict. Neutrality remains the basic command, but the Court enforces it less strictly in this area and entertains government accommodation more readily.4
Sherbert v. Verner shows the tension inside a single case. The majority rejected an establishment objection to awarding unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian, because extending benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers “reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences” and does not mingle religious with secular institutions in the way the Establishment Clause aims to forestall.5 Justice Stewart read the same facts the other way. A claimant who refused Saturday work out of indolence could be denied benefits, so the Establishment Clause as the Court had construed it not only permitted but required South Carolina to deny benefits equally when the refusal rested on a religious creed.6
Justice Souter’s account starts from what an exemption communicates. When the government frees the Native American Church from federal laws forbidding peyote use, it conveys no endorsement of peyote rituals, the Church, or religion as such; it respects the centrality of peyote to the lives of certain Americans.7 Accommodation of that kind reveals only a recognition that general rules can needlessly offend the religious conscience when they do not offend the conscience of secular society at all.8
Wisconsin v. Yoder takes the same view. Accommodating the Amish can hardly be called sponsorship or active involvement, the Court explained, because the exemption’s purpose and effect were not to support, favor, advance, or assist them but to let their centuries-old religious society survive free from the heavy impediment that compliance with Wisconsin’s compulsory-education law would impose.9 Quoting Sherbert, the Court added that such an accommodation reflects only the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.10
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos runs the reasoning through the three-part Lemon test, which the Court has called the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted.11 Justice White insisted that the exemption for religious organizations was “in no way questionable under the Lemon analysis.” The purpose prong does not demand a law unrelated to religion; it aims to prevent a decisionmaker from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters. The effect prong forbids only an effect that is fairly attributable to government itself advancing religion through its own activities and influence, and a law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion.12 The Court found a permissible purpose and effect in relief from a significant burden on religious activity, including the burden of predicting, on pain of substantial liability, which of an organization’s activities a secular court will consider religious.13 Because the government acted with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens religious exercise, there was no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.14 Government does not advance religion itself by leaving private persons free to do so, and that distinction is the theoretical basis for accommodating religious practice.15
The released-time cases draw the same line within a single subject. Zorach v. Clauson upheld a program in which all of the religious education occurred off school premises. The Court distinguished McCollum because there the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote it.16 In both cases the question is whether government steps aside or puts its own machinery behind the religious activity. The audience matters too. In the aid cases the Court has reasoned that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination than younger pupils, which reduces the risk that government aid will in fact support religious activities.17
An exam stem that describes an exemption for religious believers should not be answered by pointing out that only religion benefits. Relief from a burden is the ordinary remedy for a burden. The questions that matter are the ones the next three subsections take up.
The Discernible-Burden Requirement
An accommodation must answer a burden, and that requirement does most of the work in this area. Souter’s reasoning supplies it: concern for religious individuals in the modern regulatory State cannot justify official solicitude for a religious practice that general rules leave unburdened, because such gratuitous largesse would effectively favor religion over disbelief.19 The requirement also answers the problem O’Connor identified. Almost any statute pertaining to religion can wear the label “accommodation,” so the label proves nothing, and the useful question is what burden the measure actually lifts.
In Lee itself, Souter applied the requirement to a school-sponsored graduation prayer. Religious students have no need for the machinery of the State to affirm their beliefs, so the State’s sponsorship of prayer at the ceremony is most reasonably understood as an official endorsement of religion and, in this instance, of theistic religion.20 Souter quoted one commentator’s explanation that the government brought prayer into the ceremony “precisely because some people want a symbolic affirmation that government approves and endorses their religion, and because many of the people who want this affirmation place little or no value on the costs to religious minorities.”21 The State had therefore crossed the line from permissible accommodation to unconstitutional establishment.22 The peyote exemption stands at the opposite pole. Federal law forbade a practice central to the Church’s rites, and the exemption removed the prohibition. At the graduation, no rule stood between any student and prayer.
Wallace v. Jaffree applied the requirement against a State’s own defense. Alabama’s statute set aside a minute of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer.” It was undisputed that, when the statute was enacted, no governmental practice kept students from praying silently for a minute at the start of the school day, so there was nothing to “accommodate” and no general requirement from which to exempt anyone under the Free Exercise cases.23 What the statute added was the State’s endorsement and promotion of religion and of a particular religious practice, and that addition made it unconstitutional.24 O’Connor anticipated a second defense. If the State claimed to protect group silent prayer under state sponsorship, the burden lifted would come not from Alabama but from the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Engel and Abington, and a State has no authority to remove burdens the Constitution itself imposes. The Alabama statute therefore lifted no state-imposed burden on free exercise and could not properly be viewed as an accommodation statute.25
The burden must also be substantial. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock and Amos both involved exemptions that favored religion alone, so the preference cannot be what separates them; the burden does. The Texas Monthly plurality distinguished Amos because the Amos exemption prevented potentially serious encroachments on protected religious freedoms, whereas in most cases payment of a sales tax would not violate the tenets of a religious organization.26 The plurality added that how broad an exemption must be depends on the State’s secular aim. A State that subsidized all groups contributing to the community’s cultural, intellectual, and moral betterment could keep an exemption for religious publications.27 The same idea explains why accommodation statutes are tested by whether, by their terms, they are designed to redress substantial burdens on the exercise of religion.28 On an exam, ask what burden the measure lifts, who imposed it, and whether it is substantial before asking who benefits.
Delegation and Sect Preference
A real burden does not justify every remedy. Beyond the burden, the Establishment Clause conditions identified for permissible accommodation include that the accommodation not delegate governmental power to a religious organization or group, and that it be broadly nonsectarian, extending to religious exercise of all sorts.30 An accommodation that fails the second condition would violate the Establishment Clause because it would prefer some religions over others.31
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den shows the delegation limit. Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, delegate to a religious entity the power to exercise civic authority.32 The Massachusetts law at issue let each church decide whether a neighboring establishment could serve liquor. The Court held that the delegation conferred a significant symbolic benefit on religion, because even the appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by church and state benefits religion in the minds of some. It also held that the law enmeshed churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers.33 Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, argued that the State could have banned all liquor establishments within 500 feet of a church and so could choose the less drastic alternative of letting each church decide whether it wished to be unmolested by a neighboring bar.34 The majority treated what the State might have done itself as no defense.
The sect-preference limit rests on a firmly established rule: government violates the Establishment Clause if it discriminates among religious groups, and such discrimination survives only strict scrutiny. Larson v. Valente applied the rule to strike down a Minnesota law that imposed registration and reporting requirements on charitable organizations but exempted religious institutions receiving more than half of their financial support from members’ contributions.35 The rule does not condemn favoring religious exercise over nonreligious conduct, which is why the exemption for religious organizations in Amos was acceptable even though it did not extend to secular entities.36 The defect lies in preferring one faith over another.
The neutrality question about purpose runs in both directions. When the Court asked whether city ordinances aimed at Santeria were neutral, it asked whether their adoption was independent of the religious nature of the practice they prohibited. They were not, because their text used religious terms such as ritual and sacrifice and the events leading to their adoption showed animosity toward the religion.37
Absolute Exemptions and Third Parties
An exemption always has a cost, and the last limit asks who pays it. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Court struck down a statute that gave employees an “absolute and unqualified right” not to work on their Sabbath. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion held that this mandatory, absolute deference to the Sabbath observer clearly advanced “a particular religious practice.”39 The statute commanded that Sabbath concerns automatically control over secular interests at the workplace and took no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or of other employees. It made no exception for substantial economic burdens on the employer or significant burdens on employees who would work in the observer’s place, and it allowed no consideration of whether the employer had made reasonable accommodation proposals.40
Title VII sits on the other side of the line. O’Connor, concurring in Thornton, explained that Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends to all religious beliefs instead of protecting only Sabbath observance, so an objective observer would perceive an antidiscrimination law and not an endorsement of religion.41 Both laws address a job that collides with a religious day. The one that weighs the employer’s burden and the interests of coworkers is an accommodation, and the one that lets Sabbath concerns control regardless is a preference.
When the cost of an exemption falls on private parties who had no say, government has chosen the claimant’s interest over theirs, and lifting one burden has shifted it onto someone else. The Court later stated the limit in general terms: courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, and an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.42
Room Between the Clauses
The limits above govern when government may accommodate; a separate question is whether it must. The Court has long said that there is “room for play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses, which means that some state actions are permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.44 That space carries the most weight after Employment Division v. Smith. The Smith opinion described a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption as permitted and even desirable but not constitutionally required. It accepted that leaving accommodation to the political process will disadvantage religious practices not widely engaged in, and preferred that unavoidable consequence of democratic government to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.45 Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was adopted to negate the Smith test and require strict scrutiny for free exercise claims.46 The Court examined that Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.
Land-use disputes under RLUIPA show the burden requirement at work. A court that finds no substantial burden may simply assume without discussion that the activity counts as religious use and decide the case on the burden. Challenges to the exclusion of homeless shelters and soup kitchens from residential areas have met mixed results under the First Amendment and RLUIPA, and a number of courts uphold reasonable permit requirements without deciding whether sheltering the homeless is a religious exercise.47
Cutter v. Wilkinson shows the limits operating inside that space. The Court rejected the broadest challenge to RLUIPA, that religious accommodations unconstitutionally favor religion over other constitutionally protected reasons for acting, and relied on precedent that there is room for play in the joints between the clauses.48 It also required courts to take adequate account of the burdens an accommodation imposes on nonbeneficiaries, and to measure the accommodation so that it does not override other significant interests.49 Commentary on these statutes identifies the same conditions taught in this unit: no delegation of governmental power, relief of substantial burdens, and broadly nonsectarian reach.50 The statutes are constitutional only if interpreted and applied in conformity with the Constitution, and the Justices may still disagree about what those limits mean.51
The play in the joints also runs the other way, because a State may decline to fund what the Establishment Clause would let it fund. In Locke v. Davey the Court allowed Washington to deny scholarship funding for devotional theology degrees, even though the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, have permitted students to pursue those degrees. Under the Court’s Establishment Clause precedent, the independent and private choice of recipients breaks the link between government funds and religious training.52 The Court reasoned that training for a religious profession and training for a secular profession are not fungible, since training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor.53