Concept
Identifying a Constitutional Tax
Taxing power
Identifying a Constitutional Tax
Every federal tax rests on the first clause of Article I, section 8, which gives Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”1 The clause does not define “Taxes,” and the omission matters in practice. Because the taxing power is an independent grant, a statute that qualifies as a tax can stand even where the commerce power would not support it. If attaching a dollar amount to a command were enough to make it a tax, the limits on Congress’s other enumerated powers would be easy to evade. A court asked to sustain a measure under the taxing power must therefore decide, as a threshold matter, whether the measure is a tax at all.
The Court answers by examining how the measure operates. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), Congress called the payment owed by individuals who went without health insurance a “penalty,” yet the Court treated it as a tax. The IRS collected it with income tax returns, its amount varied with household income and filing status, and it was expected to raise substantial revenue. That approach produces two preliminary questions. First, does the measure produce at least some revenue for the Government? A measure that raises none is a bare prohibition rather than a tax. Second, even if it raises revenue, is it a penalty or a regulation dressed as a tax? The second question receives fuller treatment in the next major section.
Three ideas organize the rest of this section. Congress’s label does not decide the matter, so a payment called a penalty can be a tax and a levy called a tax can be a penalty. The revenue requirement sets a low threshold that a modest yield satisfies. And a regulatory purpose does not disqualify a measure that raises revenue, because every tax makes the taxed activity costlier than the untaxed alternatives. The modern Court applies all three deferentially and treats a measure as something other than a tax only in unusual cases. The label question comes first, and NFIB is the case that teaches it.
Labels Do Not Control
Whether a measure counts as a tax under Article I, section 8 depends on what the measure does, and the word Congress used to describe it does not settle the question. NFIB applied that principle to an exaction Congress deliberately labeled a penalty. The Affordable Care Act called the amount owed by individuals without health insurance the “shared responsibility payment” and described it as a penalty. Yet the payment went to the Treasury when taxpayers filed their returns, did not apply to anyone below the filing threshold, and was computed from taxable income, number of dependents, and joint-filing status.2 The requirement sat in the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS assessed and collected it “in the same manner as taxes,” and it was expected to raise about $4 billion a year by 2017.3 Those features gave the payment the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the Government. The Court therefore asked whether the payment fell within the taxing power by “[d]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and application,” a formula drawn from United States v. Constantine.4
A label-based test would fail in both directions. If a label could create power, Congress could extend any enumerated power by calling a command a “tax,” and the limits on its other powers would last only until the drafters found the right noun. The Court has said that the “question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”5 If a label could destroy power, Congress would lose a levy it is entitled to impose because a drafter chose the wrong word, and validity would turn on vocabulary rather than on what the law does to the people it reaches. For that reason “[m]agic words or labels” should not “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.”6 An operational test avoids both failures because it asks only what the exaction does: who pays it, how the amount is set, who collects it, and whether it raises money.
A penalty label therefore does not defeat the taxing power, and NFIB was not the first decision to say so. In the License Tax Cases, federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery tickets, for which the licensee paid a fee, were sustained as exercises of the taxing power although the fees were not labeled taxes. In New York v. United States, a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, part of which went to the Federal Treasury, was upheld as a tax.7 And in United States v. Sotelo, the Court observed that calling the funds due a “penalty” does not alter their essential character as taxes.8
The NFIB majority added an illustration that isolates the point. Suppose a statute requires every taxpayer who owns a house without energy-efficient windows to pay $50 to the IRS, adjusts the amount for taxable income and joint filing status, collects it with the income tax return, and exempts those below the filing threshold, and suppose it gives the payment no name at all. No one would doubt that such a law imposes a tax within Congress’s power, and the Court reasoned that the answer does not change when Congress substitutes the word “penalty.”9 Operation points the same way. An estimated four million people a year will pay the IRS rather than buy insurance. A Congress that regarded that outcome as tolerable was not creating four million outlaws, which indicates that the payment is a price citizens may lawfully choose to pay.10
The same method strips the label from the other side, which is why a tax label cannot rescue a punishment. In the Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), Congress had already lost an earlier case, Hammer v. Dagenhart, that barred it from regulating child labor directly. It responded with an exaction of 10 percent of a company’s net income on any employer who used child labor, however small the infraction, and it called the exaction a tax.11 The Court saw the law as an attempt to make an end run around Hammer, and it held that the exaction, although labeled a tax, was not authorized by the taxing power.12 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. is a later example, in which the Court treated a 15 percent “excise tax” on the sale price of coal at the mine as an exaction meant to compel compliance with the statute’s regulatory provisions rather than to raise revenue. When a court recharacterizes a labeled tax as a penalty, the taxing power no longer supports the law, and the commerce power may not fill the gap, because Congress cannot invoke it to impose a penalty on noneconomic conduct, at least in cases like this one.13
None of this makes the label irrelevant. A legislature’s declaration that a measure is a tax of a particular kind is entitled to much weight, but it does not make the measure that kind of tax if the measure cannot be so described consistently with the meaning and effect of the act.14 The label is evidence about what the measure is, and operation prevails when the two conflict. NFIB and the Child Labor Tax Case differ in operation. The child labor charge was a prohibitory financial punishment aimed at employers who knowingly broke labor standards. For most people the mandate payment was far less than the price of insurance, so paying it could be a reasonable financial decision, and the IRS collected it through the ordinary means of taxation.15 The sections on tax versus penalty and on NFIB develop those features in full. On an exam, the word a statute uses is only a starting fact; the analysis turns to how the exaction is calculated and collected, whether it raises revenue, and whether it works as a punishment.
One statutory question in the same litigation does treat the label as decisive. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax,” so a tax ordinarily must be challenged after payment through a refund suit. The Act and the Affordable Care Act are both creatures of Congress’s own creation, how they relate is up to Congress, and the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.16 The Court has accordingly applied the Act to statutorily described “taxes” even where that label was inaccurate.17 Congress called the shared responsibility payment a penalty while describing many other exactions in the same statute as taxes, and the Court presumed that Congress chose its words intentionally and held that the Act did not bar the suit. In that setting the label controls.
The Child Labor Tax Case produced the contrast within a single day. In one decision, a suit to enjoin collection of the exaction was barred because Congress had called it a tax. In the other, decided the same day, the same exaction with the same label was held to lie outside the taxing power.18 A label can answer what Congress intended under one of its own statutes, but it cannot answer what the Constitution lets Congress do.
The Some-Revenue Requirement
A power to lay and collect taxes is a power to bring money into the Government, and that purpose supplies the first preliminary question: does the measure raise any revenue at all?19 NFIB treated revenue as the essential feature of any tax, a formulation it drew from United States v. Kahriger. It found that feature in the individual-mandate payment because taxpayers paid it into the Treasury with their returns and it was expected to raise about $4 billion a year by 2017.20 The test asks only whether the measure produces at least some revenue, and nearly everything about the requirement follows from how little that word demands.
The threshold sits low because any higher one would require a court to make fiscal judgments it has no principled way to make. A rule demanding a particular yield would force a judge to say how many dollars make a tax, and a rule asking whether a levy covers its own administration would turn judicial review into an audit of the legislature’s budgeting. Decisions about how much to raise, from whom, and at what cost belong to Congress. The revenue requirement therefore asks the one question a court can answer from the record: does money actually come in?
Sonzinsky v. United States shows how little is enough. A firearms dealer challenged the National Firearms Act of 1934, which required every dealer to register with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and to pay a special excise tax of $200 per year.21 Twenty-seven dealers paid in 1934 and twenty-two paid the following year, so the measure brought in only $9,800, a sum quite likely smaller than the cost of administering the law. The Court nonetheless classified the measure as a tax because some money did reach the Treasury.22 Once some revenue is shown, the measure is presumptively a tax, even if the amount raised is minimal, and that presumption is hard to overcome. The hard work therefore shifts to the second preliminary question, whether a revenue-raising measure is a disguised penalty, which later sections address.23
The requirement bites only when no money comes in at all, and such cases are rare. The clearest failing example is a statute that taxes a liquor retailer $100,000 on each knowing sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor. If the charge is so heavy that such sales stop completely, no retailer ever pays it and the Treasury receives nothing. The measure is then a prohibitory regulation, because the success of the deterrent has left nothing to collect, and its validity must be assessed under the standards of some other power, such as the commerce power.24
The same reasoning reaches a measure that raises revenue at first and later stops. After NFIB, Congress reduced the shared responsibility payment to $0.00 without repealing the mandate itself. In Texas v. United States the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the revised provision could no longer be justified as a tax because it no longer functioned to raise any revenue.25 That decision was later vacated on other grounds, but the reasoning remains a useful illustration. An exaction of zero dollars is entirely uncoercive and so raises no revenue, which shows that the test looks at what the measure yields in operation, whatever amount the statute appears to impose.26
Failing the revenue test does not invalidate a measure. It means only that the taxing power is unavailable, so some other granted power must support the measure. A measure that collects nothing has no claim on the taxing power and must fit within a power that reaches the conduct on its own terms. In South Carolina v. Baker the Court rejected an argument that a federal provision was an impermissible regulatory tax, because Congress could have prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds by direct regulation. The Court added that a provision that is purely regulatory in purpose and effect and was never intended to raise revenue is not unconstitutional for that reason alone.27 A student who concludes that a zero-revenue measure must be struck down has skipped a step, because the correct question is whether the commerce power or another enumerated power supports it.
Regulatory Motive and Effect
Nothing in the taxing clause distinguishes a levy meant only to fill the Treasury from one Congress also hopes will change what people do.29 Once a measure is shown to raise revenue, the grant reaches it, and the Court has long said so plainly: “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.”30 NFIB repeated that sentence from Sonzinsky v. United States, and it supplies the working principle: a regulatory purpose or effect does not by itself disqualify a revenue-raising measure from being a tax.31
The principle follows from what a tax does. A tax raises the cost of the taxed activity relative to untaxed activities, and that shift in relative prices is the one a regulator would seek, so the regulatory effect cannot be separated from the taxation. If such an effect disqualified a measure, almost no tax would survive. Motive raises a different difficulty. Congress is a collective body whose members vote for a bill for many reasons, so a court asked to find the “real” purpose behind a levy would have to rank competing motives on thin evidence and strike down a statute on the strength of that ranking. The Court has declined the task, saying it will not inquire into the “hidden motives” of Congress to decide whether a tax is really an attempt to exercise a power the Constitution does not grant.32
Sonzinsky itself shows that refusal at work. The firearms dealer there argued that the $200 annual license tax was one of several cumulative levies, on the importer or manufacturer, on the dealer, and on the transfer to a buyer, whose combined effect was prohibitive and which showed a legislative purpose to regulate rather than to tax.33 The Court answered that the measure was a tax on its face and raised some revenue, which established its presumptive validity. Neither the regulatory effect of the overall scheme nor Congress’s plausible motive to prohibit firearms transactions was enough to rebut that presumption.34
The protective tariff is the oldest application. In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States the challengers contended that Congress may lay customs duties only to raise revenue and may not frame them to shelter domestic industry from foreign competition. The Court answered with history: the second statute the first Congress enacted, in 1789, recited that duties were laid for the support of government, the discharge of the nation’s debts, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, and many members of that Congress had sat at the Constitutional Convention.35 It then held that “[s]o long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate Congressional action.”36 Revenue is the anchor in that formulation, and other motives ride along with it. The Court drew on the Child Labor Tax Case for the same idea, that taxes may be imposed “with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them, and with the incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous,” and that “[t]hey do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive.”37
Modern examples run the same way. NFIB noted that some of the earliest federal taxes aimed to deter purchases of imported manufactured goods so as to foster domestic industry, that federal and state taxes can make up more than half the retail price of cigarettes in part to encourage people to quit, and that the Court has upheld such plainly regulatory measures as taxes on selling marijuana and sawed-off shotguns.38 A cigarette tax collects substantial revenue while also making smokers pay more than purchasers of untaxed goods, and the second fact does nothing to the first. For the same reason, the Court held that the individual-mandate payment, although plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage, was not barred from being a valid exercise of the taxing power.39
Because the Court does not examine motive, it also does not examine how heavy a tax is. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., the Court quoted the reply in Veazie Bank v. Fenno to a bank that called a tax on state bank notes so excessive as to show a purpose to destroy its franchise. Chief Justice Chase said that the judiciary cannot prescribe limits on a legislature’s exercise of its acknowledged powers, and that although the power to tax may be exercised oppressively, “the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.”40 The familiar saying that the power to tax is the power to destroy receives the same answer. It is pertinent only when Congress has no power to tax the subject at all, because if a lawful tax could be defeated on the ground that further exercise of the power might be destructive, every lawful tax would become unlawful.41 A harsh tax on a lawful subject is therefore a problem for the voters.
Two limits keep this deference from swallowing the revenue requirement. The first applies to a measure that is truly prohibitory. If its deterrent works so completely that no money ever reaches the Treasury, it raises no revenue and is not a tax, so some other enumerated power must support it.42
The second applies to a measure that does raise revenue but operates as a penalty enforcing regulatory commands that have nothing to do with collecting the money. In the Child Labor Tax Case, which later sections treat in full, the statute set detailed standards for employing children, and a knowing failure to meet any of them triggered a 10 percent excise on the employer’s annual net profits. The Court wrote that “a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed.”43 The firearms levy in Sonzinsky was a more typical excise, a charge on the business of dealing that lacked both the detailed behavioral specifications and the criminal trigger found in the child labor law.44 In Sonzinsky the discouragement was the incidental weight of a charge for doing business. In the Child Labor Tax Case the exaction attached only to breaking separate rules, so it functioned as the sanction for those rules and not as a price for engaging in the activity.
A statute in which Congress announces a hope of suppressing an activity, taxes a disfavored product, or sets a high rate does not become a penalty by those facts alone. The analysis asks whether the measure raises revenue and whether it works as a charge on an activity or as a punishment for violating other commands.