687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997)
The parties, Barbara Zeitler Kendall and Jeffrey P. Kendall, married in 1988.1 At the time of their marriage the plaintiff was Jewish and the defendant was Catholic, and before the marriage they discussed and agreed that any children would be raised in the Jewish faith.2 The couple had three children: Ariel born October 10, 1988, Moriah born May 19, 1991, and Rebekah born April 21, 1993.3
In 1991 the defendant became a member of the Boston Church of Christ.4 In 1994 the plaintiff adopted Orthodox Judaism. Their oldest child Ariel began studying and adhering to principles of Orthodox Judaism.5 The plaintiff filed for divorce in November 1994 on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.6
During the divorce proceedings the plaintiff sought to limit the children's exposure to the defendant's religion while the defendant objected to any limitation.7 On October 18, 1995, the Probate Court appointed Dr. Michael Goldberg as guardian ad litem to address the inter-religious conflict between the parties.8 After a five-day trial, the court issued a judgment of divorce nisi on August 20, 1996.9 The judgment awarded the plaintiff sole physical custody of the children and the parties joint legal custody.10 It divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home by granting the defendant twenty-five percent.11
The judgment contained paragraphs restricting the defendant's ability to share his religious beliefs with the children.12 It required the guardian ad litem to explain the judgment to the children.13 The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for contempt, leading to a temporary order issued on October 22, 1996.14 Both parties appealed from provisions of the divorce judgment and the temporary order, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.15
Whether the evidence demonstrated substantial harm to the children from exposure to the defendant's religious beliefs so as to warrant restrictions on his religious practices?16
Yes. The judge found specific instances of harm including the defendant cutting off Ariel's payes and threatening to cut his tzitzitz, which upset the child, and exposing the children to teachings that non-acceptors of the faith are damned to hell, causing Ari substantial worry that his mother may go to hell.19 These findings, credited from the GAL report, demonstrated substantial harm beyond generalized fears, supporting the limitations in paragraph 5 of the judgment.20 The court applied the Felton standard requiring clear evidence of substantial harm.21
It concluded that the harm here was demonstrable.22
The evidence demonstrated substantial harm warranting the restrictions on the defendant's religious practices.23
Whether the restrictions imposed by the divorce judgment violated the defendant's rights under the free exercise clauses of the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions?24
No. The divorce judgment is limited in scope.27 It imposes a minimal burden on the defendant by requiring only that he limit sharing particular aspects of his beliefs with his children.28 The judgment imposes no additional limitations on his individual ability to practice his religion.29 The judgment serves the secular purpose of limiting emotional harm to the children rather than establishing any religion.30
The restrictions imposed by the divorce judgment did not violate the defendant's rights under the free exercise clauses.31
Whether the award of joint legal custody to the parties was an abuse of discretion?32
No. The plaintiff pointed to no conflict other than the parties' inability to reconcile their views as to the children's religious upbringing.35 The judge had the opportunity to observe and appraise both parents over the course of a five-day trial in which considerable testimony was heard.36 Because the plaintiff established no other basis for finding an abuse of discretion, the award of joint legal custody stands.37
The award of joint legal custody to the parties was not an abuse of discretion.38
Whether the division of proceeds from the sale of the marital home was plainly wrong and excessive?39
No. The judge found that the purchase of the marital home was a completed gift to the parties from the plaintiff's parents.42 The award granting the defendant twenty-five percent of the proceeds was well within the proper exercise of her discretion after considering the completed gift from the plaintiff's family.43
The division of proceeds from the sale of the marital home was not plainly wrong and excessive.44