Concept
Executive Immunity
Executive, legislative, and judicial immunities
Executive Immunity
The Constitution gives legislators an express immunity in the Speech or Debate Clause, which protects the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators.1 It gives executive officers no counterpart. The nearest text is Article II, Section 4, which provides that the President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.2 Impeachment is a political remedy that Congress administers, and it says nothing about when a private person may sue an executive official for damages. The rules on that question therefore come from structure, history, and policy, and the Supreme Court has built most of them as federal common law.3
Two decisions announced the same day, Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, set the modern structure.4 The structure has two tiers. At the top, the President holds absolute immunity from civil damages for official acts. Below the President, aides, Cabinet members, and most other executive officials hold qualified immunity, which shields them from damages unless their conduct violates clearly established legal rules of which a reasonable person would have known.5 A narrow functional route leads upward: an aide receives absolute immunity only for discretionary functions in sensitive areas such as national security or foreign policy.6 One logic runs through both tiers. The more a function demands fearless, independent judgment, and the more a damages suit would distract or distort that judgment, the stronger the shield.7
This section takes the tiers in order: the President’s absolute immunity and the reasons for it, the lesser protection for aides, the test that governs qualified immunity, and the way courts apply that test. The last subsection marks the outer limit. Because immunity attaches to official acts, a sitting President has no immunity from a federal civil suit over unofficial conduct, including conduct that predates the presidency, as Clinton v. Jones held.8
Absolute Immunity for the President
Article II vests the executive power in a President and directs that officer to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, yet neither provision says whether a private citizen may sue the President for damages.9 Nixon v. Fitzgerald filled that silence. The Court held that a former President is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for his official acts, an immunity it called “a functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history.”10
A. Ernest Fitzgerald was a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force whose job was eliminated in January 1970 in a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, which the Air Force described as a measure to promote economy and efficiency.11 Fitzgerald alleged that he was in fact discharged in retaliation for his testimony before a congressional subcommittee, and he sued Richard Nixon and other federal officials in federal district court, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and federal statutes.12 One claim was a direct action under the Constitution and two were statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability, and Congress had taken no express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for official acts.13 The case thus posed the immunity question in its cleanest form: a damages claim against a President for conduct in office, with no statute on point.
Nothing in Article II confers the immunity, so the Court looked to structure and history. The Presidency did not exist through most of the development of the common law, so historical analysis had to draw on the constitutional heritage and structure, and it merged almost at once with the public-policy analysis a federal court properly undertakes about what is implicit in the nature of the President’s office under a separation of powers.14 The Court answered the objection that the text is silent in three steps. A specific textual basis has never been a prerequisite to immunity, since no provision expressly confers judicial immunity and judges’ immunity is nevertheless well settled. Absolute immunity had already been extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch, including prosecutors. And the historical evidence supports an inference that the Framers assumed the President’s immunity, because several delegates at the Constitutional Convention feared that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his capacity to perform the duties of the office.15 Because the materials on the Framers’ intent are fragmentary, the Court said its most compelling arguments arise from the separation of powers and the Judiciary’s historic understanding of that doctrine.16
The Court rested the immunity on the President’s unique position. Article II makes the President the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity, including enforcement of federal law, conduct of foreign affairs, and management of the Executive Branch.17 Three features of that position favor absolute protection. First, a President must decide matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings, and those are the very cases in which the public has the greatest interest in an official who can deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of the office; judges and prosecutors already hold absolute immunity for similar reasons.18 Second, the office is conspicuous. Because the effect of the President’s actions reaches countless people, he is an easily identifiable target for damages suits, and awareness of that vulnerability could distract him from public duties to the detriment of the Nation the Presidency serves.19 Third, the reach of Presidential decisions multiplies the potential plaintiffs. Many people will consider themselves aggrieved, and every suit that reached the merits would involve judicial questioning of the reasons for the decision, how it was arrived at, the information on which it was based, and who supplied it.20 A later opinion observed that the key paragraph of Fitzgerald rests on two concerns, devoting four sentences to the distraction of time and energy and three to the distortion of official decisions.21 Distraction and distortion are the same two harms that ground the other immunities in this chapter.
The Court then had to decide how far the protection reaches. Absolute immunity for other officials usually follows particular functions. Butz attached it to those specific functions of a Cabinet member for which it is clearly essential, not to the office, and the Speech or Debate Clause reaches only legislative acts.22 For the President, the Court instead recognized absolute immunity for acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official responsibility.23 The reason is practical. The President’s responsibilities are so varied that it is often hard to say which of his functions an action belongs to, and sorting Fitzgerald’s case would have required deciding the President’s motive, because Fitzgerald said he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony while the Air Force said the reorganization promoted efficiency. The Court regarded inquiries of that kind as highly intrusive.24
The reorganization fell inside the perimeter. The President’s authority to prescribe how the Secretary conducts the business of the Air Force necessarily includes authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, so the alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.25 An allegation that the act was unlawful or retaliatory therefore does not move it outside the perimeter. Fitzgerald alleged exactly that, and the Court still held the act protected.26 The usual exam error is to ask whether the President’s act was lawful or well motivated. The question is whether the act falls within his official responsibilities, and a damages claim over a discharge ordered as part of an Air Force reorganization is barred whatever the plaintiff alleges about motive.
The immunity bars a private damages suit and nothing broader. The Court explained that judicial action remains warranted when needed to serve broad public interests, as when a court acts to maintain the proper balance among the branches or to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution, though not in a merely private damages suit over official acts.27 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer illustrates the first category: although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order.28 Courts may also direct a subpoena to a President. Chief Justice Marshall so ruled in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, and the Court later held that President Nixon had to comply with a subpoena for tape recordings of his conversations.29 The protection covers official acts only. A concurring opinion stressed that the immunity is limited to civil damages claims and that a President, like Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, and congressional aides, is not immune for acts outside official duties.30 Clinton v. Jones, taken up in the last subsection, applied that limit.
Other checks on the President remain, and the Court listed them. Impeachment is still available, and the President also faces formal and informal checks that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials: constant scrutiny by the press, vigilant congressional oversight that makes the threat of impeachment credible, the desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President’s traditional concern for his historical stature.31 The Constitution also supplies mechanisms that operate outside civil damages altogether, such as the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s removal-like remedy for a President unable to discharge his duties and the Fourteenth Amendment’s disqualification rule for persons who engaged in insurrection.32 The majority drew the conclusion that impeachment demonstrates the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. Denying one remedy does not lift him above the law, any more than a judge is above the law because he cannot be held answerable in civil damages for a judgment, a prosecutor because he files an indictment, or a Congressman because he engages in legislative speech or debate.33
The majority left one question open: whether Congress could expressly create a damages action against the President. The Court noted only that Congress had taken no express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for official acts.34 Its repeated emphasis that the immunity derives from the separation of powers strongly suggests that any such effort would be unconstitutional. A concurring opinion said so directly: the immunity is either found in the separation of powers or does not exist, and once the Constitution confers it, “legislative action cannot alter that result.”35 An answer should present the question as unresolved while noting that the Court’s own reasoning cuts against congressional abrogation.
The dissent would have tied immunity to function rather than office. It pointed out that Cabinet officers receive absolute immunity only for the specific functions for which it is clearly essential, and Members of Congress only for legislative acts.36 In its view, attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather than to particular activities, places the President above the law and reverts to the old notion that the King can do no wrong.37 The only question it would ask is whether the dismissal of employees falls within a constitutionally assigned executive function whose performance a private damages action would substantially impair, and it believed the answer was no.38 It added that an immunity that was truly constitutional would logically shield the President from injunctions, criminal prosecution, and every other judicial process, a result no one claims.39 The majority’s answers appear above: a functional test would itself require the intrusive inquiry into motive, and impeachment and the other checks keep the President accountable. A companion decision announced the same day refused to extend the absolute immunity to the President’s aides, as the next subsection explains.40
Qualified Immunity for Aides
Harlow v. Fitzgerald carried the question down from the President to his staff. Decided the same day as Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it refused to extend the President’s absolute immunity to his aides.42 Fitzgerald alleged that two aides, Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, had joined a conspiracy to arrange his dismissal from the Air Force in retaliation for his congressional testimony.43 The aides sought derivative absolute immunity as an incident of their offices, and the Court held that such a claim must rest on the function the aide performs, not on proximity to the President.44 An aide who cannot make the functional showing holds only qualified immunity.
The baseline for that result was already in place. Butz v. Economou had extended the qualified-immunity approach of Scheuer to high federal officials of the Executive Branch.45 That choice reflected a balance of competing values: the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens against the need to protect officials who must exercise discretion and the public interest in the vigorous exercise of official authority.46 Both sides of the balance carry real weight. A damages action against the responsible official may give the victim of an abuse of power the only realistic chance to vindicate constitutional rights, while too strict a regime of liability may distract officers with time-consuming litigation and make public-spirited citizens reluctant to accept public employment.47 Butz resolved the balance for a Cabinet member by attaching absolute immunity only to specific functions, not to the office.48 An executive official’s claim to absolute immunity must be justified by the public interest in the special functions of the office, not the mere fact of high station, so closeness to the President cannot by itself carry an aide’s claim.49
The aides’ best argument came from Gravel v. United States, which held that a Member’s aides who implement the Member’s policies and decisions are entitled to the same absolute immunity as the Member, rejecting a literalistic reading of the Speech or Debate Clause.50 The analogy is straightforward: senior presidential aides act as the President’s alter egos, and their function is an integral part of his.51 The majority found that Gravel cuts the other way. Gravel protected Senators and their aides only when they performed acts legislative in nature, not other acts taken in an official capacity, and the cases on judges and prosecutors follow a similar line. An undifferentiated derivative immunity for the President’s aides therefore could not be reconciled with the functional approach that has characterized the Court’s immunity decisions, Gravel included.52
A second reason concerns the source of the President’s own protection. His absolute immunity derives in principal part from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station, and suits against other officials, including aides, generally do not invoke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President.53 The justifications given in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the sensitivity of the office and its visibility as a target for suits, attach to the officeholder and do not travel automatically to everyone who works nearby.
None of this means that no aide could ever claim absolute immunity. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in sensitive areas such as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.54 The Gravel analogy explains why. A derivative claim to presidential immunity is strongest in the central presidential domains of foreign policy and national security, where the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.55 The justification is the function, so a special-functions rationale supports protection for particular functions and never a blanket rule for all aides in all their duties.56
A national-security label does not carry either step by itself. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Court rejected the Attorney General’s claim to absolute immunity for authorizing a warrantless wiretap on national security grounds, which shows how hard the showing is.58
The usual exam error is to ask how close the aide stands to the President, or merely whether the act was official. The first question revives the rank argument the Court rejected, and the second skips step two, because an official act can still fall outside the protected function. Harlow and Butterfield show the failing side of the line. On the record before it, the Court could not conclude that either had shown that public policy required absolute immunity for any function of his office, and it could not conclude that the acts charged, if taken at all, lay within a protected area, though it left open that they could meet the proper standards on remand.59 Powell’s opinion contrasted national security cases with the ordinary advice-giving function involved there.60
The dissent found the result impossible to square with Gravel. The Speech or Debate Clause does not mention congressional aides, yet Gravel looked past its words to the structure of the Constitution and extended the immunity to a Member’s aides.61 By the same reasoning, the dissent argued, giving senior presidential aides only qualified immunity gives these key alter egos only lawsuits, winnable perhaps, but lawsuits nonetheless, with stress and effort that will disperse and drain their energies and their purses.62 In its view, derivative immunity depends on the function performed and the person’s relationship to the superior, not on rank. Cabinet officers outrank United States Attorneys, yet the former receive qualified immunity and the latter absolute immunity, because rank matters only insofar as it determines function.63 The dissent also distinguished Cabinet officers, who are department heads rather than alter egos, so that giving a President’s personal aides greater immunity than Cabinet officers would be consistent.64
Both opinions accept that immunity should track function, and they part over how to apply that premise. The dissent treats the senior aide’s whole role as part of the President’s function. The majority requires the aide to prove which function is sensitive enough to need a total shield and that the challenged act belonged to it. The majority’s rule controls, and an aide who cannot carry the burden has the defense described next, which was built on the assumption that insubstantial lawsuits could be quickly terminated.65
The Clearly Established Law Test
An executive official who cannot prove entitlement to absolute immunity falls back on qualified immunity. The standard for that defense comes from the second half of Harlow, which arose from Fitzgerald’s claim that two aides conspired to have him dismissed in retaliation for his testimony.67 The Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.68 Discretionary functions call for judgment, in contrast with ministerial tasks, and the judgments surrounding discretionary action are almost inevitably influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences, values, and emotions.69 The standard replaced an older test, and the weaknesses of that test explain the shape of the new one, so the older test comes first.
Before Harlow, qualified immunity had an objective and a subjective component. The objective element involved a presumptive knowledge of and respect for “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights,” and the subjective component referred to “permissible intentions.” That formulation came from Wood v. Strickland, and the Court characteristically defined the two components by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.70
The subjective component undercut the purpose of the defense. Butz had chosen a qualified rather than an absolute immunity on the assumption that the standard would let insubstantial lawsuits be quickly terminated.71 Questions of subjective intent, however, so rarely can be decided by summary judgment, the pretrial ruling that ends a case without trial when no genuine factual dispute remains. The evidence on motive also has no clear stopping point, and an inquiry into it can entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues, which is peculiarly disruptive of effective government.72 Powell’s opinion for the Court abandoned the subjective good-faith element of Butz because of its substantial costs.73
The Court’s answer was to measure immunity by the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s conduct. That moves the question from what the official was thinking, a matter of fact, to what the law was, a matter a judge can decide without a jury.74 On summary judgment the judge may determine not only the currently applicable law but also whether that law was clearly established when the action occurred, and until this threshold question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.75 The clearly-established requirement is a rule of fair notice. If the law was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate later legal developments, nor fairly be said to know that the law forbade conduct no one had yet identified as unlawful. If the law was clearly established, the defense ordinarily fails, since a reasonably competent official should know the law governing his conduct. The one exception is an official who claims extraordinary circumstances and proves that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, and even that defense turns primarily on objective factors.76
Notice runs out in the same way when the governing decisions are unsettled. In Morse v. Frederick, Justice Breyer, writing separately, would have resolved the damages claim on qualified immunity. The Court itself divided on the constitutional question, which strongly suggested that the answer as to how to apply prior law to those facts was unclear.77 A right on which judges cannot agree is not one a reasonable official can be charged with knowing.
Modern decisions break the inquiry into two questions: whether the facts pleaded show that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.78 The second question has become demanding. Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate, so that every reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violates the right.79
Because the test is objective, it still does not protect an official who should have known better. Defining immunity in objective terms is no license for lawless conduct. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate, and a person injured by that conduct may have a cause of action. Where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest is better served by action taken with independence and without fear of consequences.80 A concurring opinion added that the standard does not let an official who actually knows he is violating the law escape liability, so the clever and unusually well-informed violator will not evade just punishment.81
The standard has no subjective component, so allegations of bad faith are unavailing on the immunity question, though bad faith may be relevant to damages.82 If qualified immunity would otherwise exist, an allegation of improper motive cannot defeat it, because that would defeat the goal of allowing such suits to be dismissed at an early stage.83 The usual exam error is to try to defeat immunity by pleading malice. The plaintiff must instead show that the law was clearly established, because an official’s bad motive does not make unsettled law settled.
The standard operates across the board rather than office by office. Claims against public officers may rest on the common law of torts, on special statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or directly on the Constitution under Bivens.84 The Court had already found it untenable to distinguish, for purposes of immunity law, between § 1983 suits against state officials and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials, and it designed the Harlow standard to govern both.85 The protection also reaches private individuals temporarily retained by the government to help carry out its work, as Filarsky v. Delia held. Similar principles apply to federal officials, with the exception of the President, who has absolute immunity from civil damages liability for all conduct within the outer perimeter of his office.86 The rule applies only to suits for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of an official’s duties, and the Court expressed no view on injunctive or declaratory relief.87
Applying Qualified Immunity
The clearly established law test matters in practice because of who decides it and when. On summary judgment the judge may determine both the law that currently applies and whether that law was clearly established when the official acted, and discovery should not be allowed until that threshold question is resolved.89 The sequence follows from what the defense protects. The burdens of broad discovery fall on the official from the first deposition onward, so a ruling that waits for trial leaves the official with the name of an immunity and little of its benefit. As with other defenses, the official can raise it by a pre-answer motion or in the answer.90
The same logic explains why a denial can be appealed at once. A district-court order denying qualified immunity on an issue of law conclusively determines that the defendant must bear the burdens of discovery, is conceptually distinct from the merits, and would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, so it falls within the collateral-order doctrine, which permits immediate appeal from a narrow class of orders.91 Ashcroft v. Iqbal applied that reasoning and rejected the argument that the doctrine limits appellate jurisdiction to the “ultimate issue” whether the law was clearly established while excluding the question whether the facts pleaded establish a violation.92 The Court also cautioned that the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen.93
The right to an immediate appeal stops at disputes about what happened. A defendant who concedes that the right was clearly established but argues that the evidence is too thin to show an actual violation cannot appeal at once under Johnson v. Jones.94 The boundary tracks the justification for the appeal, since an appellate court can settle a pure question of law quickly, while a dispute over the facts is what a trial exists to resolve.
Within the motion, the court works through the two questions of violation and clearly established law. Saucier v. Katz, decided in 2001, required courts to take them in that order, so that a court’s first inquiry had to be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.95 The fixed order had a benefit, because the two-step approach is often beneficial in the development of constitutional precedent.96 It also drew criticism. Justice Breyer urged the Court to lift the rigid order-of-battle requirement and pointed out how easily the case before him could have been decided on qualified immunity, avoiding a far more difficult constitutional question.97 In Pearson v. Callahan in 2009, the Court held that Saucier’s two-step approach is not mandatory, so lower courts may alter the sequence when doing so will preserve scarce judicial resources.98
The flexibility carries a cost. A court that rests on the clearly-established question alone never decides whether the conduct was unconstitutional, so the right stays unsettled and the next official in the same position is immune for the same reason. Officials are then assured of continuing immunity even though their conduct may in fact be unconstitutional, a risk greatest on questions that seldom arise in settings where a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.99 Pearson therefore leaves a trade-off between saving resources in this case and building precedent for later ones, and a strong answer names both sides. An answer that recites Saucier’s two steps as mandatory describes the law as it stood before Pearson.
Qualified immunity also has a limit on the relief it blocks. Harlow applied only to suits for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of the official’s duties, and the Court expressed no view on injunctive or declaratory relief.100 Later descriptions state the point affirmatively: for executive and ministerial functions, the official’s qualified immunity operates solely against claims for damages.101 The limit follows from the purpose of the doctrine. The danger it addresses is personal financial liability that makes officials hesitate, and an injunction directs conduct going forward and exposes no one’s personal assets.
An allegation of improper motive does not change this early resolution. In Wood v. Moss, Secret Service agents kept their qualified immunity even though the plaintiffs alleged that the agents engaged in prohibited viewpoint discrimination.102 Bad faith is unavailing on the immunity question, although it may bear on damages.103 A plaintiff who pleads malice only to reach discovery therefore gains nothing unless the pleaded facts also show a violation of clearly established law.
Steps three and four carry the merits of the defense, and the other steps govern when and how the court reaches them. Most procedural questions on this topic turn on those timing steps.
Unofficial and Pre-Office Conduct
The President’s absolute immunity ends where official action ends, and Clinton v. Jones marks that boundary. A sitting President has no immunity from a federal civil suit over unofficial conduct that occurred before he took office.105 The Court added that the separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office.106 The holding clarifies what Nixon v. Fitzgerald protects. The immunity attaches to official acts within the outer perimeter of Presidential responsibility, and the same functional logic that gave presidential aides only qualified protection confines the President’s own protection to official conduct.
Paula Corbin Jones sued William Clinton for damages while he was President. She alleged that, while he was Governor of Arkansas, he made boorish sexual advances to her, and that her superiors at work then dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner in retaliation for her refusal.107 The complaint had four counts. The Court assumed that each stated a cause of action and observed that, except for the last count, which arguably might involve conduct within the outer perimeter of the President’s official responsibilities, the alleged misconduct was unrelated to any official duty and occurred before he was elected.108
The President moved to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any limitations periods until he was no longer President, when the plaintiff could refile.109 The District Court postponed any trial until the end of his term.110 In the Supreme Court his principal submission was that, in all but the most exceptional cases, the Constitution gives the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office.111 Two questions therefore ran together: whether any immunity exists for such conduct, and whether a court may nevertheless defer the case until the term ends.
The Court answered the first question by returning to the purpose of the immunity. Fitzgerald held that “the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purposes,” and because of the President’s broad responsibilities it extended the protection to the outer perimeter of his authority.112 Those purposes concern official decisions. A President who fears a damages judgment over an official choice may shade that choice, and the public then loses the vigorous judgment the office exists to supply.113 A suit over private conduct that predates the office challenges no official choice, so there is no decision for fear of liability to bend, and the reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct.114 The Court had never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.115
Placing Fitzgerald and Jones side by side shows which fact decides the question. In Fitzgerald a former President was protected from a damages suit over an official dismissal order, and in Jones a sitting President had no protection from a suit over events that predated his term.116 The defendant’s current office therefore neither creates nor destroys immunity. The usual exam error is to ask whether the defendant is President when sued, when the first question is whether the challenged act was official. The Court made that same sort inside Jones when it set the last count apart as arguably involving official conduct.117
The President’s strongest argument rested on the text and structure of the Constitution. He did not contend that the occupant of the office is above the law, in the sense that his conduct is entirely immune from judicial scrutiny; he argued only for a postponement of the proceedings that would decide whether he violated any law.118 The Court answered that a suit over unofficial conduct asks the courts only to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome, the decision cannot curtail the official powers of the Executive Branch, so the litigation poses no perceptible risk of misallocating either judicial or executive power.119
That left the contention that the litigation would burden the President’s time and energy even if no power shifted. The Court found the prediction unsupported: in more than two hundred years, only three sitting Presidents had been sued over private conduct, and a properly managed case seemed highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of the President’s time.120 Two settled propositions supported the Court’s view. Courts may decide whether a President’s official action conformed to law, as in Youngstown, and the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances, as the Burr and Nixon subpoenas show.121 Those propositions yield an argument from the greater to the lesser. If courts may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of official conduct, and may direct appropriate process to the President himself, they may determine the legality of unofficial conduct, whose incidental burden is lighter than the direct burden of invalidating an official act.122
Denying immunity did not settle whether the trial had to proceed on the plaintiff’s timetable. The Court refused to treat a stay as constitutionally required, whether in every case or in all but the most exceptional ones. If the Framers had thought the President needed protection from private litigation, they would more likely have adopted a categorical rule than one requiring him to litigate whether a case is exceptional, and whether a particular case deserves special treatment is more appropriately a matter of judicial discretion than of constitutional interpretation.123 The Court assumed that the President’s testimony could be taken at the White House at a time that accommodates his busy schedule, and that he need not attend a trial in person.124 The District Court’s discretion was misused here all the same. Given the danger of prejudice to the plaintiff, the President had not made an adequate showing of need, so deferring the trial until after his term was an abuse of discretion.125
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. He would have held that once the President sets forth and explains a conflict between the judicial proceeding and his public duties, a constitutional principle forbids a federal judge from interfering with the discharge of those duties, a principle grounded in Article II’s vesting of the entire executive power in a single individual and in the separation of powers.126 He doubted that ordinary case management would prove sufficient, and he thought courts might have to develop administrative rules, including postponement rules, to implement that principle.127 The majority’s prediction that the suit would absorb little presidential time was a forecast about political life, not a rule. The case itself later produced an independent counsel’s report recommending impeachment proceedings over alleged perjury in a deposition in the litigation. The House voted to impeach the President, and the Senate did not vote to convict.128