Concept
Judicial Decisions and Due Process
Ex Post Facto Laws
Judicial Decisions and Due Process
Article I, § 9 declares that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and § 10 forbids any State to pass one.1 Passing a law is legislative work, so the prohibition reaches legislative acts, federal or state, and leaves judicial decisions outside it.2 A court deciding a case applies law, often construing a statute or the common law for the first time, and the Clause does not of its own force restrain it.3 How, then, does a defendant resist a court's retroactive expansion of criminal liability? The Due Process Clause answers, and this section shows how far the answer reaches.
The gap matters because a court can do the same harm a legislature can. A person acts under one understanding of what the law forbids; a court then construes the statute, or discards a common-law rule, so that the completed act becomes a crime or draws a heavier penalty. That defendant had no more warning than someone punished under a retroactive statute. The reasons behind the Clause therefore carry over to courts, whether they are put as concern for adequate notice or as concern for unchecked official power.4 A totally unexpected construction of a statute has the same pernicious effects as an ex post facto law: the defendant lacks notice, and the government gains an opening for discriminatory enforcement.5 Those two harms track the two purposes the Supreme Court has assigned the Clause, which are to give fair warning of a law's effect and to restrain arbitrary and potentially vindictive lawmaking.6
The Due Process Clause supplies the remedy. The Supreme Court has said that due process bars an appellate court from doing what the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids a legislature to do.7 That statement cannot be applied at full breadth, because all case law, including decisions interpreting criminal statutes, operates retroactively, and that feature is an essential part of the legal system.8 A court resolves a dispute about events that have already happened, so the first time it says what a statute means or whether a common-law rule survives, its answer governs the parties before it. If every judicial interpretation had to satisfy the standard that binds a legislature, statutes would freeze at their first reading and the common law could not develop. The due process limit is therefore narrower. It asks whether the interpretation was foreseeable, borrowing ex post facto principles to decide that question.9 State courts have divided on whether their own constitutions' ex post facto provisions reach judicial decisions, so a question set in one state may turn on that state's rule.10
Two consequences follow. The prohibition on retroactive judicial decisions is less extensive than the prohibition on ex post facto statutes, and the law on it is less fully developed.11 A student therefore needs the decisions that mark the line between ordinary judicial development and a ruling no one could have foreseen. The first subsection takes up Bouie v. City of Columbia and Keeler, where an unforeseeable construction was barred.12 The second shows a court's abolition of a common-law rule surviving, and the third shows how a new constitutional standard fares when applied to earlier conduct.
Bouie and Keeler
The text of both clauses addresses lawmakers. Section 9 says an ex post facto law shall not be “passed,” and § 10 imposes the same bar on the states, so neither speaks to a court that interprets a statute.13 Yet a court can surprise a defendant as thoroughly as a legislature can, and Bouie v. City of Columbia filled the gap through the Due Process Clause. The Court held that the South Carolina Supreme Court, by applying its new construction of the trespass statute to affirm the convictions, had deprived the petitioners of due process.14 Its reasoning was that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law.15
The statute in Bouie forbade “entry upon the lands of another . . . after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.” The petitioners were sit-in demonstrators who had not entered the drugstore without permission. They were convicted because they refused to leave when asked.16 The state supreme court affirmed by reading the statute to cover not only entry after notice not to enter but also the different act of remaining after notice to leave.
The Court reasoned in steps. Calder v. Bull defined an ex post facto law as one that makes criminal an act that was innocent when done, or that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed, and a retroactive judicial enlargement of a statute does the same work.17 A legislature could not reach that result by passing a new statute. Had South Carolina applied its new statute prohibiting remaining on the premises after being asked to leave, the ex post facto proscription would clearly have invalidated these convictions.18 The Due Process Clause compels the same result where the State achieves the same effect by judicial construction. Such a construction is valid for the future, but it may not be applied retroactively, any more than a legislative enactment may be, to impose criminal penalties for conduct committed when it was not fairly stated to be criminal.19
The test asks whether the construction was “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.” A construction that meets that description must not be given retroactive effect.20 The two adjectives track the Clause's two purposes. “Unexpected” speaks to fair warning, and “indefensible” to arbitrary official action, because a reading that nothing in the earlier law supports leaves enforcement to whatever the court prefers.21
The Court established unforeseeability from the ground up, and the method is as useful on an exam as the holding. It measured the new reading against everything a person could have consulted before acting: the statute's words, the state's own decisions, and the decisions of other states. The reading was no less inconsistent with the law of other states than with South Carolina's earlier cases and the statute's own language.22 The Court then rested on Chief Justice Marshall's principle in United States v. Wiltberger: the case must be a strong one indeed that would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention the words did not suggest.23
Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County shows a state's own supreme court applying Bouie to its prosecutors. The murder statute defined the crime as the killing of a human being, and earlier California and sister-state authority had required a live birth, so the question was whether a court could now read the statute to reach the death of a viable fetus.24 The California court asked whether the proposed enlargement of section 187 would have been foreseeable to this petitioner, and it held that the broader reading could not be applied to conduct that predated the decision.25 The chain that decided Bouie decided Keeler: the words of the statute pointed to a living person, the prior cases pointed the same way, and nothing in the existing law signaled that its reach would grow.
Students often treat Bouie's remark about innocent conduct as an element of the doctrine. Bouie did say that the rule is particularly compelling where the petitioners' conduct cannot be deemed improper or immoral,26 but Keeler shows that the remark adds weight and sets no threshold. The California court conceded that the conduct charged was improper and immoral and that the defendant claimed no constitutionally favored right. It nevertheless held the matter one of degree, because due process extends to violent as well as peaceful people, and the question remained whether the enlargement was foreseeable.27 The reason lies in what fair warning measures. It measures what the law said on the day the person acted, and a person's character or the gravity of the act changes nothing about what the law said on that day.
Bouie's own language raises a harder question about narrowing glosses. It observed that the objection to a vague statute, inadequate guidance to the individual, cannot be cured retrospectively by a ruling of the trial or appellate court, though an authoritative gloss may cure it for the future.28 If that view holds for a gloss that makes a vague statute narrower or more definite, it holds a fortiori where a construction unexpectedly broadens a statute that was definite and precise on its face.29 The Supreme Court has nonetheless allowed vague or overbroad statutes the benefit of clarifying glosses added after the defendant's conduct.30 The reason is structural. A defendant who acted under a statute that was vague or broad on its face already faced its widest possible reach, a narrowing gloss cuts that reach back, and defendants are not entitled to warning of the precise way a court will construe a statute to bring it within the Constitution.31 A prosecution for selling obscene literature, saved on appeal by reading in a requirement that the seller know the material's obscene character, is the standard illustration. It has been suggested that such a gloss should apply to earlier conduct only when it is a relatively simple and natural reading, one the defendant could reasonably have foreseen.32
A court that concludes the broader reading is correct still has ordinary ways to adopt it without harming the defendant before it. It may announce the construction for future conduct and decline to apply it to that defendant, which is the result Bouie describes when it calls such a construction valid for the future.33 A decision that overrules an earlier ruling favorable to defendants, such as one holding the statute unconstitutional or allowing a defense, is likewise not applied to conduct that preceded it.34 A defendant who knew of the earlier decision and relied on it may also have a mistake-of-law defense, since the highest court of the jurisdiction misled the defendant about the statute.35
In practice the protection is narrower than its language suggests. Courts read the foreseeability requirement generously and tend to reverse only when the judicial change seems entirely arbitrary.36 The Court itself has not applied Bouie uniformly. In Ginzburg v. United States it assumed the defendant's magazines were not obscene under the guidelines then announced, yet it added a new element to the test, pandering to the interest in obscenity, and used it to sustain the conviction.37 The next subsection applies the foreseeability inquiry to a court's abolition of a common-law rule.
The third step does the work in most problems, because the first two supply the facts that answer it. A construction that reads a definite word to mean something it never meant is the Bouie and Keeler pattern, while a gloss that trims a statute already broad on its face is the contrasting pattern.
Rogers and Common-Law Change
Section 10 forbids a state to pass an ex post facto law, and that verb explains why the Clause leaves a court's own decisions alone.42 Bouie showed that due process fills the gap against an unexpected and indefensible judicial enlargement of a criminal statute. Rogers v. Tennessee tests how far that bar reaches: did the Tennessee Supreme Court deny a defendant due process when it abolished the common-law year-and-a-day rule and applied the abolition to the defendant before it?43 The Supreme Court held that it did not, by a vote of five to four.44 Rogers matters because it shows that Bouie's fair-warning principle does not import every feature of the Clause that binds legislatures.
At common law, the year-and-a-day rule barred a murder conviction unless the victim died of the defendant's act within a year and a day of that act.45 The rule concerns causation: the longer the gap between wound and death, the harder it is to say that the wound and nothing else caused the death. Rogers stabbed James Bowdery in May 1994. Bowdery survived surgery but lapsed into a coma and died about fifteen months later, and the medical examiner attributed the death to the stab wound.46 If the rule still applied, it stood in the way of a murder conviction.
Tennessee's homicide statute defines criminal homicide as the unlawful killing of another person and says nothing about the year-and-a-day rule, so the courts reviewing the conviction took different routes.47 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a 1989 sentencing reform act had already abolished the rule, and it saw no ex post facto problem because the act took effect five years before the stabbing.48 The Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed about the 1989 Act. It treated the rule as part of Tennessee common law, a point the parties themselves agreed on, noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions to consider the question had abandoned the rule, found that the reasons that once supported it no longer exist, and abolished it by its own decision.49 That route placed the abolition after both the stabbing and the death, which is why a constitutional question arose.
The Supreme Court began with the Clause's text and with Justice Chase's four categories of ex post facto laws in Calder v. Bull. Those categories describe what legislatures may not do, because the Clause is a limit on the powers of the legislature and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch.50 Limits on retroactive judicial decision making nevertheless exist, because they are inherent in the notion of due process, and Bouie is the example.51 Rogers argued that Bouie therefore carried the whole body of ex post facto law into judicial decisions. A legislature that eliminated an element of an offense or took away a defense formerly available would violate the Clause.52 The Court assumed for argument that a legislative abolition of the year-and-a-day rule would have done likewise, yet it held that Bouie did not apply all of the ex post facto jurisprudence to judicial change in the common law, and it measured the claim by whether the change was an unfair surprise.53 Calder's categories remain limits on legislatures, and due process asks the narrower question whether the defendant could have anticipated the change from the law as it stood.
The narrower test comes from how courts work. A court decides a dispute about events that have already happened, so a ruling on a question not decided before always operates on conduct that predates it. If a court could retire a rule whose purposes have vanished only by satisfying the standard that binds a legislature, the rule would stay in force until the legislature chose to act, and the case-by-case development on which the common law depends would stall. Fair warning protects something different: the defendant's ability to read the law on the day of the act and know what it forbids. A change nobody could have seen coming defeats that ability, while a change the existing law made foreseeable leaves it intact.
The Tennessee court's findings explain why Rogers lost. The vast majority of jurisdictions to consider the rule had abandoned it, and the reasons that once supported it had disappeared.54 A person who read Tennessee law on the day of the stabbing would have found a statute silent about the rule and a doctrine in retreat almost everywhere, so a claim of surprise had to rest on counting on a rule that was fading. The abolition also left untouched what the law forbade. Stabbing a man with a butcher knife was criminal from the start, and the change affected only what followed when the victim lingered. Under the unfair-surprise test Rogers lost, and his conviction stood.55
An exam built on Rogers usually asks whether a defendant can defeat a court's retroactive abolition of an old rule by showing that a statute doing the same thing would fall within Calder's categories. The answer is no. The categories bind legislatures, so the defendant must show surprise, and surprise is easiest to show when the state's own courts recently told the public the conduct was safe, as with the favorable decisions discussed in the preceding subsection. In Rogers the rule was fading across the country, and the Court found no unfair surprise.
Four Justices dissented, and their position is the strongest argument for the opposite rule. They would treat the retroactive revision of a valid rule as exactly what due process forbids. The year-and-a-day rule was valid Tennessee law when Rogers acted, as the parties agreed,56 so a court that discards it and applies the discard to him exposes him to murder liability that the law then in force did not impose. On that view, fair warning does not depend on whether a legislature or a court makes the change. The majority protects reliance on what the earlier law appeared to say and leaves courts room to retire rules whose time has passed, while the dissent protects reliance on a valid rule as written.
The third step carries the weight, because the second supplies the facts that answer it. A defendant who points to a recent holding of the state's highest court is in the position of someone told by the law itself that the conduct was safe, while a defendant who points to an obsolete rule must explain why the law gave any reason to rely on it.
Marks and New Standards
Neither § 9 nor § 10 addresses a court that announces a new rule: both forbid the “passing” of ex post facto laws, and a court passes none.58 Marks v. United States tests what protection survives when the retroactive change comes from the Supreme Court's own redefinition of a constitutional line and no new statute is involved.59 The defendants were charged with transporting obscene material in interstate commerce and conspiring to do so, and their conduct ran through February 27, 1973.60 Trial began that October. In the interval, on June 21, 1973, the Court decided Miller v. California, which announced new standards for separating unprotected hard-core material from expression the First Amendment protects.61
The two standards differ in a way that matters for punishment. Under the earlier formulation in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, expressive material stayed protected unless it was “utterly without redeeming social value,” while Miller asks whether the work, taken as a whole, “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”62 The defendants argued that Miller casts a significantly wider net, so that a work with a thin claim to value could be protected under Memoirs and punishable under Miller, and that they had charted their course of conduct by Memoirs.63 The statute they were charged under had not been amended. What moved was the constitutional line that determines which obscenity the statute may reach. The trial court nonetheless instructed the jury under Miller, the defendants were convicted, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed.64
The Court's reasoning starts from the text and then moves past it. The Ex Post Facto Clause limits the legislature and does not of its own force apply to the judicial branch.65 The principle beneath the Clause is a different matter. Persons have a right to fair warning of the conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties, and that right is fundamental to constitutional liberty, so the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects it against judicial action.66 The Court drew on Bouie v. City of Columbia, where an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute was said to operate precisely like an ex post facto law, and on Rabe v. Washington, where a conviction under a state obscenity law was reversed because it rested on an unforeseeable construction and citizens lacked fair notice.67 Applying that principle, the Court held that due process bars applying Miller to the extent it imposes criminal liability for conduct that was not punishable under Memoirs.68
A change in a constitutional standard counts as a loss of warning, and the reason can be built in short steps. A person who deals in expression charts conduct by the limit the Court has announced, so a seller who knew that material was protected unless it was utterly without redeeming social value could ship material above that line with confidence. Miller then moved the line, and material that had been protected became punishable. Applying Miller to the earlier shipments punishes conduct that was innocent when performed, which is exactly what Calder's first category forbids a legislature to do, and the Court drew that comparison to a new statute itself.69 Warning carries extra weight where the line separates protected from unprotected expression, since a seller who cannot trust the announced line has reason to hold back material the law actually protects.
Because the protection is fair warning, it operates in one direction only. The Court framed the question as whether Miller's standards apply retroactively “to the potential detriment of a defendant,” and that framing places the harm in a worse position than the law then in force and nowhere else.70 A new principle that would operate for the defendants takes away no warning they relied on, so any Miller principle that benefits them must be applied in their case. The Marks defendants could therefore invoke every favorable Miller principle while holding the government to the Memoirs line wherever Miller reached further.
The protection has not been applied evenly across the cases. In Ginzburg, discussed above, the defendant sold magazines that he believed were not obscene under the guidelines then announced, and the Court assumed his argument was correct, yet it added a new element to the test, pandering to the interest in obscenity, which was sufficient and necessary to sustain the conviction.71 Ginzburg is an example of the Bouie principle going unfollowed, while Marks points the other way on the same kind of problem. In Marks the Court confronted the retroactivity question directly and held that a broader standard cannot reach conduct the earlier standard protected. An exam answer should treat Marks as the controlling statement and cite Ginzburg only as a decision that has not been read to limit it.
The third step carries the doctrine, because the harm is liability for conduct the earlier standard protected.