521 U.S. 346 (1997)
In 1994, the Kansas Legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act, which established procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder, are likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.1 Leroy Hendricks had a long history of sexually molesting children, beginning with a 1955 conviction for indecent exposure, followed by convictions for lewdness involving a young girl in 1957, molesting two young boys in 1960, indecent liberties with a child in 1965, and taking indecent liberties with two 13-year-old boys in both 1984 and 1994.2
As Hendricks neared the end of his prison term in 1994, the State filed a petition in state court seeking to have him committed under the Act.3 Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Act but did not contest that he met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator.4 At trial, Hendricks testified that he suffers from pedophilia, that he is not cured, and that when he gets stressed out he cannot control the urge to molest children.5 The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator.6
The trial court determined that the Act was constitutional and ordered him committed to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services.7 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the commitment order.8 It held that the Act violated Hendricks’ substantive due process rights because it did not require a finding that he was unable to control his violent behavior.9 The court did not address the Act’s procedural due process or double jeopardy claims.10
The State of Kansas petitioned for certiorari, and Hendricks filed a cross-petition reasserting his federal double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on both the petition and the cross-petition.12
Whether the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act’s definition of mental abnormality satisfies substantive due process requirements?13
An individual’s constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden in the civil context. A statute satisfies due process when it requires proof of dangerousness linked to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult for the person to control dangerous behavior.14
Yes. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.15 Hendricks’ repeated convictions for child molestation beginning in 1955 and his trial testimony that he suffers from pedophilia and cannot control the urge to molest children when stressed demonstrate this linkage.16 The Act demands more than a mere predisposition to violence.17
It comports with other civil commitment statutes upheld by the Court.18
The Act’s definition of mental abnormality satisfies substantive due process requirements.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment.20 He emphasizes that the Act is constitutional only because it requires a finding of dangerousness linked to a mental abnormality or personality disorder.21 If the Act permitted commitment of persons who are not dangerous, it would raise serious constitutional concerns.22
Kennedy cautions that using civil confinement in conjunction with the criminal process risks turning it into a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence.23 Those objectives are reserved exclusively for the criminal system.24 The Act as written satisfies due process because it ties confinement to a current mental condition that produces future danger.25
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg (as To Parts Ii And Iii)
Justice Breyer agrees that the Act’s definition of mental abnormality satisfies substantive due process.26 Many mental health professionals classify pedophilia as a serious mental disorder.27 Hendricks’ condition involves a specific and highly unusual inability to control his actions that makes him dangerous to children.28
The Constitution permits a State to follow one reasonable professional view while rejecting another when defining mental illness for commitment purposes.29 Breyer notes that the psychiatric debate helps set the bounds of what is reasonable but does not dictate the precise terms of state statutes.30
Whether the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause?31
The Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal statutes.32 A statute is civil rather than criminal when the legislature expressly states a nonpunitive purpose, the statutory scheme does not implicate retribution or deterrence, and its purpose or effect is not so punitive as to negate the civil label.
No. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is civil in nature.3334 The legislature expressly stated that it establishes civil commitment proceedings and disavowed punitive objectives.35 The Act uses prior criminal conduct solely for evidentiary purposes to demonstrate a mental abnormality rather than to affix culpability.36 Hendricks’ commitment was based on his current mental condition and likelihood of future dangerousness rather than additional punishment for his pre-Act crimes.37
The Act’s indefinite but annually reviewable duration and treatment provisions further confirm its nonpunitive character.38
The Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg (as To Parts Ii And Iii)
Justice Breyer dissents because the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to Hendricks.40 The Act changes the legal consequences of past conduct in a manner that disadvantages the offender by imposing indefinite confinement after he has already served his criminal sentence.41 Its primary purpose is punitive incapacitation rather than treatment.42
This conclusion follows from the deliberate delay in providing treatment until after the prison term ends and the absence of any requirement to consider less restrictive alternatives such as supervised release or halfway houses.43
Whether the Act violates the Double Jeopardy Clause?44
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.45 A civil commitment proceeding does not constitute a second prosecution or punishment when the confinement is nonpunitive in purpose and effect.
No. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act does not impose punishment.4647 It is civil in nature and does not implicate retribution or deterrence.48 The Act uses prior convictions only as evidence of a mental abnormality rather than as the basis for additional criminal sanctions.49 Hendricks’ commitment following his prison term therefore does not constitute a second punishment for his earlier offenses.50
The Act’s procedural safeguards and focus on protecting the public from future harm confirm that it is not a second prosecution.51
The Act does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.52