524 U.S. 417, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 141 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1998)
In April 1996 Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act, which took effect on January 1, 1997, and authorized the President to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit.1
On August 5, 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which included section 4722(c) deeming certain New York health-care-provider taxes permissible and in compliance with federal Medicaid requirements.2 On the same day Congress passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which included section 968 granting a limited tax benefit allowing owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer recognition of gain when selling stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives.3
On August 11, 1997, President Clinton transmitted notices canceling section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act and section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act.4 The City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health-care employees filed suit challenging the cancellation of section 4722(c).5
Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., a farmers' cooperative formed in May 1997 to acquire potato-processing facilities, and one of its members filed a separate action challenging the cancellation of section 968.6 The District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated the two actions and held that at least one plaintiff in each case had Article III standing.7 It ruled on the merits that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws.8
Earlier, six Members of Congress who had voted against the Line Item Veto Act had brought a separate challenge; the District Court had held the Act unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed that action for lack of standing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).9 After the President exercised the cancellation authority, the present appellees filed suit challenging the two cancellations, and the District Court again held the statute invalid.
Whether the appellees have Article III standing to challenge the President's cancellations under the Line Item Veto Act?10
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to allege a personal injury that is concrete and particularized, fairly traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.11
Yes. The City of New York Health and Hospitals Corporation faces an immediate concrete injury from the revival of a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.12 This injury is traceable to the President's cancellation and would be redressed by a declaration that the cancellation is invalid.13
Similarly, Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. suffered injury when the cancellation of section 968 terminated its negotiations for a tax-deferred purchase of a processing facility, depriving it of a statutory bargaining chip that Congress intended for cooperatives like it.14 The District Court correctly concluded that the State, and the appellees, suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.15
The appellees have Article III standing to challenge the cancellations.16
Related opinions on this issue
I also agree with the Court that the appellees have standing to challenge the Act.17 The injury they suffer is concrete and particularized, and it is traceable to the President's exercise of authority under the Act.18 The Act gives the President the power to cancel specific items in a bill after it has been signed into law.
This power is not consistent with the separation of powers established by the Constitution. The Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress. The President's role is to approve or disapprove legislation in its entirety.
The Line Item Veto Act transfers a portion of the legislative power to the President, allowing him to pick and choose which provisions of a bill will become law. This is inconsistent with the constitutional design.
Joined by O'connor, Scalia, Jj., As To Part Iii
I agree with the Court that the parties have standing, but I do not agree with its ultimate conclusion.19 Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional.20
The Act represents a legislative effort to provide the President with the power to give effect to some, but not to all, of the expenditure and revenue-diminishing provisions contained in a single massive appropriations bill.21 And this objective is constitutionally proper.22 When our Nation was founded, Congress could easily have provided the President with this kind of power.23
Whether the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 violates the Presentment Clause by authorizing the President to cancel provisions of duly enacted statutes?24
The Presentment Clause requires that every bill passed by both Houses of Congress be presented to the President, who may sign it into law or veto it in its entirety; if vetoed, it can become law only if repassed by a two-thirds vote in both Houses, and repeal or amendment of statutes must conform to the same process.25
Yes. The cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate this constitutional requirement because they allow the President to create a different law than the one presented to him.26 The cancellation of one provision of a bill effectively amends the bill that Congress passed.27 The Constitution does not authorize the President to enact such amendments.28
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.29 There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.30 The Act authorizes the President to cancel provisions of a bill after it has been signed into law.31 When the President cancels an item, he in effect amends the law by striking out parts of it.32 The Constitution does not authorize the President to enact such amendments.
The Line Item Veto Act violates the Presentment Clause.33
Related opinions on this issue
A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril.34 The statute before us, then, is of first importance, for it seems undeniable the Act will tend to restrain persistent excessive spending.35 Nevertheless, for the reasons given by Justice Stevens in the opinion for the Court, the statute must be found invalid.36 Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.37
I write to respond to my colleague Justice Breyer, who observes that the statute does not threaten the liberties of individual citizens, a point on which I disagree.38 The argument is related to his earlier suggestion that our role is lessened here because the two political branches are adjusting their own powers between themselves.39 To say the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority would seem to require acceptance of two premises: first, that the public good demands it, and second, that liberty is not at risk.40 The former premise is inadmissible. The Constitution's structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment.41 The latter premise, too, is flawed.42 Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.43
Joined by O'connor, Scalia, Jj., As To Part Iii
The Court believes that the Act violates the literal text of the Constitution.44 A simple syllogism captures its basic reasoning: Major Premise: The Constitution sets forth an exclusive method for enacting, repealing, or amending laws.45 Minor Premise: The Act authorizes the President to repeal or amend laws in a different way, namely by announcing a cancellation of a portion of a previously enacted law.46 Conclusion: The Act is inconsistent with the Constitution.47
I find this syllogism unconvincing, however, because its Minor Premise is faulty.48 When the President canceled the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any law.49 He simply followed the law, leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.50 To understand why one cannot say, literally speaking, that the President has repealed or amended any law, imagine how the provisions of law before us might have been, but were not, written.51
The Act does not violate the Constitution.52 It represents a reasonable effort by Congress and the President to address the problem of excessive federal spending.53 The Act permits the President to cancel specific items of spending or tax benefits after a bill has been signed into law.54 This authority is similar to the historical practice of impoundment, in which Presidents have declined to spend funds appropriated by Congress.55 The Act does not amend the Constitution's requirements for the enactment of legislation.56 A bill is still presented to the President in its entirety, and he must sign or veto it as a whole.57 The cancellation authority granted by the Act is an exercise of discretion delegated by Congress, subject to congressional override.58 The majority's holding rests on a formalistic interpretation of the Presentment Clause that is not compelled by the text of the Constitution or by historical practice.59 The Constitution grants Congress broad authority to delegate power to the Executive.60 The Line Item Veto Act is a valid exercise of that authority.61 I would uphold the constitutionality of the Act.62