Concept
Other Settings
Unconstitutional Conditions
Other Settings
Justice Holmes once wrote that a policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” The modern doctrine rejects that dictum: government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech” even if the person has no entitlement to the benefit.1 The rule does not stop at the funding, employment, permit, and assistance cases covered above. It follows the government wherever it holds something a person wants, or can spare a person a burden, and attaches a term to the offer. Licensing, probation, clemency, plea bargaining, and the opportunity to be heard all fit that description, and each asks whether the term costs the person a constitutional right.
The courts do not answer that question the same way in each setting. A license term is tested against the right it demands, a probation condition is absorbed into Fourth Amendment reasonableness, and a charge for a hearing is measured against due process. One question still helps in all three: what does the term demand of the person, and could the government have demanded it directly?
Licenses and Privileges
A state that licenses a business may be tempted to argue that, because it could refuse every license, it may attach any term to the licenses it grants. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island rejected that argument. Rhode Island licensed its liquor retailers and banned advertising of liquor prices, and the Court held that the decision to license did not change the analysis: even though government is under no obligation to provide a particular benefit, it does not follow that the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional right.2 Rhode Island could not ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, and its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely likewise did not include a power to censor accurate, nonmisleading advertisements of price.3
The limit is older than the modern formulation. In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, the Court found it unnecessary to challenge the proposition that a state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it on such conditions as it sees fit. It held, however, that the state’s power is “not unlimited,” because a state “may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.” The reason is one of logic: if a state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may compel the surrender of all, and it is “inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.”4 The modern doctrine carries that logic to benefits the person has no entitlement to receive.5
Two companion defenses fared no better in 44 Liquormart. The first was the argument that the greater power includes the lesser. The Court did not dispute that greater powers include lesser ones, but it saw no reason to think the state’s power to regulate commercial activity is greater than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech. Banning speech may prove far more intrusive than banning conduct, since preventing people from teaching others to fish may do more harm than preventing fish from being sold, and the First Amendment presumes that regulating speech is more dangerous than regulating conduct.6 The second defense relied on a “vice” label for alcohol. Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or morals might be called vice activity by a legislature, the Court answered, so an exception built on the label would let legislatures justify censorship by placing it on selected lawful activities.7 The first defense fails because the supposed lesser power can reach further than the greater one. The second fails because the state would control the label that decides how much protection speech receives.
Authority over a whole field gives a state no exemption from the rest of the Constitution. The Twenty-first Amendment gives states authority over commerce in alcohol that might otherwise belong to the federal government, but its text “places no limit whatsoever on other constitutional provisions.”8 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a voting case and not a licensing case, states the general point. The Court there traced the principle to decisions that bar a state from exploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in an isolated context to justify an unconstitutional condition, and it repeated that “a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result.” The insulation such a power enjoys, it added, “is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.”9
The privilege theory gave way slowly in the law of foreign corporations. Justice Harlan dissented from the view that a state may condition a corporation’s entry as it pleases: the terms “must not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or inconsistent with any right granted or secured by that instrument,” and a corporation is not estopped from claiming equal protection merely because it voluntarily entered and remained in the state. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia suffered “an almost complete disintegration,” and in the October Term 1909 the Court decided four cases in conflict with the principle that states have unlimited power to condition the entry of foreign corporations.10 Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton belongs to this line; it invalidated a statute that required a corporation, as a condition precedent to a permit to do business in the state, to surrender a right secured by the Constitution.11 The Court later explained why the old rule could not survive intact. Two principles pulled against each other. If a state cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on the grant of a privilege, its right to withhold the privilege is less than absolute; if its right to withhold is absolute, no one may challenge the terms on which it grants the privilege. Attempts to honor both produced results that seem inconsistent or illogical.12
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. shows the same objection raised against federal license terms, with a procedural wrinkle. The petitioner urged that the validity of the Power Act’s acquisition clause, section 14, and of the license conditions based on it, could wait until the United States claimed the right to purchase the project fifty years after issuance. The Court assumed that the mere acceptance of a license would not later bar the objection of unconstitutional conditions, even when accompanied by a specific agreement to abide by the statute and license. It then held that section 14 so vitally affected the establishment and financing of the respondent’s project that its validity had to be decided before the injunction issue was finally adjudged.13 The point is an assumption, not a holding, but it answers the old claim that a licensee who accepts a license accepts its terms for good.
The doctrine does not condemn every license term, and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. marks the other side of the line. The applicant there submitted data to obtain an EPA registration under a statute with data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions, and it later objected that the government’s use and disclosure of the data disturbed its property expectations. The Court answered that an applicant who chose to submit the data despite those provisions could hardly claim disturbed expectations when EPA acted in a manner authorized by law at the time of submission. The working rule followed: as long as the applicant is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary submission of data in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.14 What separates Monsanto from 44 Liquormart is the thing demanded. Monsanto concerned terms announced before submission and a claim of uncompensated taking. The Rhode Island ban demanded silence about truthful information, speech the Constitution presumes the government may not suppress as easily as conduct.15
A stem on this topic usually supplies a license, a state that need not issue it, and a label such as “vice” or a grant of authority over the field. None of those answers the claim. Start with what the term demands of the holder and whether the state could have commanded the same thing directly. If the term reaches speech or another protected right, neither the gratuitous character of the license nor the state’s authority over the field defends it, and, as Appalachian Electric assumed, an applicant who accepted the license has not necessarily lost the objection. If instead the term is a known part of a regulatory scheme and rationally serves a legitimate interest, as the data terms did in Monsanto, a claim that it took the licensee’s property fails on notice and fit. Land-use permits follow their own tests, taken up above.
Probation, Clemency, and Pleas
The criminal process runs on offers of leniency: probation in place of prison, a hearing before the executive in place of none, a lighter charge in place of a heavier one. Most of those offers carry terms, which makes the process a natural home for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, though courts seldom apply the doctrine under its own name. The leading modern example is United States v. Knights. The sentencing judge there conditioned probation on the offender’s acceptance of a search provision, the probation order stated the condition clearly, and the Court upheld a search of Knights’ house that rested on reasonable suspicion.17
The Government treated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a limit on what a probationer may validly consent to, and it argued that the search condition cleared that limit because waiver of Fourth Amendment rights “directly furthers the State’s interest in the effective administration of its probation system.”18 The Court never reached the consent question. It did not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the condition was consent in the sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, because the search was reasonable under the general approach of “examining the totality of the circumstances,” with the probation search condition “a salient circumstance.”19
Choosing reasonableness over waiver changes what the court must ask. A waiver theory asks whether the probationer gave the right up. A reasonableness inquiry asks how far the condition shrank the probationer’s expectation of privacy and whether the search was reasonable against what remained. The sentencing judge had found the condition necessary to further the two primary goals of probation, rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations, and the Court thought that conclusion reasonable. Because the order clearly expressed the condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it, the condition significantly diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy.20 Balancing these considerations, the Court held that no more than reasonable suspicion was required, a standard below probable cause: when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, the likelihood of criminal conduct is high enough that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.21
The holding is narrower than the Government’s theory. The Court did not decide whether the condition so diminished Knights’ privacy, or amounted to consent, that a search with no individualized suspicion would have been reasonable, because the search before it had reasonable suspicion behind it.22 State law adds a second screen. Under the California rule the Court noted, a probation condition is invalid if it has no relationship to the crime of conviction, relates to conduct that is not itself criminal, and requires or forbids conduct not reasonably related to future criminality.23 That test resembles the relation-to-purpose inquiry taught in the state-constitutional section above.
Clemency shows the doctrine offered as an argument and not sustained. In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, an inmate attacked a clemency review whose interview was voluntary. The Court of Appeals agreed that the procedure gave him a “Hobson’s choice” between asserting his Fifth Amendment rights and participating in the review, which raised the specter of an unconstitutional condition, and it found no compelling state interest that would justify forcing that choice. One judge dissented, finding the Fifth Amendment claim too speculative given that the interview was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.24 The account of the proceedings below reports the lower court’s reasoning and the reversal and supports no more. The Hobson’s-choice theory is therefore the Court of Appeals’ theory, and no Supreme Court rationale should be credited to the opinion.
Plea bargaining presses the doctrine hardest, because the defendant trades the trial right itself for leniency, the structure the doctrine condemns elsewhere. The Court accepts the practice as an exception to the general rule against bargaining away constitutional rights, and the debate is over why trial rights should be treated differently.25 Defenders describe the bargain as an exchange of entitlements that benefits both sides, so that a defendant who pleads presumably valued the leniency above the trial right sold. Critics answer that a choice made against the risk of the maximum sentence is coerced in substance, and that bargains each defendant rationally accepts can leave defendants as a group worse off.26 One proposal for policing bargains accepts the practice and draws a line inside it. A prosecutor may bargain because he is willing to take a sure half loaf rather than await the outcome of a trial. A prosecutor who bargains because limited resources convince him he must deter defendants from demanding a trial is doing something different, though the divide is hard for even a well-intentioned prosecutor to locate and harder for a judge to review.27
That line is a proposal for policing bargains. The Court’s general acceptance of plea bargaining remains the baseline against which the proposal is made.28
A stem that describes someone who “accepted” a condition to avoid a worse outcome invites two shortcuts. One treats the acceptance as consent that ends the claim, and the other treats the forced choice as an unconstitutional condition without further analysis. For a probation search condition, Knights supports a third path: run the reasonableness balance, with the clearly communicated condition and the two goals of probation on one side and the probationer’s diminished privacy on the other, and ask whether the officer had at least reasonable suspicion. For a clemency interview, state the Hobson’s-choice theory as the Court of Appeals’ theory, note the dissenting judge’s response, and report the reversal without supplying a rationale for the Supreme Court. For a plea bargain, identify the trial right and the leniency offered, say that the practice is accepted as an exception to the general rule against bargaining away rights, and present the contract and coercion arguments as the competing explanations.
Paying for a Hearing
A concurring opinion in Van Dyke v. Thompson treated a price on a hearing as an unconstitutional condition on the due process right to be heard.31 Because the source is a state-court concurrence, it shows how one judge carried the doctrine into procedural rights and does not state the court’s holding. An exam answer should keep that label attached to it.
The collection scheme worked this way. The agency, DSHS, conditioned the opportunity for a hearing on payment. Sidney requested a hearing and did not receive one because he failed to pay the amount required. DSHS then, without further notice, served an order on Sallie’s employer to withhold and deliver 25 percent of her wages under RCW 74.20A.080. The concurrence found that this procedure failed even the bare minimal requirements of due process, and it called the hearing DSHS allowed “meaningless.”32
The concurrence found two defects, and each has its own logic. The first is that DSHS made the opportunity for a hearing depend on payment, which imposes an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of a due process right.33 It drew its principle from Garrity v. New Jersey: “There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.” It compared North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., where a garnishment statute fell in part because the debtor’s only way to dissolve the garnishment was to post a bond, and it found the condition before it more onerous, since payment was a prerequisite to the hearing itself. It added a cf. citation to Boddie v. Connecticut, in which a state could not deny dissolution of marriage to a person unable to pay court costs.34
The reasoning runs in a circle that the doctrine exposes. A hearing exists so that a person can contest the government’s claim. If the person must first pay the claim, the government has collected the very thing the hearing was meant to test, and a debtor who disputes the debt, or who simply cannot raise the money, never reaches the forum. The price operates as a penalty on invoking the right, and because the right is the process the state owes before it takes property, the person must give up the protection in order to use it.
The second defect concerned what the hearing could decide. The concurrence read the hearing as confined to the amount owed, so a debtor could not contest whether the claim itself was valid. It took from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. that due process is afforded only by a hearing aimed at establishing the validity of the underlying claim.35 A hearing about arithmetic never asks whether the debt should be collected at all. The two defects compound each other: the first screens out debtors who cannot pay, and the second drains the hearing of value for those who can.
An exam stem describing a collection or seizure procedure invites two questions drawn from this reasoning. The first is whether the opportunity for a hearing depends on prepayment of the disputed sum, and the second is whether the hearing can reach the debtor’s defenses on liability or only the amount. A stem with either feature points toward invalidity under the concurrence’s analysis, and a stem with neither presents no condition on the hearing at all. Identify the source as a concurring state-court opinion applying due process, and treat its reasoning as persuasive and not as the court’s holding.