210 U.S. 373 (1908)
The plaintiffs in error, owners of lands abutting Eighth Avenue in Denver, Colorado, commenced an action in a Colorado state court seeking to relieve their properties from an assessment for the cost of paving the street.1
The trial court granted the requested relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's judgment and ordered judgment in favor of the defendants, the City and County of Denver.2 The case reached the United States Supreme Court on writ of error.3
Under the Denver City Charter of 1893, the board of public works could order street paving upon petition by a majority of the owners of the frontage to be assessed.4 The board was required to adopt specifications, designate an assessment district, prepare a map and cost estimate, and provide notice by publication with an opportunity to be heard before recommending an ordinance to the city council.5 The city council could pass the ordinance, which included a finding that the board had complied with the charter requirements, including the petition.6
After the paving work in Eighth Avenue Paving District No. 1 was completed, the board of public works certified the total cost and a provisional apportionment among the lots to the city clerk.7 The clerk published notice that written complaints or objections filed within thirty days would be heard and determined by the city council before passage of any assessing ordinance. The plaintiffs in error, through their attorney Joshua Grozier, filed a detailed written protest on January 13, 1900, objecting to the assessment on multiple grounds, including lack of proper petition and insufficient benefits.8
The city council, sitting as a board of equalization in a specially called session without providing notice of the hearing time to the objectors, adopted a resolution confirming the apportionment made by the board of public works.9 Subsequently, the city council enacted the assessment ordinance without further notice or hearing to the landowners.10 The trial court found as a fact that no opportunity for hearing was afforded to the affected property owners.11
Whether the Denver City Charter provision authorizing the city council to make a conclusive finding by ordinance that improvements were duly ordered after notice duly given and a proper petition was filed denies due process of law to the affected landowners under the Fourteenth Amendment?12
Due process of law does not require notice and hearing at every stage of proceedings that lay the foundation for a tax assessment.13 The legislature may authorize a conclusive determination by the city council on preliminary matters such as compliance with a petition requirement without notice to landowners, provided a hearing is afforded before the assessment itself becomes irrevocably fixed.14
No. The proceedings from the beginning up to and including the passage of the ordinance authorizing the work did not include any assessment or necessitate any assessment.15 The board of public works transmitted the resolution and form of ordinance to the city council after receiving petitions.16 The council in the ordinance directing the improvement adjudged that a proper petition had been filed.17 The Supreme Court of Colorado held this determination conclusive under the charter.18
That holding is accepted as state law.19 Because the charter could have authorized improvements without any petition requirement at all, the conclusive finding on the petition without notice does not deny due process when a later hearing on the assessment is provided.20
The Denver City Charter provision does not deny due process of law to the affected landowners under the Fourteenth Amendment.21
Whether the assessment procedure followed by Denver authorities for the cost of paving in Eighth Avenue Paving District No. 1 afforded the abutting landowners notice and an opportunity to be heard before the assessment became fixed, as required by due process of law?22
Where a state legislature commits to a subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount, and upon whom an assessment shall be levied, due process requires that at some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, and that hearing in its essence demands the right to support allegations by argument however brief and, if need be, by proof however informal.23
No. After completion of the paving the board of public works certified the total cost and provisional apportionment to the city clerk.24 The clerk published notice that written complaints filed within thirty days would be heard and determined by the city council before passage of any assessing ordinance.25 The plaintiffs in error filed a detailed written protest through their attorney on January 13, 1900, objecting on multiple grounds including lack of a proper petition and insufficient benefits.26 The city council then met as a board of equalization in a specially called session without notice to the objectors.27
It confirmed the apportionment without hearing any testimony or argument on the filed complaints.28 Subsequently the city council enacted the assessment ordinance without further notice or hearing.29 The trial court found as a fact that no opportunity for hearing was afforded.30 The state law denied landowners any court review of objections cognizable by the board of equalization.31
The assessment procedure did not afford the abutting landowners notice and an opportunity to be heard before the assessment became fixed, as required by due process of law.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Holmes, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented from the judgment reversing the assessment.33 The dissent reflects disagreement with the majority conclusion that the city council's handling of written objections denied due process.34 Although no separate opinion elaborates the grounds, the dissent indicates that the procedure satisfied constitutional requirements.35
The position of the dissenters was that the assessment should have been upheld against the landowners' challenge.36