Concept
The State Action Limit
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
The State Action Limit
Section 5 lets Congress “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,” and the provisions it enforces restrain States.1 The central prohibitions of Section 1 begin “No State shall.” From the start, the Court has read the Amendment to separate deprivation by a State, which the Amendment reaches, from private conduct, “however discriminatory and wrongful,” against which it offers no shield.2 The distinction is deceptively simple, and this section tests it.
Against States, Section 5 is a strong power. The Civil War Amendments expanded Congress’s powers at the cost of state sovereignty, and legislation under them has intruded into spheres of judicial, executive, and legislative autonomy once reserved to the States.3 A Title VII remedy against a State, for example, was held within Congress’s power and not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4 Against private persons, the same power gives out.
The reason is structural. The Constitution divides individual liberty from the exercise of government power, and its restraints protect the individual from government, not from other private persons.5 A Section 5 power that reached every private wrong Congress thought serious would leave nothing to limit it. The Court has named that danger: if Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, “it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.”6 State action is one such principle. It ties the power to what a State has done.
The limit works apart from the congruence and proportionality test taught above. That test measures how closely a statute fits an injury the Amendment recognizes. The state action limit asks an earlier question: whom does the statute regulate, and what triggers it? A statute that answers a grave, well-documented harm can still fail when the harm comes from private persons.
The Civil Rights Cases fixed the rule, and United States v. Morrison applied it to a modern statute. A third subsection shows where Congress has gone around the limit. The limit follows the wording of Section 1, so it does not travel to every amendment: the Thirteenth, unlike the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, is not explicitly limited to governmental action.7
Civil Rights Cases Rule
In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court held by an 8-1 vote that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 exceeded Congress’s power.8 The Act entitled all persons to the full and equal enjoyment of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement; in other words, it broadly prohibited private racial discrimination by hotels, restaurants, transportation, and other public accommodations.9 The Court read Section 1 to prohibit only state action and treated Section 5 as a remedial power.10 City of Boerne v. Flores later summarized the holding: the Enforcement Clause did not authorize “general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce.”11
The Court reasoned in two steps. First, Section 1 prohibits “State action of a particular character,” so Section 5 can authorize only legislation that answers such action.12 Congress may provide “modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers,” but it may not “create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights,” and its legislation “must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed state laws or state proceedings.”13 Second, the 1875 Act met none of those conditions. It did not “profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States”; it applied equally in States with the justest laws and in States that had violated the Amendment. It laid down rules for how individuals deal with one another “without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities.”14
An individual’s wrong, “unsupported by any such authority,” remained “simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual,” to be redressed under state law.15 Concern for personal liberty and for federalism drove that conclusion: extending the Amendment further would let Congress “establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society.”16 If such legislation were appropriate, the Court warned, “it is difficult to see where it is to stop.”17
The first statute fits the Court’s own account: where a State’s laws themselves make unjust discrimination, “Congress has full power to afford a remedy.”18 The second repeats the design of the 1875 Act, a uniform national rule that waits on no state wrong, and it fails for the same reason.19
United States v. Harris applied the same limit to a criminal statute. Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 sought to punish “private persons” for conspiring “to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State,” and the Court held it beyond Section 5 because it was “directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers.”20 A hotel law and a conspiracy law regulate different things, and both failed for one reason: neither depended on state action. The limit turns on whom a statute regulates and what triggers it. The gravity of the private wrong does not enter.
Justice Harlan, dissenting alone, called the majority’s reasoning “entirely too narrow and artificial.”21 The first clause of Section 1, he argued, is “of a distinctly affirmative character,” and Section 5 empowers Congress to enforce “all of the provisions” of the article, “affirmative and prohibitive.”22 In the alternative, he argued that owners of places of public accommodation are “agents of the state, because amenable, in respect of public duties and functions, to public regulation,” so the Act would regulate state agents and not purely private actors.23 History lends his view some support, since the framers meant the Civil War Amendments to serve as the basis for a federal program protecting civil rights “against both state and private encroachment.”24 A dissent states no holding, though, and the majority’s corrective reading is the one later cases follow.
Boerne observed that although the specific holdings of the early cases might have been superseded or modified, citing Heart of Atlanta and Guest as examples, their treatment of Section 5 as corrective or preventive, not definitional, “has not been questioned.”25 The limit therefore survives even where particular decisions have not.
The limit still leaves Congress some room. Congress has latitude to prohibit private conduct that prevents state officials from giving others equal protection or due process. A federal statute punishing private persons who threaten a school principal in order to stop him from enrolling Black students illustrates the point.26 What triggers that statute is the principal’s effort to perform the State’s Section 1 duty, so the statute protects state compliance with the Amendment and writes no rule for private dealings. Remove the principal and the school, leave a private proprietor choosing whom to serve, and the statute returns to ground the Civil Rights Cases closed.27 The principal unmapped area is purely private discrimination in which no state facilities, programs, or rights are directly involved, such as discrimination by small social clubs that hold no state licenses.
The Court also reserved a question that points beyond Section 5. It declined to decide whether Congress, under its power to regulate commerce among the States, might pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, because the sections before it were not framed that way.28 When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nearly a century later, it relied on its commerce power as well as on Section 5, a route taken up in the last subsection.29
United States v. Morrison
United States v. Morrison applied the Civil Rights Cases rule to a modern statute. The Violence Against Women Act gave victims of gender-motivated violence a federal civil cause of action against the private individuals who injured them, and it contained no state action requirement.31 Congress had documented gender-based stereotypes that hampered many state legal systems, sometimes unconstitutionally, and it had task force reports from at least 21 States describing constitutional violations.32 The Court nonetheless held that Section 5 could not support the remedy. It gave two grounds.
The first ground was the state action limit itself. The remedy ran against the individuals who committed the violence, and no state official stood in its path. It therefore belonged with the statutes struck in Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, which were directed at private persons without reference to state law or its administration.33 The mechanism is the one the Civil Rights Cases described. Section 1 commands States, so a statute enforcing it must answer something a State has done, and a remedy triggered by a private person’s crime answers no act of any State. Were it otherwise, a record of lax state enforcement could support federal regulation of every private wrong that state criminal and tort law also reaches, and the old question, “where is it to stop,” would have no answer.34
The second ground assumes, for the sake of analysis, that the injury Congress meant to remedy was gender discrimination in state justice systems, and it holds that the remedy still does not fit that injury. The remedy is not corrective of the underlying violation, because lawsuits against private assailants will not alter the patterns of discrimination in state justice systems.35 A State that mishandles every such case and a State that handles them all well produce the same suit against the assailant. The remedy also applies throughout the Nation although the record documented the problem in only some States.
The remedies the Court has upheld look different. The Voting Rights Act provision in Katzenbach v. Morgan worked directly on a state rule: New York required voters to read and write English, and Section 4(e) barred denying the vote because of inability to read English to a person who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican public school where the language of instruction was other than English.36 South Carolina v. Katzenbach upheld “remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,” including suspension of literacy tests and review of new voting regulations in covered jurisdictions.37 Each remedy was aimed at state law and at the places where the evil appeared. The VAWA remedy had neither feature.
The challengers relied chiefly on United States v. Guest, where separate opinions said that Section 5 lets Congress punish private conspiracies. Justice Clark wrote that, although the Court specifically rejected any such connotation, there could be “no doubt” that Section 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing “all conspiracies—with or without state action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”38 Justice Brennan’s separate opinion went further and said that a majority of the Court rejected the Civil Rights Cases’ reading of Section 5.39 The Morrison Court answered that these statements did not bind. The Guest majority had read the indictment to allege active connivance by agents of the State, which removed any need to decide the threshold level of state action, so it had no occasion to revisit the Civil Rights Cases or Harris.40 Statements of that kind on a question the Court did not reach are dicta, and a later footnote in District of Columbia v. Carter that repeated the account of Guest was dicta too.41
The VAWA remedy fails each step: the defendants are private assailants, the asserted injury is state bias, the remedy leaves state officials untouched, and its reach is national. Step one answers the first ground by itself. Steps two through four supply the second ground, which holds even if the state bias is accepted as the injury.
Commentators describe at least three possibilities that Morrison leaves open.42 More carefully crafted remedial statutes might pass muster if Congress aims only at jurisdictions with a longstanding history of discriminatory non-enforcement by local law enforcement officials, as the hypothetical does. Congress might be able to sanction private individuals who affirmatively disable public officials from affording rights-vindicating protections to victims. And the Court might distinguish Morrison in a case of private wrongdoing aimed at a victim already protected by a court order vindicating that victim’s Section 1 rights.
A dissent shows the question was open. The government’s argument, the dissent said, was that Congress used Section 5 to remedy the actions of state actors, namely States that, through discriminatory design or the discriminatory conduct of their officials, failed to provide adequate (or any) state remedies for women injured by gender-motivated violence, a failure that the States and Congress had documented in depth.43 On nationwide scope, the dissent noted that Congress had task force reports from at least 21 States and its own findings about pervasive gender-based stereotypes, that “[t]he record nowhere reveals a congressional finding that the problem ‘does not exist’ elsewhere,” and that the Court had never held that Congress must document a problem in every State before proposing a national solution. The deference owed Congress’s chosen remedy under Section 5, it added, suggests that any such requirement would be inappropriate.44 The majority’s view is the law. The dissent marks where the disagreement lies: whether a remedy against private actors can count as a remedy for state failures, and whether a nationwide remedy needs a nationwide record.
Routes Beyond Section 5
The state action limit confines one source of power and leaves the others alone. Congress can draw on several constitutional provisions when it legislates in aid of civil rights, and under those provisions it may legislate against even private misconduct.46 It has used the commerce power against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation and the spending power to bar racial discrimination by recipients of federal funds.47 A power that does not depend on state action has no use for the filter taught above, and three routes show it.
The commerce route produced the best-known example. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States involved an Atlanta motel that, like other hotels and motels throughout the South, refused to accommodate Black people.48 The motel had 216 rooms, was accessible to interstate highways, and drew 75 percent of its guests from out of state.49 Congress was morally opposed to racism, yet it chose to rely primarily on its authority to regulate interstate commerce.50 A concurring Justice joined the Court’s opinions upholding Title II as applied to the motel but was “somewhat reluctant ... to rest solely on the Commerce Clause,” because the right to be free of state action that discriminates because of race “occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”51
Congress chose commerce for a reason the Civil Rights Cases supplied. That 1883 decision had barred Section 5 statutes that regulated private action, and the Court there had expressly left undecided whether antidiscrimination legislation resting on the Commerce Clause would stand.52 By 1964 the commerce power also had a firmer footing, because the Court’s stance toward it had changed dramatically in 1937.53 The two statutes regulated the same kind of private conduct. What separates their fates is the power each was defended under.
The spending power reaches private actors through conditions on money. Title VI of the 1964 Act uses it to prohibit racial discrimination by grantees of federal funds.54 Conditional spending is constitutional so long as Congress acts in the general welfare, the conditions relate to the purpose of the federal program, and they do not violate another guarantee of individual liberty. The theory is that the recipient may refuse the money: in the drinking-age example, it was enough that the States could theoretically turn down the funding, even if Congress lacked power to impose the rule directly.55
The Thirteenth Amendment is the third route, and its text explains why the state action limit does not follow it. The Amendment “is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” The Civil Rights Cases themselves said so, and they recognized that the power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation includes the power to enact laws “direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”56 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. drew on that passage. The decision that confined Section 5 to state action thus recognized a different enforcement power with a different reach. A unanimous Court took the same route in Griffin v. Breckenridge, which applied 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) to certain purely private conspiracies to deprive persons of civil rights, relying on Congress’s power to reach private conduct under the Thirteenth Amendment and finding it unnecessary to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment would support the provision.57 The Thirteenth Amendment is practically the only clause in the Constitution that prevents one private citizen from doing something to another, so it gives Congress authority to reach private conduct that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments do not.58
The state action limit is therefore a limit on one source of power. When a statute reaches private discrimination, the first question is which constitutional power supports it. If the answer is Section 5, the filter taught in this section applies and the statute must be aimed at state action. If the answer is commerce, spending, or the Thirteenth Amendment, the statute is measured against that power’s own requirements, and the Section 5 limit never enters. Heart of Atlanta illustrates the second path, and the Civil Rights Cases illustrate the first.