Concept
Murphy and Prohibitions
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
Murphy and Prohibitions
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association asked whether the anticommandeering rule of New York v. United States and Printz v. United States reaches a federal order phrased as a prohibition. In New York, Congress told states to take title to radioactive waste or to regulate as it instructed. In Printz, it imposed duties on state law enforcement officers. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) told states to stop. A state obeys a prohibition by doing nothing, which tempts a reader to conclude that no one has been conscripted. The Court rejected that inference: the distinction between compelling a state to enact legislation and prohibiting it from enacting new laws is empty, because Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures in either event.1
The rule rests on the structure of the grant of power. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States, or to the people, the powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the United States nor prohibits to the States.2 The Constitution gives Congress only enumerated powers, so all other legislative power stays with the states, and the list of conferred powers conspicuously omits any power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The anticommandeering doctrine “simply represents the recognition of this limit on congressional authority.”3 A limit that rests on a missing power does not care whether the federal order says “do” or “do not.”
Four questions organize the case, and the subsections that follow take them in order. What does PASPA forbid, and did New Jersey’s repeal violate it? Does a prohibition command a legislature as surely as an obligation does? Can the prohibition be rescued as preemption? What remains of the Act once its central provision falls?
PASPA and New Jersey's Repeal
PASPA makes it unlawful for a State or its subdivisions “to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based on competitive sporting events. A second subsection makes it unlawful for “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” those same schemes if done “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.”4 The first subsection speaks to states and the second to private persons, a division that matters later in this unit.
The Act does not make sports gambling itself a federal crime. The Attorney General and professional and amateur sports organizations may bring civil actions to enjoin violations. “Grandfather” provisions let existing forms of sports gambling continue in four States, and another provision would have permitted New Jersey to set up a scheme in Atlantic City within a year of PASPA’s enactment.5 The federal answer to a state that authorized betting was therefore a lawsuit to enjoin the authorization.
New Jersey responded with a statute framed as a repealer. The 2014 Act declares that it is not to be interpreted as causing the State to authorize, license, sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote sports gambling. It repeals the state-law provisions that prohibited the placement and acceptance of wagers on sporting events by persons 21 or older at a horseracing track or a casino or gambling house in Atlantic City.6 The legislature acted on a suggestion that a partial repeal would be allowed, so the statute raised a precise question: is a repeal, whatever it calls itself, the kind of authorization PASPA forbids?
The Court answered yes. When a state completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports gambling schemes, it “authorize[s]” those schemes under PASPA.7 The ordinary use of the word explains why. The concept of authorization makes sense only against a backdrop of prohibition or regulation, and a state is not regarded as authorizing everything it does not prohibit. No one would say that a state “authorizes” its residents to brush their teeth, eat apples, or sing in the shower; we speak of state authorization only if the activity in question would otherwise be restricted.8 Two states may be equally silent today about an activity, one because it never regulated apple-eating and the other because it just repealed its sports-betting ban. Only the second has authorized anything.
The narrower reading also carried a cost. The Third Circuit could not say which, if any, partial repeals are allowed. The respondents and the United States said that PASPA’s ban on state authorization allows complete repeals, but beyond that they identified no clear line, and the Court thought it improbable that Congress meant to enact so nebulous a regime.9 A legislature told that a full repeal is safe and a partial one is risky would have no way to know how much repealing is too little.
The choice between the readings did not change the outcome. The plausibility of the alternative interpretations is debatable, but even if the provision could be read as the respondents and the United States suggested, it would still violate the anticommandeering principle.10 A narrowing construction can save a statute only when the narrowed statute is valid, and here it was not. The next subsection explains why.
On an exam, look first to the activity’s legal status before the legislature acted. A legislature that lifts a prior ban on adult wagering at licensed casinos has authorized the activity in PASPA’s sense, even if the enactment calls itself a repeal and even if some prohibitions remain. The instinct to treat a repeal as a mere absence of law fits an activity the state never restricted, such as eating apples, and fails for one it did.
Prohibitions Are Commands Too
New York, Printz, and Murphy v. NCAA have one feature in common: in each, Congress spoke to a state in its governing capacity. They differ in the branch addressed and the direction of the order. In New York, the provision required a state, acting through whichever branch state law empowered to act, either to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste or to regulate according to Congress’s instructions, and the Court held that “the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction.”12 Offering the state a choice between the two commands cured nothing, because a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.13 Printz carried the principle to state executive officers. The Court struck down Brady Act provisions that imposed duties on state law enforcement officers in the background checking and licensing of handgun sales, because Congress must depend on the federal Executive, not the state executive, to enforce its laws.14 Justice Stevens, dissenting, called the Act’s interim provisions “a modest and temporary measure” that did not commandeer the States “in any meaningful sense.”15 The majority held that even seemingly minor duties, imposed only temporarily, are not allowed.16 Murphy applied the same principle to a state legislature and to a prohibition.
Underneath all three decisions runs a distinction between regulating private conduct and regulating states. Even where Congress has authority to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. The Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.17 That allocation reflects the Framers’ design: they rejected a central government that would act upon and through the States and conferred on Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.18 Because the formulation covers commands to “require or prohibit,” nothing in the rule turns on the form of the command.
The respondents and the United States nonetheless drew a line between commands to act and prohibitions. New York and Printz, they said, involved affirmative commands, and PASPA’s anti-authorization provision told states only what not to do. The Court answered: “This distinction is empty.” It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz commanded affirmative action rather than imposing a prohibition, and the basic principle, that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures, applies in either event.19
The distinction is empty because the form of an order is a matter of drafting. A command to enact a recycling program can be restated as a ban on leaving recycling unregulated, and a command to keep an existing ban in force can be restated as a ban on repealing it. If the rule reached only the first form, Congress could recover everything it had lost by changing a few verbs. The Court saw “no good reason” why an order of one kind would intrude more deeply on state sovereignty than the other.20
The effect on the legislature is the same either way. The anti-authorization provision “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do,” and under the Court’s reading or the narrower one urged by the respondents and the United States, “state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress.” The Court put it this way: it is “as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”21 That image explains why inaction offers no refuge. A federal officer at the chamber door controls the legislature as fully as a federal clerk who writes the bill.
The respondents and the United States also cited South Carolina v. Baker, Reno v. Condon, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, and FERC v. Mississippi to show that the provision is constitutional. The Court distinguished each of them.22 Evenhanded federal regulation of an activity in which both states and private actors engage is a different matter, because the anticommandeering doctrine does not apply to it.23
What matters, then, is whom the federal provision addresses. A provision that speaks to a state legislature about its own lawmaking is a direct order, and it is invalid whether it compels or forbids. Congress has other tools. In New York, it could have regulated the producers of radioactive waste directly and preempted disfavored state rules in the process, or encouraged states to adopt its preferred regime through incentives, and the Court upheld the conditional distribution of escrow funds as a valid exercise of the Spending Clause.24 What Congress could not do was force a state to administer a federal scheme.25 The Constitution “authorizes Congress to regulate directly or to pre-empt, but it does not authorize Congress to conscript state legislative processes.”26 Murphy applied the same line: Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each state is free to act on its own.27
None of this depends on appraising the importance of a state function. Garcia held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitutionally be applied to state and local governments, rejected a rule of state immunity that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a function is “integral” or “traditional,” and left the protection of the states’ regulatory autonomy to the political process.28 Nothing in Murphy’s reasoning asks whether gambling regulation is a traditional state function. The question is whether Congress has issued a direct order to the legislature.
Federal limits on state power sometimes leave the work of implementation to the states. After announcing a constitutional restriction in Atkins, for example, the Court left to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.”29
A common first instinct about a federal ban aimed at state lawmakers is that no one has been conscripted, since the state complies by leaving its statute book alone. That instinct asks whether the state must act, which is the question the Court found irrelevant. The useful question is whether the provision dictates to the legislature, or to state officers, what they may or must do in their governing roles. If it does, the form of the order is beside the point, and a valid federal route runs through direct regulation of private parties, which displaces contrary state law.
Preemption Versus Commandeering
Defenders of the anti-authorization provision also characterized it as preemption. Preemption is the doctrine under which valid federal law, whether a statute, a treaty, or an administrative rule, supplants state law that is inconsistent with it.31 It rests on the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, which makes federal law the supreme law of the land and makes federal law control when it conflicts with state law.32 The label mattered because it offered a route around the rule stated in the last subsection. If calling an order to a state “preemption” were enough, Congress could dictate the contents of any state’s statute book.
The Supremacy Clause blocks that route, because it “is not an independent grant of legislative power to Congress” but only “a rule of decision.” A provision claiming preemptive force must therefore satisfy two requirements. First, it must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution, and pointing to the Supremacy Clause will not do. Second, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” the provision must be best read as one that regulates private actors.33 The first requirement prevents circularity: a rule that ranks federal law above state law presupposes a federal law Congress had power to make. The second is where preemption meets the anticommandeering rule. When Congress fixes the rights and duties of private persons and a state law collides with them, the state law yields, yet no one has ordered the state legislature to do anything.
The Court identified three recognized types of preemption, conflict, express, and field, and observed that all work the same way. Congress imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors, a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law, and the federal law takes precedence.34 Each type shows that pattern in a different setting:
- In conflict preemption, as in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, federal law enacted under the Commerce Clause barred generic-drug manufacturers from altering the composition or labeling the FDA had approved, while state tort law effectively required a manufacturer to add warnings. The state duty was preempted because it conflicted with the federal rule governing manufacturers.35
- In express preemption, the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption provision, at issue in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., is phrased as a limit on the states but operates like any other preemptive federal law, because it confers on covered carriers a federal right to engage in certain conduct, subject only to federal constraints.36
- In field preemption, the federal alien-registration statutes in Arizona v. United States provided a full set of standards governing registration and reflected a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if parallel to federal standards. The statutes imposed federal registration obligations on aliens and also conferred a federal right to be free from any other registration requirements.37
Every form of preemption, whatever language Congress or the Court uses, is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the States.38 The airline provision shows that phrasing does not settle the question. A clause that says no state shall do something reads like an order to a legislature, but what decides the matter is how the provision operates on private actors.
Measured against that principle, the anti-authorization clause fails the second requirement. Section 3702(1) addresses the state: it makes it unlawful for a State or its subdivisions to authorize sports gambling. The provision aimed at private persons is a different one, §3702(2), which bars them from running or promoting such schemes under a government’s law.39 As Justice Breyer put it in a separate opinion, the challenged part of §3702(1) forces the States to prohibit sports gambling schemes, thereby shifting the burden of enforcing federal regulatory policy from the federal government to state governments.40 The Court described the provision as one that “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”41 With no federal rule about private conduct for state law to conflict with, the clause is a direct order to the state and not preemption. The drug-labeling case shows the contrast: the labeling rule regulated manufacturers, and the state tort duty collided with it.
Section 3702(2) is the part of PASPA that applies federal policy directly to individuals.42 Whether it could survive without the clause that fell is a question of severability, which the next subsection takes up.
Severability and Separate Opinions
Invalidating the anti-authorization clause raised a different question: whether the rest of PASPA survives. That is a question of severability. The Court’s answer was that “no provision of PASPA is severable from the provision directly at issue.”44
The determination turns on a counterfactual question about Congress: “Would Congress still have passed” the valid sections “had it known” about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?45 The Court asked that question provision by provision, and its reasons for two of the remaining groups show the method.
The private-party provisions came first. Congress would not want to sever the provisions that prohibit a private actor from sponsoring, operating, or promoting sports gambling schemes “pursuant to” state law, because PASPA’s enforcement scheme shows that §3702(1) and §3702(2) were meant to operate together. That scheme, suited for challenging state authorization or licensing or a small number of private operations, would break down if a state broadly decriminalized sports gambling.46
The advertising bans fell for a different reason. If they stood alone, federal law would forbid the advertising of an activity that is legal under both federal and state law, something Congress has rarely done. Even cigarette advertising is heavily regulated but not totally banned.47
Two Justices wrote separately on these questions. Justice Breyer read the two subsections apart. Section 3702(2), addressed to individuals, would standing alone pursue Congress’s objective of halting the spread of sports gambling schemes by “regulat[ing] interstate commerce directly,” while the challenged part of §3702(1) forces the States to prohibit such schemes.48 Justice Thomas, concurring, questioned the severability doctrine itself. When early American courts found a statute unconstitutional, they simply declined to enforce it in the case before them, and there was no “next step” of asking whether the legislature would have preferred no law at all.49 He added that although no party had asked the Court to reconsider its modern severability precedents, which are in tension with longstanding limits on the judicial power, “at some point, it behooves us to do so.”50
Keep the two holdings apart. The anticommandeering holding reached the provision that dictates what a state legislature may enact. The severability holding rests on a counterfactual about Congress, and the private-party ban fell under it because Congress would not have wanted it standing alone, not because the Court held that it commands the states.51 The Court summed up the result: PASPA “regulate[s] state governments’ regulation” of their citizens, and the Constitution gives Congress no such power.52