Concept
No Power to Dilute
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
No Power to Dilute
Section 5 empowers Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,” and “enforce” points in one direction.1 To enforce a guarantee is to give it effect against the States. The preceding sections asked how far Congress may go in strengthening the guarantees through remedial and preventive measures. This section asks the opposite question: may Congress use Section 5 to lower what Section 1 demands of the States? It may not.
The Court said so in a footnote to Katzenbach v. Morgan, the decision that sustained Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5, the footnote explains, “does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact ‘statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.’” Congress’s power “is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”2
The footnote’s own example shows how the rule works. A statute authorizing the States to run racially segregated school systems would not be a measure “to enforce” the Equal Protection Clause, because the Clause “of its own force prohibits such state laws.”3 Section 1 binds the States without any help from Congress. A federal statute that approves the forbidden practice therefore adds nothing to the guarantee, and it purports to take the practice out of the guarantee’s reach. Enforcement closes the gap between what Section 1 demands and what the States do; dilution widens that gap.
City of Boerne v. Flores reaches the same conclusion from the meaning of “enforce.” The Court called the Section 5 power “remedial” and held that the design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with a power to decree the substance of the Amendment’s restrictions: “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”4 Congress may remedy unconstitutional actions, but it may not make “a substantive change in the governing law.”5 The early cases, the Court added, treated the power as “corrective or preventive, not definitional.”6 A statute that lowers a guarantee changes what the right is just as surely as one that raises it, so the dilution rule does not turn on how much room Congress keeps to expand the guarantees. That earlier question belongs to the sections above. The answer to this one follows from both Morgan and Boerne.
The clause sets two limits, and they work differently. Congress may only “enforce” the provisions of the amendments, and it may do so only by “appropriate legislation.”7 The first limit fixes the direction of the power, and the guarantee being enforced fixes its reach. The Thirteenth Amendment shows how much that reach can vary. Because it “is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist,” the power to enforce it includes laws “direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”8 The second limit concerns means, and a remedy can fail as a means without lowering any guarantee. In the Title VII backpay litigation covered in the abrogation discussion above, the court of appeals found that Congress had intended to let state employees sue the State for backpay, yet held that a private federal action for retroactive damages was not a constitutionally permissible method of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights.9 That is a dispute about means. The no-dilution rule is about direction.
Morgan itself shows what the permitted direction looks like. The majority rested on two alternative rationales. Section 4(e) was rationally related to securing for Puerto Ricans in New York nondiscriminatory treatment in the provision or administration of governmental services, and Congress could reasonably have thought it would eliminate an invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.10 Under the first rationale, Congress was implementing judicially determined rights, because discrimination in public services on the basis of race or national origin was already clearly unconstitutional.11 The second rationale is harder. Commentary presses whether it let Congress act substantively, and whether the footnote’s distinction between “dilution” and “expansion” is persuasive.12 Boerne separates statutes that remedy unconstitutional state action from statutes that make “a substantive change in the governing law.”13 A statute that adds protection must still fit that line, under the congruence and proportionality inquiry taught earlier. A statute that lowers the floor never reaches that inquiry. It neither remedies nor prevents a violation by the States; it licenses one.
Courts apply the limit whenever a State defends a violation by pointing to Congress. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, a State defended a nursing school’s exclusion of men by relying on a federal exemption for single-sex public undergraduate institutions and on Section 5. The Court rejected the defense: Section 5 confines Congress to enforcing the guarantees, and neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. In Saenz v. Roe, a State defended a welfare scheme that limited new residents’ benefits by pointing to congressional approval of durational residency requirements. The Court again rejected the defense: Congress has no affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In each case the federal approval stood behind a practice that Section 1 forbids, and the approval changed nothing about whether the practice was constitutional.
One opinion states the limit for the amendments generally. Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments’ guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination, and none to undermine the Bill of Rights protections that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States.14 The affirmative action cases repeat the limit in another setting. Some Justices have tried to rely on Section 5 to justify federal statutes that distribute benefits or burdens by race, but it now appears that a majority rejects the notion that Congress can use Section 5 to justify action that would violate Section 1 if a State had taken it.15 The Court has approved affirmative action in certain cases, and it has not relied on Section 5 to do so.16