Concept
Chadha's Reach
Nondelegation doctrine
Chadha's Reach
INS v. Chadha arose from one deportation and a resolution passed by one House, but the rule it announced is framed by effect, not subject matter. Any exercise of legislative power by Congress that has the purpose and effect of altering the rights, duties, or legal relations of persons outside the legislative branch must conform to bicameralism and presentment: passage by both Houses and delivery to the President to sign or veto.1 A rule drawn that broadly has no natural stopping point. Chadha appeared to invalidate all of the nearly 200 legislative veto devices then on the books, and two weeks later the Court summarily upheld challenges to two more, both involving rulemaking proceedings.2
The two settings below test the rule from opposite directions. Many separation-of-powers disputes pit Congress against the executive, and these show each branch in turn taking a route the Constitution does not prescribe.3 In the first, Congress reaches into execution by giving itself, its members, or officers it controls a role in administering laws already enacted. In the second, the President reaches into legislation by cancelling parts of a statute Congress has passed. The same questions decide both. Who is acting? What does the action do to the law and to those it governs? Were Article I's steps taken? The label on the action answers none of them.4
Congressional Agents as Executors
Congress may not give itself, its members, or its agents a role in the execution of the laws.5 Bowsher v. Synar is the leading application. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 gave the Comptroller General a role in its deficit-reduction scheme, and because the Comptroller General is an officer of Congress, separation of powers precluded Congress from giving him that role.6 Congress could remove the officer by joint resolution,7 and the Court held that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power to remove an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.8
The Court's reason lies in what removal power means to the officer. As the district court observed, “[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey.”9 An officer answerable only to Congress would leave Congress in practical control of the execution of the laws. Because the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, Congress cannot grant an officer under its control a power it does not itself possess.10
The Court tied that reasoning directly to Chadha. Letting a congressionally controlled officer execute the laws would amount to a congressional veto, because Congress could remove, or threaten to remove, the officer for executing the laws in any way it disliked.11 The Court quoted Chadha for the underlying rule: disagreement with an executive decision, like the original choice to delegate, involves policy determinations that Congress can implement in only one way, by bicameral passage followed by presentment, and Congress “must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.”12 The threat alone does the work, since an officer who knows what Congress will tolerate adjusts his conduct before any resolution is passed.
Two independent ideas support the holding. The first is the separation of lawmaking from execution. Repeating Montesquieu's warning, Madison wrote in The Federalist that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body … there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”13 A Congress that administered its own statutes would lose the check that comes from needing a separate branch to carry them out.
The second idea is Article I's procedure. Justice Stevens, concurring in Bowsher, reasoned that if Congress were free to delegate policymaking authority to one of its components or agents, it could evade “the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”14 A committee, board, or officer in Congress's own camp could produce binding policy without ever clearing both Houses or reaching the President, which is the one-house veto of Chadha under another name. That danger does not arise when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency.15
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on this ground alone. Congress may delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the Executive and so divest itself of part of its lawmaking power, but when it elects to exercise that power itself, it may not authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative Branch to act on its behalf. If Congress wants to act with conclusive effect, it must enact the measure through both Houses and present it to the President.16
Neither route rests on the nondelegation doctrine. A dissenting opinion in Bowsher agreed with the district court that the Act did not violate that doctrine,17 so the case turned on who would carry out the Act's duties.18 The two inquiries ask different questions. The intelligible principle test asks how much guidance Congress supplied, while the agent question asks who the recipient is, and a statute can supply an adequate standard and still fail because the person administering it answers to Congress.
A delegation to an executive officer raises no comparable objection. Chadha observed, in language a Bowsher dissent quoted, that executive action under delegated authority “is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely.”19 Each of those checks runs through enacted law or an independent court, so Congress keeps its influence over an executive recipient by legislating, and legislating means passing through Article I.
Morrison v. Olson posed the mirror-image question. The issue there was whether Congress could restrict the removal of an independent counsel charged solely with prosecution. The challengers called prosecution a core executive function and argued that Congress could not restrict the executive's control over such a person in any way, and the majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected that argument.20 Bowsher bars Congress from holding the removal power over an officer who executes the laws, but Morrison shows that a limit on the President's removal of such an officer is not forbidden outright. Separately, the Incompatibility Clause would pose a problem if Congress insisted that one or more of its members be appointed to a federal executive office.21
The Court applied the same principle to a body of legislators, not a single officer, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. A board of members of Congress held a veto over decisions of the authority managing two Washington-area airports, and the Court treated the board as an agent of Congress and struck the scheme down. Classifying the board's power was unnecessary, because both classifications lead to the same result. If the veto was legislative, it needed bicameralism and presentment and had neither.22 If it was executive, Congress could not exercise it at all.23
That the governor, not Congress, chooses the legislators changes nothing in the second version, because the objection is that members of Congress would hold a role in executing a federal law.24 If federal oversight of the reservoir matters, the Constitution requires that the function go to the federal executive branch, not to Congress.25 The first version gives Congress only the lawmaking tools it already has, and the second gives its members a hand in administration.
The second step does most of the work. An answer that opens by asking whether the statute supplies an intelligible principle skips the question that decided Bowsher and the airports case, which was who held the power. A board of legislators with a veto and an officer removable by Congress who performs executive duties are each resolved at the second step, before any statutory standard is examined. Where the recipient is an ordinary agency, the fourth step returns the analysis to the earlier sections of this chapter.
The Line-Item Veto
Clinton v. City of New York held the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because a presidential cancellation under the Act was a legislative act that did not follow the procedure Article I requires. “[I]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each,” and repeal of a statute, like its enactment, must comply with Article I.27
That is Chadha's principle applied to the other branch. Chadha condemned a shortcut Congress reserved for itself, and Clinton condemned one Congress handed to the President. In both, the Court asked what the action did to the law as enacted, not what the action was called.28
The text and design of Article I point the same way. Although some state constitutions expressly grant governors line-item authority, the U.S. Constitution does not grant the President such power.29 What Article I does grant is a veto that is itself limited, since the power of two thirds of both Houses to overrule it precludes final arbitrary action by one person.30 A statutory power to excise provisions from an enacted law has to be measured against that design.
The dissenters saw a different problem. Justice Scalia denied that Article I, § 7 categorically forbids a statute authorizing the President to cancel or reduce its provisions, and said the Court's own cases “conclusively disprove” such a prohibition. The limit comes instead from “the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority: When authorized Executive reduction or augmentation is allowed to go too far, it usurps the nondelegable function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.”31 On that framing, Congress's authorization is itself the legislative act, and the only question is how much lawmaking power it handed over. Scalia answered that the President's discretion under the Act was no broader than the discretion traditionally granted in executing spending laws.32
Field v. Clark shows what the dissenters had in mind. The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the President to “suspend” an exemption for sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides “whenever, and so often” as he was satisfied that a country exporting those products imposed duties on American agricultural products that he deemed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.”33 Congress wrote the rule and tied it to a condition, and the President's job was to decide whether the condition had occurred abroad. Scalia noted that the Court distinguished authorizations of this kind on two grounds: they were contingent on an executive finding of fact, and they related to foreign affairs, where the President has a special degree of discretion and freedom.34 The foreign-affairs ground is itself unsettled, since Zivotofsky disclaimed Curtiss-Wright's sweeping dictum that the President has exclusive power to conduct international relations, though Justice Scalia's dissent there accused the majority of replicating its reasoning.35
The Line Item Veto Act fit neither ground. It concerned domestic spending and special tax relief, and it let the President tailor both to what he concluded were the demands of fiscal responsibility.36 That is a judgment about which spending should exist, not a finding that a condition Congress specified had occurred. The contingent fact-finding category treated earlier in this chapter marks the line: a statute that states the legal consequence of each outcome in advance leaves the executive a question about the world, while the Act left the President to decide what the law would provide.
Justice Breyer's dissent also treated the case as a delegation question and found the delegation permissible. He located guidance in the Act's purpose: “[t]he clear purpose behind the Act, confirmed by its legislative history, is to promote ‘greater fiscal accountability’ and to ‘eliminate wasteful federal spending and . . . special tax breaks.’”37 He added that the case involved no “roving commission,” no delegation to private parties, and no reach over all of American industry. It was limited to one area of Government, the budget, and gave the President power over one portion of that budget to tailor spending and special tax relief.38 That language echoes the 1935 invalidations discussed earlier in the chapter.
The majority and the dissenters therefore disagree about when Article I does its work. The majority applies it when the law is changed, so a cancellation had to pass both Houses and reach the President however Congress authorized it. The dissenters treat the authorization as Congress's legislative act and ask only whether too much was delegated. The majority's view controls.
A question that gives the President power to cancel, suspend, or reduce part of a statute therefore calls for the order of events first. If the statute itself says that a provision lapses on a stated condition and asks the President whether the condition has occurred, as in Field, the issue is delegation and the intelligible principle test governs. If the President may sign a bill and then, on his own judgment, strip a provision of legal force, the cancellation is a repeal that never passed through bicameralism and presentment, and Congress's authorization does not cure that defect.39 The dissenters' view that only delegation was at issue lost, but it is the best argument for the opposite result, and an answer that invokes it should say so.