483 U.S. 327, 335 n.17 (1987)
The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and the Corporation of the President operated the Deseret Gymnasium as a nonprofit facility open to the public in Salt Lake City, Utah.1 Appellee Mayson worked at the Gymnasium for some sixteen years as an assistant building engineer and then as building engineer.2 Mayson and others purporting to represent a class brought an action in Federal District Court alleging religious discrimination in employment.3
In 1981 Mayson was discharged because he failed to qualify for a temple recommend, a certificate that he is a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples.4 The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that they were shielded from liability under § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 The District Court developed a three-part test to determine whether an activity is religious and applied it to Mayson.6
The District Court found that the Gymnasium was intimately connected to the Church in finance and management, that the Gymnasium's primary function had no clear connection to the Church's religious tenets or administration, and that Mayson's duties were not even tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual.7 The court concluded that Mayson's case involved nonreligious activity.8 The District Court entered summary judgment for Mayson and ordered reinstatement with backpay.9
The District Court later vacated its judgment to permit the United States to intervene.10 After further proceedings the District Court reaffirmed its judgment.11 The cases reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the District Court.12
Whether applying the § 702 exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?13
The Establishment Clause permits governmental accommodation of religion consistent with benevolent neutrality.14 Under the Lemon test, a law must serve a secular legislative purpose, have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.15 A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion; for a forbidden effect the Government itself must have advanced religion through its activities and influence.16
No.17 The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop and the Corporation of the President operated the Deseret Gymnasium as a nonprofit facility open to the public in Salt Lake City, Utah.18 The purpose of § 702 is to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions, which is a permissible legislative purpose.19 The exemption satisfies the effects prong because the Gymnasium is a nonprofit activity and any advancement of religion is attributable to the Church rather than the Government.20 Subsequently the District Court vacated its judgment to permit the United States to intervene.21
After further proceedings the District Court reaffirmed its judgment. The statute avoids intrusive judicial inquiry into religious belief and therefore does not create excessive entanglement.22 Applying the exemption to the discharge of Mayson after sixteen years for failing to qualify for a temple recommend does not violate the Establishment Clause.23
Applying § 702's exemption to religious organizations' secular nonprofit activities does not violate the Establishment Clause.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment to emphasize that the categorical exemption for nonprofit activities is appropriate because a case-by-case determination whether an activity is religious or secular would produce excessive entanglement and chill religious activity.25 Nonprofit activities are more likely infused with religious purpose since earnings must be used to continue services rather than distributed as surplus.26 The categorical exemption demarcates a sphere of deference that balances individual religious freedom against organizational autonomy without the chilling effect of litigation risk.27
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment.28 He stated that he concurred essentially for the reasons set forth in Justice O'Connor's opinion, particularly the third and final paragraphs thereof.29 He agreed that the distinction drawn by the Court seems to obscure far more than to enlighten and that the question of the constitutionality of the § 702 exemption as applied to for-profit activities of religious organizations remains open.30
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to note difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the Lemon test.31 She observed that the necessary first step is to recognize that lifting regulatory burdens does have the effect of advancing religion.32 She then explained the need to separate permissible accommodations from unjustified assistance by asking whether the government purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute conveys a message of endorsement to an objective observer.33
For nonprofit activities an objective observer should perceive the lifting of burdens as an accommodation rather than endorsement.34 The constitutionality of § 702 as applied to for-profit activities remains open.35