345 U.S. 22
The Revenue Act of 1951 imposed an occupational tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers.1 It required such persons to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue by filing names, addresses, and places of business.2
Kahriger was in the business of accepting wagers in Pennsylvania.3 Such activity is a crime punishable by separate or solitary imprisonment.4 Yet he willfully failed to register for and pay the tax.5
An information was filed against Kahriger in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.6 It alleged that he was engaged in the wagering business and had willfully failed to register and pay the occupational tax under 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §§ 3285, 3290, 3291, and 3294.7 Kahriger moved to dismiss the information on constitutional grounds.8
The district court sustained the motion to dismiss on the authority of United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287.9 The court reasoned that while the revenue purpose was within federal authority, the registration information was peculiarly applicable to law enforcement and vice control.10 This made the legislation an infringement on the police power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.11 Seven other district courts had upheld the statute against similar challenges.12
The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.13 Legislative history of the Act contained suggestions that Congress sought to hinder or prevent wagering.14 Actual collections under the tax totaled $4,371,869 against an expected $400,000,000 annually.15 The registration requirements applied only to specified gamblers whose calling was illegal in most states.16 The definitions of covered activities used terms such as "engaged in the business" of wagering and "usually."17
Whether the occupational tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951, which levy a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers and require registration with the Collector of Internal Revenue, are unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because Congress has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate gambling through regulatory features?18
The power of Congress to tax is extensive.19 A federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed or has a regulatory effect, provided the tax produces revenue.20 Precedents such as the License Tax Cases and Sonzinsky v. United States establish that Congress may tax activities within the states even when those activities violate state law.21 Legislative history showing a motive to suppress the taxed conduct does not invalidate the tax.22
No. The Revenue Act of 1951 imposes the occupational tax on all persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers regardless of whether the activity violates state law.23 The tax has produced revenue of $4,371,869.24 The registration provisions require only the filing of names, addresses, and places of business.25 These data are directly related to revenue collection and therefore supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose under Sonzinsky.26
The district court erred in relying on United States v. Constantine because that case involved a tax applicable only to liquor businesses violating state law.27 This tax applies uniformly without regard to state-law violations.28 Legislative history suggesting a congressional desire to hinder wagering does not invalidate the measure.29 The Court has repeatedly upheld taxes with similar deterrent effects when revenue is generated.30
The occupational tax provisions do not violate the Tenth Amendment.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment but expressed doubt.32 He noted that the statute requires specified gamblers whose calling is illegal in most states to identify themselves because of the source of their income rather than because they have income like others.33 He viewed the measure as difficult to regard as a rational revenue plan.34
He warned that using taxation for moral reforms risks frittering away public good will toward the self-assessment system.35 Yet he joined the decision to avoid impairing legitimate taxing power through extreme constitutional interpretations.36
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented from the majority's conclusion that the occupational tax provisions are constitutional.37 He argued that the Act requires a man to register and confess that he is engaged in the business of gambling.38 This confession can provide a basis to convict him of a federal crime for having gambled before registration without paying the tax.39
Whether or not the Act has this effect, Black was sure that it creates a squeezing device.40 It was contrived to put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a state prison as a violator of state gambling laws.41 In Pennsylvania, where the defendant was accused, such conduct is punishable by separate or solitary imprisonment.42 He concluded that compelling such self-incriminating disclosures violates the Fifth Amendment regardless of the tax label.43
Justice Frankfurter dissented, emphasizing the difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the tax is constitutional.44 He noted that constitutional issues arise when Congress draws on the taxing power not to raise revenue but to regulate conduct reserved to the states.45 Although courts should abstain from hobbling congressional policies, allowing what is excluded from congressional authority to be brought within it by casting legislation in revenue form offers an easy way to control subjects left to the states.46
The context of the legislation, including disclosures regarding gambling and public response, supports that it was an effort to check professional gambling rather than raise revenue.47 The enforcing provisions are designed for the systematic confession of crimes with a view to prosecution under state law.48 Therefore, it constitutes an inadmissible intrusion into a domain reserved to the states.49
Whether the registration provisions of the wagering tax violate the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment?50
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only to past acts and not to future acts that may or may not be committed.51 A taxpayer cannot refuse to file any return at all even if some answers might be privileged.52 The taxpayer must instead raise the objection on the return itself, as established in United States v. Sullivan.53
No. Kahriger failed to register at all, making it difficult to claim the privilege.54 The registration provisions inform a person that to engage in wagering in the future the conditions of registration and payment of the occupational tax must be met.55 They do not compel confession of acts already committed.56 The requirement to file names, addresses, and places of business is general in tax returns.57
It does not force disclosure of past criminal conduct in a manner that triggers the privilege.58
The registration provisions do not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.59
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment but with considerable doubt.60 He observed that sweeping and undiscriminating application of the immunity doctrines to taxation would almost give the taxpayer an option to refuse to report, as it now gives witnesses a virtual option to refuse to testify.61 The Fifth Amendment should not be construed to impair the taxing power conferred by the original Constitution, and especially by the Sixteenth Amendment, further than is absolutely required.62
He acknowledged that all taxation has a tendency to discourage the activity taxed and that Congress may place the burden where it will least handicap desirable activities.63 However, he viewed the statute as approaching the fair limits of constitutionality and joined the decision to avoid impairing legitimate taxing power by extreme constitutional interpretations.64
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented.65 He maintained that the Act compels a man to register and confess engagement in the business of gambling.66 This provides a basis for conviction of prior federal crimes or state gambling violations.67
Such coerced confessions violate the Fifth Amendment irrespective of the revenue form.68 The Act creates a squeezing device that can lead either to federal prison for refusing to confess or to state prison for violating gambling laws.69 Black would hold that this violates the Fifth Amendment.70
Justice Frankfurter dissented.71 He emphasized that Congress cannot compel self-incriminating disclosures for enforcement of state gambling laws merely by labeling the measure a revenue act.72 He distinguished this from cases allowing testimony in one jurisdiction to be used in another.73
He concluded that the enforcing provisions offend standards of decency protected by due process.74 When Congress uses the taxing power to regulate conduct beyond its direct authority, courts must examine the context showing an effort to check professional gambling rather than raise revenue.75
Whether the wagering tax provisions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the classification is arbitrary and the statutory definitions are vague?76
No. The definitions in 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3285(b), (d) and (e) make clear the activities covered and excluded.79 Exclusion of some wagering activities does not render the classification arbitrary because a tax statute need not cover every phase of the business.80 The terms engaged in the business and usually provide adequate notice of the conduct subject to the tax.81
The wagering tax provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause.82