Concept
Congress's Enforcement Power
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power
Congress's Enforcement Power
The Nineteenth Amendment ends with one enforcement sentence: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”1 Three questions follow from those words, and most enforcement problems turn on one of them. What makes legislation “appropriate”? What separates enforcing the right from redefining it? Can a statute reach a State itself, so that the State must answer in court for a violation?
The answers come mostly from other amendments. The leading decisions construe the Fifteenth Amendment's matching clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's parallel clause, and the Nineteenth Amendment appears chiefly in separate opinions that treat it alongside the others. The borrowing is sound, because the clauses grant the same power and attach it to prohibitions built on the same pattern, but it calls for care. The broadest statements of the power date from the 1960s, and a recent dissent charges that the Court now gives Congress less respect than those decisions did.2 An answer built only on the expansive language will overstate what Congress may do.
The doctrine balances two pressures. A court decides only the case before it, so enforcement means little unless Congress can reach a whole category of denial in advance. Yet the same breadth, unchecked, would let Congress decide what the Amendment prohibits, and the Amendment would then mean whatever the current Congress declared, when the Constitution reserves changes of that kind for Article V. The law settles the tension by giving Congress wide choice of means while holding the content of the right fixed. The first subsection states the standard for choosing means, the second states the limit that fixes the content, and the third asks whether the power reaches a State as defendant.
Appropriate Legislation
Section 2 authorizes “appropriate legislation,” and the meaning of that phrase comes from decisions on the Nineteenth Amendment's siblings. The Fifteenth Amendment's first section forbids denying or abridging the vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The Nineteenth repeats that sentence with one change, sex for race, and each Amendment ends by giving Congress power to enforce it.3 Because the two clauses grant the same power, an answer may carry the Fifteenth Amendment decisions over, and it should say that it does so by analogy.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the standard. Reviewing the Voting Rights Act under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court began from the point that the Amendment's ban is self-executing: courts had repeatedly construed it, without further legislation, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures that were discriminatory on their face or in practice. The Court then held that, as against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.4 The breadth of that standard comes from older language in Ex parte Virginia: “Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain . . . if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”5
The Court read the power generously for a practical reason. A lawsuit resolves one dispute at a time, and where officials resist the prohibition, the lawsuits themselves become a tool of delay. Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate against widespread and persistent discrimination, because of the inordinate time and energy needed to overcome the obstructionist tactics these suits invariably met, and the Court held that after nearly a century of systematic resistance Congress might shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.6 The Court then asked only whether the specific remedies were an appropriate means of combatting the evil. It accepted Congress's choice to confine them to the small number of States and subdivisions where discrimination was substantial as a permissible method, and it held that the doctrine of the equality of States, which governs the terms of admission to the Union, did not bar the approach.7
The Fourteenth Amendment's parallel clause received the same reading in Katzenbach v. Morgan. By including Section 5, the Court said, the draftsmen sought to give Congress the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the classic formulation of those powers is Chief Justice Marshall's in McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”8 The Court then rejected a reading of Section 5 that would require a judicial determination that the state law Congress had precluded violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the statute. That rule would depreciate congressional resourcefulness and responsibility, and it would confine Congress to abrogating only the state laws the judiciary was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or to informing the judiciary's judgment by particularizing the “majestic generalities” of Section 1.9 A court-first rule would make Congress's power a copy of the judicial power and leave the second enforcer with nothing to add. For the Nineteenth Amendment, a State cannot defeat an enforcement statute by showing that no court has yet held its challenged practice to be a sex-based denial. This is a Fourteenth Amendment decision, so it supplies a parallel and not a holding on Section 2.
Ex parte Virginia also shows whom enforcement legislation may reach. The Court could not see how holding an office under a State, and claiming to act for the State, relieves the holder of the obligation to obey the Constitution or takes away Congress's power to punish his disobedience.10 That reasoning matters for the Nineteenth Amendment because a State denies the vote only through the people who act for it, such as a registrar or an election judge. Enforcement legislation can act on those officials personally and need not be aimed at the State as an abstraction.
A State's brief will usually argue that Congress may restate the prohibition but must leave particular remedies to the courts. The Fifteenth Amendment decision cuts against that argument. Courts had already enforced the Amendment's ban without further legislation, and the Court still read the enforcement clause as a separate grant of power to use any rational means.12 A Section 2 limited to repeating Section 1 would add nothing to what the Amendment's first sentence already accomplishes.
Separate opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell, the fractured decision on Congress's power to lower the voting age, show Justices reading the enforcement clauses the same way. Because they are individual opinions, they show how their authors read the power and do not hold anything about the Nineteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas reasoned that the Civil War Amendments made vast inroads on the power of the States, that equal protection became a standard for state action with Congress given authority to enforce it, and that the manner of enforcement involves discretion largely entrusted to Congress, not to the courts. He also tested Congress's choice against Marshall's phrase “the letter and spirit of the constitution.”13
The most recent statement of the standard comes from a dissent, so it shows how its author read the cases and not what the Court held. The dissent in Shelby County v. Holder wrote that South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the standard of review, that the Court had reaffirmed it when it faced later reauthorizations of the Voting Rights Act, and that the majority did not purport to alter the settled rule that the dispositive question is whether Congress employed “rational means.” It added that, until that decision, the Court had accorded Congress the full measure of respect its judgments in this domain should garner.14 On the dissent's account, then, the standard is still stated in rational-means terms but the majority applies it with less deference.
Together these authorities give the working rule. Legislation is appropriate under Section 2 when it is a rational means, plainly adapted to preventing the denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex, that no other constitutional provision forbids. Congress may reach the officials who act for the State, adopt remedies that do not wait on lawsuits, and act without a prior judicial finding that the targeted practice is unconstitutional. The power still extends only to enforcing “this article,” so the end must be the Nineteenth Amendment's own.15
Remedial, Not Substantive
The verb “enforce” sets the boundary of Section 2. To enforce a right is to give effect to something already defined, so Section 1 supplies the content, no denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex, and Section 2 supplies the means.17 The standard statement of that division comes from a Fourteenth Amendment case, City of Boerne v. Flores. Congress may create enforcement mechanisms and remedies, such as criminal penalties or civil liability, against those who deprive others of constitutional rights, but it may not change the substantive right, either to enlarge it or to reduce it, and it has no power to determine what conduct violates the Constitution in the first place.18 The Nineteenth Amendment ends with a parallel enforcement sentence, so the principle reaches it by analogy.
Two reasons support the limit, and they protect different things. The first protects the constitutional text. If Congress could define the content of the right it enforces, an ordinary statute could widen or narrow the Amendment, and the Constitution reserves changes of that kind for Article V. In Oregon v. Mitchell, Justice Harlan stressed that States may be deprived of their retained powers only with the concurrence of two-thirds of each House and three-fourths of the States, and that the power to set voting qualifications survives except as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments limit it.19 The second reason protects the division of power between governments. Justice Black wrote that the Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections except where the people have narrowed it by amendment, and he counted the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments among the express narrowings. He added that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, since that reading would make the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superfluous.20 Each voting amendment therefore removes one ground of exclusion from the States and leaves the rest of their control over qualifications in place.
Another separate opinion in the same case turned these concerns into a list. It called the congressional enforcement power broad but not unlimited and identified at least three limits on Congress's power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments:21
- Congress may not repeal other provisions of the Constitution by legislation.
- The grant was not meant to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to turn a national government of enumerated powers into one with unrestrained authority over every inch of the Nation.
- Congress may only “enforce” the amendments' provisions, and only by “appropriate legislation,” so it cannot undercut their guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination (see Katzenbach v. Morgan) or undermine the Bill of Rights protections that the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the States.
Because that opinion speaks for its author alone, an answer should present it as persuasive authority that applies to the Nineteenth Amendment by analogy. The third limit is the remedial-versus-substantive line in the Civil War Amendments' own words. The first two mark what lies outside that line: the rest of the Constitution, and the state control over voter qualifications that the Nineteenth Amendment never touched.
Oregon v. Mitchell itself shows the line from the wrong side. Congress had lowered the voting age to eighteen in state and local elections, and Justice Black concluded that it had attempted to invade an area preserved to the States without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination, so it exceeded its powers as to those elections.22 Age was not the forbidden ground, so the statute did not enforce the ban. It substituted Congress's own view of who should vote, which is the redefinition the remedial limit rules out. The same Justice would have held that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections and may oversee presidential elections and set the qualifications of voters for presidential electors, so a statute reaching those elections needs no enforcement clause at all.23 The remedial limit therefore binds only a statute that rests on Section 2. The age dispute was resolved through the amendment process, because the Twenty-sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, prohibits denying or abridging the vote on account of age to citizens eighteen and over.24
What matters is what the statute operates on. A preamble that recites Section 2 proves nothing, because the operative text decides whether the statute reaches sex-based denial or abridgment of the vote or something else.
That statute fails because the voting amendments prohibit exclusion on certain grounds and do not confer an affirmative right to vote on all citizens.26 Section 2 can attach remedies to the ban but cannot add a guarantee that Section 1 omits. The same reasoning blocks a second overreach. The Amendment concerns the vote and one ground, so Congress cannot use Section 2 to turn it into a general sex-equality clause for employment or licensed occupations. Those subjects fall under equal protection, where gender classifications are tested under intermediate scrutiny.27
The tie to the named ground also affects how closely the Court looks. It has been jealous of congressional efforts to push the envelope, particularly when Congress tries to benefit non-suspect classes or to protect non-fundamental rights.28 A statute aimed at sex-based denial of the ballot falls on the safer side of that caution, because voting is fundamental: through it the people choose their government and hold it accountable.29 Congress thus has wide room to choose remedies, penalties, and preemption of state rules that use sex as a voter qualification, and no room to change what the Amendment prohibits.
Reaching State Governments
A statute under Section 2 can be aimed at a State's own election machinery, because the Amendment's first sentence forbids denial or abridgment of the vote “by the United States or by any State” and its second sentence authorizes enforcement legislation.31 That possibility raises a question the earlier subsections left open. Sovereign immunity, which the Court ties to the Eleventh Amendment, shields a State from being sued without its consent, and a damages suit against a state election agency that systematically refuses to register women would draw the defense that the State cannot be sued.32 The remedy therefore works only if Congress can override the immunity by statute, which is called abrogation. No decision in this chapter resolves that question for the Nineteenth Amendment, so what follows is extrapolation by analogy, and an answer should present it that way.
The source of Congress's power decides whether abrogation is available. Congress may not abrogate this immunity under its commerce power, a rule that traces to Seminole Tribe v. Florida, but it is free to do so under its Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers.33 The line between those powers tracks two features of the enforcement amendments. They were adopted after the Eleventh Amendment, so they can narrow an immunity that existed before them, and their prohibitions address state action, so the remedies they authorize will often run against States.34 The point of that logic is plain: a clause that told States what they may not do, yet let every State plead immunity from whatever remedy Congress chose, would leave Congress little to enforce it with.
Applied to the Nineteenth Amendment, the logic points toward abrogation. The Amendment came after the Eleventh, and its first sentence names “any State” as a bound actor, so Section 2 is a later-enacted enforcement power attached to a constraint on state action, the combination that supports abrogation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.35 The reasoning behind those rulings would seem to indicate that Congress can strip away state sovereign immunity when it wields its enforcement powers under the sex-related Nineteenth Amendment, and the same is said of the age-related Twenty-sixth.36 The inference is tentative. An answer that tracks the authorities says the reasoning would seem to support abrogation and does not say the Court has held it.
A statute that authorized the same suits under the Commerce Clause would stand differently, because the commerce power cannot abrogate, and enforcement-clause authority is the only plausible route to the State itself.38 The power Congress invokes therefore matters in an exam problem, and a recital of Section 2 helps only if the operative text addresses denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex.
Abrogation answers only the immunity defense. A statute that clears it must still be appropriate and remedial, a rational means of enforcing the Section 1 ban without redefining it, as the preceding subsections explained. Penalties aimed at officials operate on persons and not on the State, so the immunity question arises for remedies that run against the State as defendant.