Concept
Limits on Congress’s Reach
Congressional limits on the executive
Limits on Congress’s Reach
Read alone, Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes could suggest that Congress may command the executive branch however it likes. The opinion rules out that reading. A duty Congress imposes must not be repugnant to rights the Constitution secures, and the President’s own constitutional powers stay beyond the reach of the other departments except through impeachment.1 Those two qualifications mark where the rule stops, and each suggests a boundary.
The first boundary concerns what Congress may do after it legislates. Kendall works because a statute is law, made through the process the Constitution prescribes, so an officer who obeys the statute obeys the law. If Congress also kept a hand on the officer who performs the duty, the officer would answer to Congress, the statute would no longer be in control, and Congress would in effect be executing the laws it wrote.
The second boundary concerns what the rule covers. Kendall governs duties that Congress creates, which is why an officer’s obligation can be said to grow out of the law. A power the Constitution vests in the President directly is different: Congress did not create it, and ordinary legislation cannot rewrite the Constitution. A statute can bind the Postmaster General, whose duty Congress made; it cannot dictate how the President exercises a power the Constitution gave the President by name.
Taken together, the boundaries complete the picture. A valid statute controls the officer, Congress controls the statute but not its execution, and the Constitution controls Congress. The limit on congressional control of execution comes first, and the exclusive presidential powers follow.
No Congressional Control of Execution
Bowsher v. Synar is the mirror image of Kendall. There the Court held that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power to remove an officer charged with executing the laws, except by impeachment.2 Kendall had established that Congress may direct an officer through the statute it enacts. Bowsher asks what Congress may do once the statute exists, and it answers that Congress may not keep a hand on the officer who carries the statute out.
The constitutional text does little of the work. Apart from impeachment, the Constitution is almost silent on who may remove federal officials, and the Court has never required that an officer be removed in the way the officer was appointed.3 What the Court drew from the text was a negative inference: the Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in supervising the officers who execute its laws. The President appoints officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, and once the appointment is confirmed, the Constitution provides for removal by Congress only upon impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate.4
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act placed responsibility for executing its deficit-control scheme in the Comptroller General, the head of the General Accounting Office.5 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created that office. The President nominated the Comptroller General from a list of three persons recommended by the presiding officers of the House and the Senate, and the Comptroller General could be removed only by impeachment or by a joint resolution of Congress, which was subject to presidential veto, on grounds the 1921 Act specified.6 That removal arrangement decided the case.
The Court treated the Comptroller General’s functions as executive. The Act gave him ultimate authority over the budget cuts and bound the President to carry out his report, so he was executing the law and not merely advising about it. The remaining question was whom he answered to, and the Court’s answer was that he was an officer subject to removal only by Congress itself. By placing execution of the Act in such an officer’s hands, Congress in effect retained control over the execution of the Act and intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does not permit such intrusion.7
The reasoning runs in short steps. Once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends, and it can control the execution of the enactment only indirectly, by passing new legislation.8 Removal power is a form of control, because an officer heeds whoever can dismiss the officer. As the district court put it, “Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey.”9 An officer answerable only to Congress therefore gives Congress, in practical terms, control over the execution of the laws. And because the structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.10
The Court tied this conclusion to INS v. Chadha, which struck down a one-House legislative veto over the Attorney General’s decisions about deportation.11 Chadha reasoned that disagreement with an executive decision involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way, bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President, and that Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until it legislatively alters or revokes it.12 Bowsher treats removal control as the same device in quieter form. An officer controlled by Congress would let Congress remove, or threaten to remove, the officer for executing the laws in any fashion Congress found unsatisfactory, and a threat of that kind works as a veto without the two Houses and the presentment that Chadha requires. The Court also recalled the long-recognized fear that the legislature will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches, which explains its insistence on the formal path for any congressional influence over execution.13
Set side by side, the two decisions show what each one limits. In Kendall, Congress acted through an act that told the Postmaster General to credit whatever sum the Solicitor found due, and the Court held that the officer’s duty grew out of, and was subject to the control of, the law.14 Congress’s influence ran through the content of the act, and its participation ended when the act passed. In Bowsher the content of the Act likewise defined the executive duty, as the Court acknowledged, but Congress went further and placed the duty with an officer it could dismiss.15 The first arrangement binds the executive by law, a power Congress holds. The second binds the officer to Congress itself, which would be the exercise of a power Congress does not hold. Kendall therefore denies the President any power to forbid execution of a statute, and Bowsher denies Congress any power to execute one.
The holding is narrower than a first reading suggests. In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court upheld a statute that let the President remove a Federal Trade Commissioner only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, and it distinguished Myers while reaffirming Myers’s holding that congressional participation in the removal of executive officers is unconstitutional.16 The dissent in Bowsher stressed that the Court did not hold that executive powers of this kind may be exercised only by officers the President can remove at will, and in its view Congress may vest executive authority in officers who are not so removable. A for-cause condition on the President’s removal power is written into the statute before the officer acts, so Congress controls through the law. A removal power held by Congress lets Congress decide, after the officer has acted, whether the execution pleased it, so Congress controls through the officer. Whether a function may sit with officers the President cannot remove at will, the dissent added, “will depend upon the character of the office,” and the court must ask whether the limitation prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.17
The same premise surfaced in Printz v. United States, although the officials there were state officers. The Court held that the Brady Act unconstitutionally assigned background checks on gun buyers to state and local law enforcement officials, reasoning in part that the Framers insisted on unity in the Federal Executive, so federal laws must be executed by the President or by those under “meaningful Presidential control.”18 The Court even questioned whether such control is possible without the power to appoint and remove, powers the President lacks over state officials.19 Printz also turned on federalism, so it parallels Bowsher and does not control it. What the two share is the premise that executing federal law belongs inside an executive branch accountable to the President, which is why placing execution with an officer answerable to someone else meets resistance, whether that someone is Congress or a state government.
The third step does the real work because it asks who holds the power to dismiss, and the fourth keeps a student from reading Bowsher as a rule that every executive officer must be removable by the President at will.
Exclusive Presidential Powers
Kendall marks the place where its own rule stops. The Court said that, so far as the President’s powers derive from the Constitution, the President stands beyond the reach of any other department except in the mode the Constitution prescribes through the impeaching power.22 That sentence gives two kinds of executive authority different footing. A statutory duty grows out of a law Congress wrote, so the law controls the officer who owes it. A power the Constitution vests in the President grows out of no act of Congress, so a statute has no authority over how it is exercised. Kendall never had to say where the second kind begins, because the act before the Court was Congress’s consent to have claims against the United States examined by the Solicitor of the Treasury, with a direction to the Postmaster General to credit whatever sum the Solicitor found due.23
Two arguments hold the boundary up. The first concerns rank: ordinary legislation cannot rewrite what the Constitution assigns, so a statute can control a task Congress created but cannot reassign a power the Constitution placed in the President. The second concerns the text and function of Article II, which begins with a Vesting Clause assigning “[t]he executive Power” to “a President of the United States of America.”24 The case for exclusivity is that some functions the Constitution gives the President depend on a single decision-maker who can act decisively and speak for the nation, and that if Congress could prescribe how the President exercises such a function, the assignment would survive in name while its substance passed to the legislature.
The default still runs the other way. The duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed obliges the President to use executive power consistently with all valid acts of Congress, and not simply according to the President’s own preferences.25 A claim of exclusive presidential authority is therefore an exception, and the President must earn it by pointing to a specific constitutional grant.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry shows the boundary at work. A federal statute, § 214(d), dealt with how the Executive treats Jerusalem in passport records, and the Court held that Congress could not impose it because it intruded on the President’s recognition power.26 As the dissent describes the majority’s reasoning, the Court objected that the law interfered with the autonomy and unity of the Executive Branch, and it relied on the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” about the status of Jerusalem. The recognition power, in the dissent’s account, is the power to recognize states and territorial claims, which the Court inferred from the President’s responsibility to receive ambassadors.27 Zivotofsky and Kendall both involved a statute addressed to a department head, so the form of the legislation was the same. The subject matter differed. The Postmaster General’s credit was an entry under an act of Congress that touched no power the Constitution gave the President, and the officer had to comply. The passport statute, on the Court’s view, reached for a decision the Constitution commits to the President, and Kendall’s rule had never claimed that territory.
Justice Scalia, dissenting, treated the case as an application of the principle Kendall itself applies. In his view Congress has power to legislate on the subject without regard to recognition, and where Congress has that power the President has a duty to “take Care” that its legislation “be faithfully executed.”28 He relied on Marbury v. Madison for the proposition that when Congress imposes a responsibility on the Secretary of State, the Secretary “is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.”29 The claim that the statute sets the Executive Branch against itself carried no constitutional significance for him, because “the Executive carries out every law.”30 A dissent is not a holding, but it shows what the opposing position looks like stated whole: Congress legislates, and the President executes.
Justice Scalia also tested the majority’s reasoning against the President’s express power to make treaties. Congress may pass laws that openly flout treaties the President has made, he observed, and he asked whether anyone would suppose the President may refuse to carry out such laws, or the federal court judgments under them, so that the Executive may speak with one voice about the country’s international obligations. On that comparison, the majority had placed an implied power to recognize territorial claims on a higher footing than an express power over treaties.31 His broader objection went to method. The decision rests on “functional considerations,” principally the perception that the Nation must speak with one voice, and functionalism of that kind, he wrote, “will systematically favor the unitary President over the plural Congress in disputes involving foreign affairs.”32 The worry follows from the rationale itself. A test built on the need for one voice favors a single decision-maker whenever the subject is important, and a plural body like Congress can never be one voice. How to identify an exclusive power therefore matters as much as the premise that such powers exist.
Two errors tempt students here. One reads Kendall as proof that Congress may command the President in any field, which overlooks the Court’s statement that the President’s constitutional powers stand beyond the other departments except through impeachment. The other reads Zivotofsky as holding that a statute fails whenever the President says it complicates foreign policy, which overlooks that the Court’s holding rested on a specific power, recognition, and that Congress may legislate in foreign affairs while the Executive carries out what it enacts.33 The President’s objection must identify a power the Constitution commits to the President.
The second step does the real work, since it requires the President to name a constitutional grant instead of a general interest in controlling the executive branch, and the third step is where the Court and the dissent in Zivotofsky parted.