523 U.S. 272 (1998)
The Ohio Constitution vests the Governor with power to grant clemency upon conditions he deems proper.1 The General Assembly has delegated much of the application and investigation process to the Ohio Adult Parole Authority.2
For an inmate under death sentence, the Authority must conduct a clemency hearing within 45 days of the scheduled execution date.3 Prior to the hearing, the inmate may request an interview with one or more parole board members at which counsel is not permitted.4 The Authority must complete its review and make a recommendation to the Governor even if a stay is later obtained.5
Eugene Woodard was sentenced to death for aggravated murder committed during a carjacking.6 His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1993, and this Court denied certiorari in 1994.7 When Woodard failed to obtain a stay more than 45 days before his scheduled execution, the Authority commenced its clemency investigation and informed him that he could have an interview on September 9, 1994, with the hearing to follow on September 16, 1994.8
Woodard did not request the interview.9 He instead objected to the short notice and requested assurances that counsel could attend and participate in both the interview and the hearing.10 When the Authority did not respond, Woodard filed suit in the United States District Court on September 14, 1994, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Ohio’s clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.11
The District Court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.12 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this Court granted certiorari.13
Whether an inmate has a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings under either Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat or Evitts v. Lucey?14
Pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review. The Due Process Clause is not violated where the procedures in question do no more than confirm that the clemency and pardon powers are committed, as is our tradition, to the authority of the executive.15
No. The established facts establish that the Ohio Constitution vests the Governor with power to grant clemency upon conditions he deems proper and that the Authority's recommendation remains purely advisory even after the mandatory hearing and review. This structure confirms that clemency powers rest with the executive, exactly as Dumschat requires for the conclusion that an inmate possesses only a unilateral hope rather than a protected interest.16 The facts further show that Woodard had already been convicted and sentenced to death with full appellate review completed before the clemency process began, so no new life interest arises from the subsequent executive procedures.17 Evitts supplies no different result because clemency lies outside the adjudicatory system and does not determine guilt or innocence.18
An inmate does not have a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens maintains that a living person possesses a constitutionally protected interest in life under the Due Process Clause.20 He argues that when a state adopts clemency procedures as an integral part of its system for determining whether to deprive a person of life, those procedures must comport with due process.21 Stevens would remand the case to the District Court to determine whether Ohio's procedures meet the minimum requirements of due process.22
He notes that the interest in life warrants even greater protection than liberty interests at stake in parole or postconviction cases because death is a different kind of punishment in its severity and finality.23 Stevens emphasizes that the text of the Due Process Clause expressly prohibits a state from depriving any person of life without due process of law.24
Justice O'Connor concludes that some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.25 She notes that judicial intervention might be warranted in cases of arbitrary denial of access to the clemency process, but finds that the process afforded to Woodard, including notice and opportunity to participate, comports with whatever limitations the Due Process Clause may impose.26 O'Connor agrees that a prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person with an interest in his life.27
She rejects the view that clemency committed to executive discretion receives no constitutional safeguards at all.28
Whether giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violates an inmate’s Fifth Amendment rights?29
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination.30 A voluntary interview does not compel an inmate to speak, even if adverse inferences may be drawn from silence in a civil proceeding.31 The choice presented is similar to other choices criminal defendants must make in the course of proceedings, none of which violate the Fifth Amendment.32
No. The established facts establish that Woodard declined to request the interview, objected only to notice and counsel participation, and filed suit alleging a Fifth Amendment violation without any showing that statements were required.33 The procedure offers a voluntary interview without counsel or immunity, yet the facts demonstrate that any pressure to participate arises solely from the hope of obtaining clemency rather than from governmental compulsion.34 An inmate therefore faces the same sort of strategic election that defendants routinely confront when deciding whether to testify, and that election does not constitute compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.35
Giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process does not violate an inmate’s Fifth Amendment rights.36