4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333 (1867)
On July 2, 1862, Congress passed an act requiring an oath to be taken by every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States.1 Subsequently, on January 24, 1865, Congress enacted a supplementary statute extending the oath requirement to attorneys and counselors of the courts of the United States, prohibiting admission or appearance without first taking and subscribing the prescribed oath after specified dates.2
During the December term of 1860, the petitioner was admitted as an attorney and counselor of the Supreme Court upon meeting the requirements then in force, which included three years of practice in the highest courts of his state and evidence of fair private and professional character.3 In May, 1861, the state of Arkansas, of which the petitioner was a citizen, passed an ordinance of secession, which purported to withdraw the state from the union.4 Afterwards, in the same year, by another ordinance, Arkansas attached herself to the so-called Confederate States, and by act of the congress of that confederacy, she was received as one of its members.5 The petitioner followed the state, and was one of her representatives, first in the lower house, and afterwards in the senate of the congress of that confederacy, and was a member of the senate at the time of the surrender of the confederate forces to the armies of the United States.6
In July 1865, the petitioner obtained a full pardon from the President for all offenses committed by his participation in the rebellion.7 The Supreme Court amended its second rule in March 1865 to require administration of the new oath.8 The petitioner was unable to take the oath because of the offices he held under the Confederate government.9 He produced the pardon and applied for permission to continue practicing as an attorney and counselor without complying with the oath requirement.10
A parallel application was made by R. H. Marr, whose case shared the main features with that of the petitioner.11
Whether the Act of January 24, 1865, is unconstitutional and void insofar as it affects the petitioner's status as an attorney and counselor before the Supreme Court?12
Congress may not pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, which include statutes that impose punishment for past conduct by legislative decree without judicial trial, such as perpetual exclusion from a profession based on prior acts.13
Yes. The Act of January 24, 1865, as applied to the petitioner who was admitted in December term of 1860 and later served in the Confederate Congress after Arkansas's secession in May 1861, operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from the bar for past conduct that constitutes punishment, violating the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.14 The oath requirement targets past acts including holding office under hostile authority, which the petitioner cannot meet due to his service, thus functioning as punishment rather than a proper qualification attainable by all.15
The Act of January 24, 1865 is unconstitutional and void as it affects the petitioner's status.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chase, C.j., And Swayne And Davis, Jj.
Justice Miller dissented, arguing that the act is not a bill of attainder because it does not work corruption of blood or pronounce sentence on designated persons.17 He maintained that Congress has power to prescribe qualifications for attorneys, including an oath of allegiance, and that the law was intended to secure loyal attachment to the government.18 The purpose of congress was to require loyalty as a condition to practice in the courts, and not as a punishment for past offenses.19
Attorneys are subject to legislation the same as judges.20
Whether the presidential pardon relieves the petitioner from compliance with the oath requirement imposed by the Act of January 24, 1865?21
Yes. The full pardon granted to the petitioner in July 1865 for all offenses arising from participation in the rebellion relieves him from all penalties and disabilities attached to that offense.24 Excluding him from continuing to practice based on the offense would enforce a punishment notwithstanding the pardon.25 This is beyond the constitutional power of Congress.26
The presidential pardon relieves the petitioner from compliance with the oath requirement.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chase, C.j., And Swayne And Davis, Jj.
Justice Miller dissented on this point as well.28 He contended that the President cannot by pardon or otherwise dispense with the law.29 The man guilty of counterfeiting may be saved by the President from the gallows, but a lawyer cannot by him be readmitted to this bar.30
It remains for the legislative power to say to what extent relief shall be extended.31 Miller viewed the requirement of the oath as a proper qualification for the privilege of practicing law in the federal courts.32 This qualification could not be overridden by executive clemency, leaving Congress to determine the scope of any relief from the statutory condition.33