3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 386 (1798)
The grandson Normand Morrison executed his will on August 21, 1779.1 On March 21, 1793, the Court of Probate for Hartford County disapproved the will and refused to record it.2 More than eighteen months elapsed from this decree, during which the right of appeal was lost under Connecticut law.3 There was no law in Connecticut allowing a new hearing before the court of probate except through special legislative action.4
On the second Thursday of May 1795, the Legislature of Connecticut passed a resolution setting aside the March 1793 decree of the Court of Probate.5 The resolution granted a new hearing before the same court of probate with liberty of appeal in six months.6 This resolution was passed after the time for appeal from the original decree had expired.7
A new hearing occurred on July 27, 1795, resulting in the court of probate approving the will and ordering it recorded.8 An appeal followed in August 1795 to the Superior Court at Hartford, which affirmed the decree in February 1796.9 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut then reviewed the case and in June 1796 confirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.10
Calder and his wife asserted a claim to the premises as the heiress of Normand Morrison the physician.11 Bull and his wife asserted their claim under the will of Normand Morrison the grandson.12 The matter came before the United States Supreme Court for review of the state court proceedings.
Whether the resolution passed by the Connecticut legislature setting aside the probate court decree and granting a new hearing is an ex post facto law prohibited by the United States Constitution?13
An ex post facto law within the meaning of the federal prohibition includes four types of laws. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes it. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed. Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed at the time of the crime. Every law that alters legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the offense to convict the offender.14
No.15 The Connecticut resolution granting a new hearing in the probate matter does not fall within any category of ex post facto laws.16 It did not criminalize any previously innocent action by Bull and wife or impose any punishment on them for past conduct.17 The resolution operated exclusively on the prior decree of the Court of Probate for Hartford County by setting it aside and authorizing a new hearing with appeal rights.18 This civil proceeding concerned the validity of a will executed on August 21, 1779, and the competing claims of Calder and wife as heiress and Bull and wife under the will, without implicating criminal liability or altering evidentiary rules in any penal context.19
No.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Iredell concurred in the judgment that the resolution was not an ex post facto law.20 He emphasized that the constitutional prohibition extends to criminal cases and does not reach civil cases that merely affect private property.21 Justice Iredell noted that the legislature of Connecticut has from the beginning exercised a general superintending power over its courts by granting new trials. In this instance it acted in a judicial capacity consistent with established usage.22
Even if the resolution is viewed as a legislative act, it remains outside the scope of the ex post facto clause.23 That provision was designed to prevent retrospective penal laws punishing actions innocent when done or increasing punishments for past offenses.24 The policy of the prohibition does not extend to civil matters where private rights may yield to public needs with just compensation.25