Concept
Modern Uses of the Clause
Other powers
Modern Uses of the Clause
Article I, Section 1 vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted,” so every federal statute must trace to a power the Constitution confers.1 McCulloch v. Maryland shows how a list of granted powers can still support a wide range of laws: Congress may use the Necessary and Proper Clause to choose appropriate means, such as chartering a bank, for carrying into execution powers like taxing, borrowing, and regulating commerce. The clause is auxiliary. It implements a specifically granted power and cannot serve as a freestanding source of substantive legislative authority.
Current cases apply that premise in three recurring settings, and each puts a different pressure on the test. In the first, Congress uses criminal, custodial, or spending laws to protect a federal program it has already established. In the second, Congress builds a comprehensive regulatory scheme under a granted power, and the question is whether the scheme may reach local activity that cannot be separated from the larger regulation. In the third, Congress creates and structures the agencies that carry its laws into effect, an authority that appears nowhere in Section 8 by name. Each setting asks the questions taught in the preceding sections: whether the end is legitimate, whether the means is rationally related to it, and whether the means is proper in the structural sense.
The same method works on every statute in this unit. A problem starts with the enumerated power the statute serves, and the clause enters only to vouch for the means. Congress starts there too. When it considered banning racial discrimination in public accommodations in the early 1960s, it first had to decide whether to rely primarily on the Commerce Clause or on its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the equality right conferred in Section One.2 A court that sustains a statute under the clause is applying McCulloch to a new means, not discovering a new subject of legislation. The method also explains why challengers sometimes win. A means that serves no granted power fails, and so does a means that would create the predicate for federal regulation by compelling people into a market, however useful either might seem.
Protecting Federal Programs
A law that protects a federal program carries the program’s own power into execution. The Court describes its decisions upholding laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause as involving exercises of authority “derivative of, and in service to, a granted power.”3 A postal system, a mint, a prison system, and a spending program each exist because an enumerated power authorizes them, and a protective law for any of them presents the same question: is it a rational means of making that power work? The answer shows up in the statute itself. Federal offenses that overlap with state crimes typically carry an element tied to an enumerated power, such as use of the mails, interstate travel, or a victim’s financial connection to the federal government, and that element is what distinguishes the federal offense from the state one.4
McCulloch itself supplies the oldest example. The power to establish post offices and post roads is executed by the single act of making the establishment, yet Congress has inferred from it the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post road and, from that implied power, the right to punish those who steal letters or rob the mail.5 Marshall conceded that this right is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office, but he found it “essential to the beneficial exercise of the power.”6 He drew the same inference for punishing the theft or falsification of a court record or process and for perjury in a federal court.7 A postal system that cannot protect what it carries cannot do the job the grant contemplates.
The coinage power moves protection one step earlier in the chain. In Baender v. Barnett, the Court held that conscious and willing possession, without lawful authority, of a die in the likeness of one used to make genuine United States coin may be made a criminal offense: “If this be not a necessary, it is at least an appropriate, step in effectively suppressing and preventing the making and use of illegitimate coin.”8 A statute that punished only finished counterfeits would act after the harm, and a ban on the tools acts before it. Possession of a potentially misusable object fares differently under the Commerce Clause, where, as a rule, possession alone is not “economic activity” that Congress may regulate, as the handgun in Lopez shows.9 The act of possession is the same in both settings, and the power behind it differs. A die serves a power whose subject is the integrity of the coin, while a handgun defended on commerce alone had no such power behind it.
United States v. Comstock states the idea in its modern form. A federal statute, part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006, authorized federal courts to order the indefinite confinement of persons in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who are deemed “sexually dangerous.” Kansas v. Hendricks had already held that a state may confine such persons after their sentences end without violating due process, so the issue in Comstock was whether Congress had the constitutional authority to provide for the detentions.10
The Court upheld the statute and framed the inquiry as whether the statute “constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”11 The Constitution does not explicitly mention Congress’s power to criminalize conduct, to imprison those who engage in it, or to enact laws governing prisons and prisoners.12 The Court nevertheless reasoned in a chain, each link a rational means serving the one before. Enumerated powers support federal crimes, crimes support imprisonment, and imprisonment makes the government the custodian of its prisoners, with power to protect nearby and other communities from the danger they may pose.13 Congress could reasonably conclude that federal inmates whose mental illness causes serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct would pose an especially high danger if released, and that a reasonable number of them would not be detained by the States.14 The danger arises from the federal prison system’s own releases, so the commitment statute protects a federal function much as the mail-robbery law protects the post.
The majority rested on five considerations taken together, and each one limits the holding:
- The clause grants Congress broad authority to enact legislation that is “convenient, or useful” or “conducive” to the beneficial exercise of an enumerated power.15
- The statute is a modest addition to federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed since 1855.16
- Congress reasonably extended its civil-commitment system to dangerous persons already in federal custody, because the government is their custodian.17
- The statute accounts for state interests by requiring the Attorney General to encourage the relevant State to take custody and to relinquish federal authority whenever a State asserts its own.18
- The links between the statute and an enumerated power are not too attenuated, because the statute is narrow, has been applied to a small fraction of federal prisoners, and reaches only those already in federal custody.19
The last two considerations answer the worry that a rational-means test could grow into a general police power, and the majority said it did not fear that result because the statute is narrow.20 The dissent put the problem at the top of the chain. It found that the government identified no enumerated power as a predicate for the statute and that none was discernible, and it added that not even the Commerce Clause could justify civil detention of sex offenders, because sexual violence is noneconomic. Caring for the mentally ill and protecting the community from dangerous mentally ill persons, the dissent said, are among the powers that remain with the States.21 The majority answered by finding the anchor in the powers behind federal crimes and prisons.
Sabri v. United States applies the same logic to federal spending. The statute punishes bribery of officials of state and local governments that receive more than a threshold amount of federal funds. Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal money to promote the general welfare, the Court explained, and “corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause” to see that those dollars are spent for the general welfare and not frittered away in graft.22 The defendant was a real estate developer who allegedly bribed a city councilor in a city that received $29 million in federal funds that year, and no connection between the bribe and any federal dollar had been proved.23 The statute stood nonetheless.
Two features of the reasoning matter. First, the Court required no tracing. Federal projects are undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars, so corruption threatens the federal interest even when no bribe can be followed to a particular federal payment.24 Second, the statute carries its own limit. It conditions the offense on a threshold amount of federal dollars, which defines the federal interest, and on a bribe that goes well beyond liquor and cigars.25 The clause thus let Congress criminalize the conduct of people who receive no federal funds themselves but whose conduct threatens indirectly to impair the integrity of a federal spending program.26
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court gathered Comstock and Sabri with a third decision, Jinks, which upheld tolling of state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in federal court. Each law reached a person or matter already within federal authority: those already in federal custody, organizations receiving federal funds, and cases pending in federal court.27 Federal authority had attached before the clause came into play, and the law protected what that authority had created. The individual mandate lacked that quality, because it would have vested Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate for exercising an enumerated power.28 The Court has accordingly made clear that Congress cannot issue “individual mandates” under the commerce power.29
A statute’s public benefit does not supply the anchor, because Congress has no general police power, and the Comstock majority took care to say that its holding confers none.30 An answer that defends a protective statute by describing the good it does skips the step that matters: the enumerated power behind the program and the element that ties the offense to it.
Comprehensive Regulatory Schemes
The hardest cases arise when Congress builds a comprehensive scheme under a granted power and the scheme reaches local activity that is not itself commerce. Gonzales v. Raich put the question directly. California authorized the medicinal use of marijuana, and the issue was whether the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” Congress’s authority to regulate commerce lets Congress prohibit the local possession and manufacture of the drug.32 The Court said yes. It sustained federal regulation of growing marijuana for personal use on the ground that, without such regulation, an entire nationwide scheme for regulating interstate commerce would be jeopardized.33
The majority’s reasoning rested on a gap in the scheme. Congress’s attempt to regulate the interstate market for marijuana would have been substantially undercut if it could not also regulate intrastate possession and consumption.34 Marijuana is a fungible commodity, so marijuana grown or held at home can move into the interstate market, and an exemption for home users would let supply flow around the ban. The majority grounded this in Wickard v. Filburn, which it read to let Congress regulate local activity that is not itself commercial when failing to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in the commodity.
Two requirements follow, and they do different work. A valid larger regulation of an interstate market supplies the enumerated power the clause executes, and without it the clause has nothing to carry out. A showing that regulating the local activity is a necessary part of that regulation supplies the reason Congress may touch something local, and without that limit any local act could be swept in on the theory that it bears some relation to a market.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and placed the authority in the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the commerce power alone. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce, he reasoned, is a rational and commonly used means of regulating commerce in that product.35 That simple possession is noneconomic is “immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation,” because Congress’s authority depends only on whether the prohibitions are appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating Schedule I substances from interstate commerce.36 Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.37 The structure is McCulloch applied to commerce: the commerce power names the subject, an interstate market, and the clause vouches for the means of making the regulation of that market work.
Justice Scalia also attached a limit. Justice O’Connor’s dissent charged that the Court’s approach reduces Lopez and Morrison to “little more than a drafting guide.” He answered that the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce “can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market,” and that it extends only to the measures necessary to make that regulation effective.38 The majority’s broad view of the commerce power and his narrower view with the clause added reached the same result in Raich. The usual exam error is to treat the noneconomic character of the local activity as decisive. On this reasoning it is immaterial, and the question is whether the activity is a necessary part of the scheme.
A separate dissent by Justice Thomas denied the necessary link directly. Regulating the respondents’ conduct, he concluded, is not “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” Congress’s restrictions on the interstate drug trade, so neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress power to regulate it.39 That dissent frames the dispute as one about necessity: whether regulating the local conduct is genuinely needed to make the interstate restrictions work.
United States v. Lopez shows where the same reasoning fails. Section 922(q), the school-zone gun statute, was a criminal provision that by its terms had nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise. It was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated, and so the cases upholding regulation of activities connected with commercial transactions could not sustain it.40 No interstate market stood behind the statute, so nothing about one person’s handgun near a school could leak into anything Congress was regulating. The question to put to any local-activity statute is therefore whether a larger scheme exists that the local activity could undercut.
The Ninth Circuit applied the same idea in Rambo to a statute that banned distributing machine guns and also banned possessing one if the defendant first obtained it after the distribution law took effect. The time limit ensured that anyone covered had taken part in unlawful distribution as a transferee, so the possession ban effectuated the distribution ban.41 The time limit tied the local act to the scheme, which is the connection Lopez found missing. Even so, that two-part statute differs from the elaborate, multi-layered drug-control scheme that Raich characterized as “comprehensive.”42 The Court has also confined Raich. In NFIB it described Raich as involving no “great substantive and independent power” and concerning only “individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”43 The comprehensive-scheme theory therefore explains how far a valid scheme extends over local acts, and it cannot supply the missing predicate for a scheme whose own source of power is in doubt.
Creating and Structuring Agencies
No clause of Section 8 mentions agencies, yet Congress creates and runs them under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article I does not in terms give Congress the power to create executive agencies, but it has long been recognized that the clause supports a wide-ranging authority to create and empower agencies that help carry out the laws Congress enacts.46 The Constitution left the details of the executive branch to the institutions it created. It says nothing about the identity or organization of the “Departments,” and Congress has taken the lead in filling the gap.47 The agency question is therefore the bank question from McCulloch in administrative form. If a particular agency would be “useful” or “conducive” to carrying into execution one of Congress’s enumerated powers, Congress may establish it and put it to work.48
Each familiar agency pairs with a grant. The power to lay and collect taxes supports an Internal Revenue Service, and the power to establish post offices and post roads supports a Postal Service. The power to regulate interstate commerce supports the Food and Drug Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Environmental Protection Agency, and countless other regulators of the economy.49 In each pairing, the statute that sets substantive requirements rests on an Article I grant, and the clause authorizes an agency to help implement those requirements. These agencies are the next step after the protective laws taught above: those laws guard a federal program, and an agency is the machinery that operates it.
Congress needs this power for a practical reason. A statute is only text until someone collects the revenue, inspects the product, or decides the disputes under it, and a legislature of two Houses cannot perform those tasks for every taxpayer and every shipment. An agency, like the bank charter in McCulloch, has no purpose of its own. It exists to administer the law that created it. The First Congress acted on that understanding. It debated whether each executive department should be led by one person or by a governing group and whether the President could remove department heads alone or only with Senate approval, and it wrote organic acts that placed the original departments under a single official removable at the President’s sole and unlimited discretion.50
The clause does a second job once the agency exists. If Congress may create an agency because it helps carry a granted power into execution, it may also enact rules that help the agency do its work well, including rules about structure, organization, and procedure.51 One statute may open an agency’s decisionmaking to participation by interested parties and the public.52 Rules of this sort do not themselves execute any enumerated power, but they are measures necessary and proper to facilitate the sound operation of the agencies Congress has power to create.53 The chain has two links, each resting on the one before: an enumerated power supports the agency, and the agency’s needs support the rules that shape it. Congress has also used this structuring power to give some bodies independence from the President. The debates behind one early commission show the prevailing view that it was to be “separate and apart from any existing department of the government—not subject to the orders of the President.”54
Because the clause reaches all powers vested in any department or officer of the government, it also supports the machinery of the other branches. It “does not vest regulatory or supervisory authority over any particular subject matter”; it guarantees a latitude of discretion in the exercise of the granted powers so that they can be exercised completely and effectively.55 Since 1825, the Court has held that Congress may confer rulemaking power on federal judges, as in the authorization of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and may authorize the Supreme Court to set rules for its own business, for criminal cases, and for bankruptcy cases, and to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence.56 Mistretta v. United States confirms the point. Article III limits the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies,” but the Court has never held, and has clearly disavowed in practice, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that are, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “necessary and proper . . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce.”57
Congress’s power to shape an agency’s work extends to the duties of the officers who run it. In Kendall v. United States, the Court rejected the idea that every executive officer stands under the President’s exclusive direction. Congress may impose on an executive officer any duty it thinks proper, so long as the statute is otherwise constitutional, and the President cannot direct the officer to violate that duty. The clause’s express reach over powers vested in “any Department or Officer” suggests that legislators have at least some say in how the federal government is administered, and the President’s own duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed obligates him to deploy executive power consistently with all valid acts of Congress.58 How far that authority runs against a President’s own claims is a question for the Steel Seizure Case. Justice Jackson’s concurrence there is the most influential and most frequently cited opinion in that case, and the Court has come to treat it as though it were the opinion of the Court.59
Every one of these powers operates through legislation, and that fact marks where the clause stops. Congress may design the agency, define its duties, and shape its procedures by enacting a statute that passes both Houses and reaches the President, but it may not keep for itself a part in carrying out the statute. Bowsher v. Synar applied that line to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which required across-the-board spending cuts when the deficit exceeded statutory targets and assigned certain functions in that process to the Comptroller General. Congress could remove the Comptroller General by joint resolution, and the Court treated that removability as the critical factor. Congress cannot reserve for itself the power to remove an officer charged with executing the laws, except by impeachment.
The reason follows from what a removal power does. An officer whom Congress can remove, or threaten to remove, for executing the laws in a way Congress dislikes will tend to execute them the way Congress prefers, so vesting execution in such an officer would leave control of execution with Congress. That control would operate as a congressional veto exercised outside the route Article I prescribes for lawmaking, because Congress would steer laws already enacted without passing a new law and presenting it to the President. Chadha drew the same line from another direction. The House used a one-House veto to overrule the Attorney General and mandate an individual’s deportation, an action that altered the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the Legislative Branch.60 Congress keeps abundant means of controlling its agencies all the same. It controls them first through the legislation that creates them, and durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements lie well within its constitutional power.61
The limit is narrower than it may first appear. The Bowsher dissent stressed what the Court did not hold, namely that executive-type powers may be exercised only by officers removable at will by the President. That fits the Court’s longstanding recognition that Congress may, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, vest authority within the definition of executive power in officers who are not removable at will and are therefore not under the President’s direct control.62 Bowsher targets Congress’s own control over execution. Presidential removal is a separate doctrine, one that is hard to capture but that seems, after Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, to have crystallized for now.63 What separates Kendall from Bowsher is the instrument Congress used. In Kendall, Congress imposed a duty by law, and both the officer and the President had to obey it. In Bowsher, Congress kept a lever over the officer’s performance of the law.
An answer defending an agency should name the underlying power the agency administers and treat the clause as the bridge between that power and the agency. An answer attacking a statute should aim at the congressional role in execution, where Bowsher and Chadha apply, and should not question Congress’s authority to create or structure the agency in the first place.