Concept
Is the Law Punitive?
Ex Post Facto Laws
Is the Law Punitive?
Every category covered so far, from criminalizing innocent conduct to raising a sentence, assumed that the measure under attack was punishment. That assumption is the first question in any ex post facto problem, because the Clause reaches only penal laws.1 Article I, § 9 bars Congress from passing an ex post facto law and § 10 bars the states, but neither provision says what makes a law penal.2 A court must therefore decide whether the legislature has actually imposed a penalty for past conduct.3 A student who skips that step will apply Calder's categories to measures the Clause never governed.
The legislature's label cannot answer the question, and the reason shows from both directions. If a label controlled, a legislature could write a penalty into a statute called regulatory and escape the Clause through drafting. If every burden triggered by past conduct counted as punishment, legislatures could not adopt civil measures that protect the public whenever those measures touch something already done. The Clause has to leave room for the second kind of measure and give the first kind no shelter. The value at stake is fair warning: criminal penalties may not be imposed for conduct committed when it was not fairly stated to be criminal, whether the new rule comes from a legislature or, as a later section shows, from a court.4
The approach that serves both concerns begins with the legislature's stated purpose and then asks whether the measure is so punitive in purpose or effect that it negates the civil label.5 Because the second question looks at what the measure does to the person, a civil label opens the analysis and does not close it. The two subsections below show the two outcomes. In the first, a scheme that confines people keeps its civil label and the Clause does not apply. In the second, a burden that nobody called punishment turns out to be punishment.
Civil Regulatory Schemes
Kansas v. Hendricks states the limit and tests it where the test is hardest, in a scheme that confines people. The Court repeated that the Clause “forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated” and pertains exclusively to penal statutes.6 A measure that is not punishment never reaches Calder's categories, however heavily it falls on someone whose offense predates it.
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act allowed involuntary confinement of a person who currently suffered from a mental abnormality and was likely to commit sexually violent acts in the future. Hendricks argued that confinement under a statute enacted after his crimes was new punishment for completed conduct. By a vote of five to four, the Court found that the Act, as applied to him, was not punitive and did not increase his criminal penalty, so it violated neither the ex post facto nor the double jeopardy prohibition.7
The decision supplies a standard that can be run on new facts. A statute is civil, and the Clause stays out of the case, when the legislature expressly states a nonpunitive purpose, the scheme does not implicate retribution or deterrence, and its purpose or effect is not so punitive as to negate the civil label.8 The majority found the Act's goals to be incapacitation and treatment, which look to the person as that person now is.
The majority added that the Act did not operate retroactively in any sense that matters. It did not criminalize conduct that was legal before its enactment, and it took from Hendricks no defense that was available when he committed his crimes.9 Those are the two moves that make a law ex post facto under Calder's first category, the creation of a new crime and the abolition of an existing defense, and the Act made neither. Confinement rested on a finding that the person currently had the qualifying abnormality and was dangerous, so the earlier crimes triggered the proceeding as evidence of a present condition and nothing was being priced after the fact.
The civil category exists because protecting the public from future harm is a legitimate regulatory aim that does not require a criminal conviction. If every measure triggered by a past act were punishment, a legislature that found a danger among people already convicted could respond only prospectively, and the danger would stay in place for exactly the people who present it. The Clause's two functions explain where the line falls. Fair warning and the check on targeted lawmaking both address a legislature that sets a price on a completed act, and a measure aimed at present danger sets no such price. The inquiry still examines the scheme's actual purpose and effect, because the civil label must not conceal punishment.
Smith v. Doe applied the same framework to a sex-offender registration and notification scheme and treated it as civil. The two schemes differ sharply in weight: registration discloses information, while the Hendricks scheme takes away liberty. They came out the same way, which shows that the severity of the burden does not decide the question. What decides it is whether the scheme aims at retribution and deterrence for the past act or at present danger.
Other consequences of past conduct follow the same logic. Laws that require deportation for past conduct, and statutes that deny future privileges to convicted offenders because of their earlier criminal activity, have been held not to impose penalties for past conduct.10 These measures concern what a person may do or where the person may remain from now on, and the earlier conduct enters as a fact about the person. The contrasting case is a denial with no connection to the duties it restricts. A post-Civil War oath requirement tied to participation in the rebellion was treated as punitive because taking the oath had no relationship to the professional duties of the attorneys it burdened.11 The next subsection takes up that side of the line.
The third and fourth steps do most of the work, because a heavy burden such as confinement can still be civil and a burden with a regulatory label can still be punishment.
Disabilities as Punishment
Punishment under the Clauses need not take the form of a sentence.13 Cummings v. Missouri asked whether a state can avoid the Clause by attaching a condition to an office or a calling. Missouri could point to its power over matters of internal police, and the Court did not question that power. The question was whether the power had been made “an instrument for the infliction of punishment against the inhibition of the Constitution.”14
The breadth of Missouri's oath shows what the Court was reacting to. It was directed at more than overt and visible acts of hostility to the government and reached words, desires, and sympathies as well. It drew no line between acts springing from malignant enmity and acts prompted by charity, affection, or family ties. A person who had ever expressed sympathy with anyone drawn into the Rebellion, even a close relative, could no more subscribe to the oath than could the most active and cruel of the rebels.15
The label “qualification” did not matter to the Court. What mattered was what the provisions did. They were aimed at past acts, and they operated by depriving those who had aided or sympathized with the Rebellion, or had tried to escape a citizen's wartime duties, of the right to hold certain offices and to pursue their ordinary occupations. The Court called that deprivation punishment.16
The oath's escape route did not change the characterization, and the reasoning is the most portable part of the opinion. A person who could truthfully swear lost nothing. The framers of the Missouri constitution knew, however, that whole classes of people could not swear it, and for them the deprivation was meant to be absolute and perpetual.17 To make the enjoyment of a right depend on an impossible condition, the Court said, “is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition,” and a denial enforced for a past act is punishment imposed for that act.18 The oath sorted people by what they had done, as a sentence does, and the way out was open only to people who had done nothing for the oath to punish.
The Court also refused to let form decide the case. If the state could not have reached the result by the direct course, no other mode producing the same result could succeed, because the constitutional protection of the citizen's liberty “cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is exerted.” If indirect means could accomplish what direct means could not, the inhibition “may be evaded at pleasure.”19 The reasoning gives you a method for exams: restate the disability as an ordinary penal statute, and if that statute would be ex post facto, so is the disability.
Ex parte Garland applied the same reasoning to a post-Civil War law that required attorneys to swear they had taken no part in the rebellion before practicing in federal court. The law was punitive because the oath had no relationship to the professional duties of attorneys, so the Court found it penal in nature and applied to past conduct.20 Other burdens that follow past conduct come out the other way. Laws that require deportation for past conduct, and statutes that deny future privileges to convicted offenders because of their earlier criminal activities, have been held not to impose penalties for past conduct.21
The connection between the burden and the thing restricted marks the difference between those measures and the oaths. A rule that bars a person convicted of a crime from a post whose duties the crime bears on looks forward, because it asks whether the person can be trusted with the privilege and treats the conviction as evidence on that question. A condition with no relationship to the duties of the calling cannot be explained that way, and the only work left for the past conduct is to set a cost for it. An oath about sympathy for the Rebellion had no evident connection to the work of a teacher or a priest, which puts Missouri's oath on the punishment side of the line. An exam stem that describes a licensing bar enacted after the facts invites the question whether the bar is a qualification or a penalty, and the connection to the work is usually the fact that decides it.
The second and third steps do the work in most problems, because the connection to the duties restricted separates a true qualification from a penalty, and an impossible condition shows that the burden is aimed at the past.