143 U.S. 649 (1892)
Duties were assessed and collected under the rates in the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, on woollen dress goods, woollen wearing apparel, and silk embroideries imported by Marshall Field & Co., on silk and cotton laces imported by Boyd, Sutton & Co., and on colored cotton cloths imported by Herman, Sternbach & Co.1
The importers each protested the assessments on the ground that the act was not a law of the United States.2 Appeals were taken to the Board of General Appraisers under the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, which affirmed the collectors' decisions in each case.3 The Circuit Courts of the United States in the respective districts affirmed the board's judgments, after which the cases were brought to the Supreme Court for review.4
The original enrolled act, designated H.R. 9416 on its face, was received at the Department of State on October 1, 1890.5 It bore the signatures of Thomas B. Reed as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Levi P. Morton as Vice-President and President of the Senate, together with the endorsement "Approved October 1st, 1890. BENJ. HARRISON" and a certificate by Clerk Edw. McPherson that the act originated in the House. The Secretary of State furnished a correct copy to the Congressional Printer, and the act appeared in the published volume of statutes.6
The importers alleged that the enrolled act omitted a section that had been part of the bill as finally passed.7 That omitted section, numbered 30, provided for a drawback or rebate on original factory packages of smoking and manufactured tobacco and snuff held by manufacturers or dealers at the time the tax reduction took effect, required claims to be presented within sixty days, authorized payment in stamps, set a five-dollar minimum, and appropriated funds for the rebates.8 The importers contended that congressional journals, committee reports, conference reports, and other documents printed by authority of Congress demonstrated the omission.
The act contained additional provisions that formed part of the importers' challenges.9 Section 3 authorized the President, on and after January 1, 1892, to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides from any producing country that imposed duties or exactions on United States agricultural or other products deemed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, and to impose specified duties during the suspension.10 Paragraph 231 of Schedule E directed that, from July 1, 1891, until July 1, 1905, bounties of two cents per pound on sugar testing not less than ninety degrees and one and three-fourths cents per pound on sugar testing between eighty and ninety degrees be paid from the Treasury to producers of qualifying domestic sugar, subject to rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.11
Whether an enrolled bill designated H.R. 9416, attested by the signatures of the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, approved by the President on October 1, 1890, and deposited with the Secretary of State, could be shown by the Congressional Record, committee reports, and other legislative documents not to have been validly passed by Congress?12
When a bill has been signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, approved by the President, and deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete and unimpeachable, and the judicial department must accept it as having passed Congress, leaving to the courts only the question of constitutional conformity.13
No. The established facts show that the original enrolled act H.R. 9416 was received at the Department of State on October 1, 1890, attested by the signatures of Speaker Thomas B. Reed and Vice-President Levi P. Morton, endorsed with the President's approval, and certified as originating in the House by Clerk Edw. McPherson.
The importers sought to show from congressional journals and reports that section 30 on tobacco rebates was omitted from the enrolled act.14 The rule requires that the court accept the enrolled act as conclusive evidence of passage.15 The respect due to coequal branches forbids inquiring behind the authentication into the journals, as the possibility of deliberate conspiracy among officers is too remote, and the stability of law would be shaken if journals could impeach the enrolled bill.16
The enrolled bill cannot be shown not to have been validly passed by Congress, and it must be treated as a valid law.17
Whether section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, which authorized the President to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides from any country that imposed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable duties on United States products, constituted an invalid delegation of legislative or treaty-making power?18
Congress may authorize the President to ascertain the existence of a named contingency, such as the imposition of unequal duties by foreign countries, and to suspend statutory provisions upon that contingency, without delegating legislative power, because the legislature has exercised its discretion in advance by prescribing the conditions and the consequences.19
No. Section 3 of the act provided that upon the President's satisfaction that a country imposed duties deemed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall suspend the free introduction and impose specified duties.20 This is not a delegation because Congress determined the policy of reciprocity, specified the articles and the duties to be applied during suspension, and left to the President only the execution by ascertaining the fact and proclaiming the suspension for such time as he deems just. Historical precedents, including acts from 1794 authorizing embargoes and acts from 1815 and 1830 regarding discriminating duties, confirm that such authority has long been conferred on the President in trade matters.21 The President acts as the mere agent of the law-making department to declare the event upon which the expressed will takes effect.
Section 3 does not constitute an invalid delegation of legislative or treaty-making power.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Fuller
Justice Lamar, joined by Chief Justice Fuller, dissented from the validation of section 3.23 He argued that the provision delegates legislative power by allowing the President to suspend the law and impose duties based on his own judgment of what is reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.24 The President may also continue the suspension for such time as he deems just.25
This goes beyond the contingent legislation in the non-intercourse acts of 1809 and 1810.26 In those acts the President merely ascertained a defined fact without exercising discretion over the policy or duration.27 Instead the section vests in the executive the power to regulate commerce and adjust trade relations upon his discretion, violating the vesting of legislative power in Congress.28
Whether the provisions of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, appropriating money from the Treasury for bounties of two cents per pound on sugar testing not less than ninety degrees produced from domestic beets, sorghum, sugar-cane, or maple sap were within Congress's constitutional power to lay taxes and appropriate funds, and if not, whether those provisions rendered the entire act inoperative?29
Congress has the power under Article I, Section 8 to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare, which includes appropriating funds for bounties to encourage domestic production, and even if a particular provision is invalid, it does not render the entire act inoperative if the provisions are separable and not dependent upon each other.30
Yes. The bounty provisions in paragraph 231 of Schedule E appropriated funds for payments to producers of qualifying domestic sugar.31 The court held this within Congress's power as part of the system to encourage domestic industries through the taxing power.32 Even assuming arguendo that the bounties exceeded constitutional authority, the duty-imposing provisions on imported articles are wholly independent.33
One concerns appropriations from the Treasury and the other the imposition of duties on imports.34 There is no evident intent that Congress would not have enacted the duties without the bounties.35 Therefore the act remains operative as to the importers' challenges.36
The bounty provisions are within Congress's power, and in any event do not render the entire act inoperative.37