Concept
Deprivation by Government Action
Procedural due process
Deprivation by Government Action
Both due process clauses turn on a verb as well as a noun. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State to “deprive any person” of those interests without it.1 The previous section took up the nouns, meaning which interests count as property or liberty. This section takes up the verb, because a protected interest entitles its holder to process only when government deprives the holder of it.
Most of the time the verb poses no obstacle. Whether government action amounts to a deprivation is seldom at issue, because ordinarily any government action that adversely affects a person’s liberty or property interest qualifies.2 The limits matter because they end a claim before the real contest over notice and hearing begins. Four do most of the work:
- The government must act against an individual, not by enacting a general rule.
- The official must act intentionally (in most courts, recklessly will do), not merely negligently.
- The government’s action must be directed at the claimant, not at a third party whose situation happens to affect the claimant.
- The claimant must be able to contest facts that matter under the governing law.
A claim that falls on the wrong side of any one of them fails as a procedural due process claim, even when the interest at stake is plainly protected. Failure here does not leave government unchecked: a careless injury may be redressed in state tort law, and a challenge to the rule itself may be brought under another constitutional provision. Each limit follows from what a hearing can accomplish. A hearing tests a decision about a particular person against the facts and the governing standard, so it has work to do only when government has deliberately made such a decision about that person on facts that could matter. The first limit separates decisions about individuals from rules for everyone.
Adjudication Versus General Rules
Procedural due process attaches when government acts in an adjudicatory capacity, applying a rule or policy to specific individuals, and it rarely attaches when government acts in a legislative capacity by adopting the rule itself.3 A state welfare department can play both roles within one program. When it adopts a regulation barring benefits beyond two years, recipients have no right to be heard on the regulation. When it later moves to terminate one recipient who has reached the limit, that recipient may object that the limit does not lawfully apply and is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question.4
The Court uses the Londoner v. Denver/Bi-Metallic distinction as shorthand for this line. Londoner marks the adjudicative decision to which the clause may apply, and Bi-Metallic marks the rulemaking to which it rarely applies, because agency rules rarely single out an individual for adverse treatment and instead reach an entire class.5 The line does not depend on the size of the loss. The Bi-Metallic side of it accepts that general statutes within the state’s power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, “sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.”6
What replaces the hearing is the political process. A person hurt as a member of a group or class must complain to elected representatives or seek their replacement at the next election.7 A state law that retroactively imposes pension obligations on companies about to terminate operations in the state, in order to protect employees with unvested pensions, shows the pattern: the law reaches a class of employers, and their recourse against its wisdom lies in the legislature.8 The individual keeps a voice at the enforcement stage, however, because after a statute or rule is enacted, those adversely affected may object that it does not lawfully apply to them.9 A general rule contains no facts about a particular person for a hearing to test, so the hearing right waits until the rule is applied to someone.
Two instincts mislead here. The first is that a large loss entitles the loser to a hearing, and Bi-Metallic accepts the opposite, so the weight of the loss matters later, when the question becomes how much process is due. The second is that the number of people affected decides the matter, when the real question is whether government is deciding something about a particular person on that person’s own circumstances or setting a rule for a class. A claimant who is the subject of an individualized decision must still show that the official’s conduct was deliberate, which is the next limit.
Intentional Conduct Required
The second limit looks to the official’s state of mind. In Daniels v. Williams, the Court began with the purpose of the Due Process Clause, which is to avert and redress government officials’ “affirmative abuse of power,” and concluded that negligence, a failure to act with reasonable care, is not that kind of abuse.11 The plaintiff in Daniels may have lost something in a literal sense, namely his liberty interest in not being injured, but he suffered no deprivation in the constitutional sense. The Court added that its conclusion did not make negligence claims unimportant, only better suited to another forum: a tort action in state court.12
The limit fits the remedy as well as the purpose. A hearing tests a decision to take an interest, and a careless injury rests on no such decision, so a hearing would have nothing to examine. The intentional actions of officials, by contrast, can support a due process claim.13
The strongest argument for loosening the limit appeared in Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion in Davidson v. Cannon. He conceded that negligence alone will ordinarily not effect a deprivation, but he argued that a prisoner stripped of every means of self-protection, unable to possess or use weapons, to fight back without discipline, or to escape, depends wholly on prison officials. On that footing, he reasoned, their negligence in ignoring a probable risk of harm is the abuse of governmental authority that triggers the clause.14 The argument has not displaced the general rule that negligence does not suffice.
Between the two poles lies conduct worse than carelessness but short of purpose, and the law there is unsettled. Daniels left unresolved whether officials who act with a state of mind between negligence and intent can effect a deprivation.15 Most courts that have confronted the question hold that recklessness can, and most also require that the official actually recognized the substantial risk of harm, which is what distinguishes recklessness from negligence.16 The Supreme Court has not resolved the middle range, even in a later case such as County of Sacramento v. Lewis.
The seriousness of the injury does not decide this limit. The plaintiff in Daniels was hurt, and what mattered was what the officials chose to do. A claimant who fails here still has the state tort remedy, and a claimant who shows an intentional deprivation moves on to the third limit, which asks whom the government’s action targeted.
Direct Effects Only
The third limit concerns whom the government’s action targets. An individual must be the target of the action in order to suffer a deprivation of liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clauses.18 A person who feels the consequences of an action aimed at someone else has, for procedural due process purposes, lost nothing the clause counts.
The leading illustration is O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, where the Court held that nursing home residents had no due process right to notice and a hearing before a federal agency decertified the facility in which they lived.19 The justices acknowledged that decertification might cause “severe hardship” for at least some residents, because one must live in a qualified nursing home to be eligible for federal medical benefits. They nonetheless called that harm “an indirect and incidental result” of government action against a third party, the nursing home.20 The residents fell on the wrong side of “[t]he simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen’s legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally.”21
The distinction fits what a hearing is for. A hearing tests a decision about the claimant, and the decertification was a decision directed at the facility. The facility could contest the agency’s case, and the residents were bystanders to a decision made about someone else. A beneficiary whose own benefits an agency terminates stands differently, because that person is the one the decision is about.
Students often treat the severity of the harm as the test, and O’Bannon rejects that move. The Court acknowledged that the residents might suffer severe hardship and still found no deprivation, because the question is whom the government acted against, and the size of the loss does not answer it.22 The weight of a claimant’s loss matters later, when the question is how much process is due. It cannot turn an incidental effect into a direct one. A claimant who clears this limit still faces the last of the four, which asks whether the dispute turns on facts the claimant can contest.
Contestable Facts Required
Even a party who has been deprived of a protected interest is entitled to a hearing only if, under the relevant substantive legal principles, there is some ground on which to challenge the deprivation.24 In short, a hearing is required only if the party’s challenge to the government action is relevant to establishing that the deprivation is illegitimate. If the government seeks to condemn A’s car on the basis that it was used in a criminal enterprise and A denies any such use, A must be afforded a hearing to contest the government’s factual claim. A would not be entitled to a hearing to prove an irrelevant point, such as having been out of town when the crime was committed.25
The Court applied this relevancy principle in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe. The respondent there sought a hearing on his current dangerousness before Connecticut publicly disclosed his registry information. But Connecticut had decided that the registry information of all sex offenders, currently dangerous or not, must be disclosed, so even if he proved he was not likely to be currently dangerous, disclosure would follow. Unless he could show that this substantive rule of law was defective by conflicting with a provision of the Constitution, “any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise.”26
The logic is simple. A hearing is a fact-finding device that protects a claimant by exposing government error on facts that determine the outcome. When the governing rule makes a fact immaterial, proof of that fact cannot change the result, and the hearing has nothing to protect. What the claimant objects to is the rule, and a fair procedure cannot cure a complaint about the rule itself.
A claimant who loses at this screen is not left without any argument. A challenge that the rule itself conflicts with the Constitution is a different kind of claim from a procedural one. In Kansas v. Hendricks, for example, the Court upheld a statute allowing civil commitment of persons likely to engage in “predatory acts” of sexual violence because of a mental abnormality or disorder, rejecting an attack on the statute’s validity, on its face and as applied, under the due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto clauses.27 On an exam, a claimant who admits the triggering fact and asks to prove something else presents a failed procedural claim with a possible challenge to the rule. A claimant who denies the triggering fact, like the misidentified driver or the owner who denies using the car, presents a hearing right, and the analysis moves on to what process is due.
A claimant who clears all four limits has shown that government intentionally and directly took a protected interest through an individualized decision that turns on disputed, relevant facts. The inquiry then shifts from whether a hearing is owed to what the hearing must look like and when it must occur, questions that call for weighing competing interests. How quickly an agency must adjudicate after a summary action, for instance, depends on a careful weighing, and the Court has held that a ninety-day wait does not necessarily violate due process.28 The next sections begin with notice and the opportunity to be heard.