Concept
The Road to Younger
Younger abstention
Younger Abstention
The Road to Younger
A court of equity, the part of the judicial power that issues injunctions rather than money judgments, has long been reluctant to enjoin criminal proceedings. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), restated the general rule that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings under state law, and then added that there are exceptions.1 The doctrine of equitable restraint that Younger v. Harris (1971) formalized and extended to federal-state relations marks where those exceptions stop once a state proceeding is already pending.2 Three pieces of background explain the problem Younger addressed: the route into federal court that Ex parte Young opened, the statute that restricts federal injunctions against state proceedings, and Dombrowski v. Pfister, which litigants read as a broad license to sue.
From Shield to Sword
Ex parte Young turned federal constitutional defenses, which a defendant would ordinarily raise in a state criminal prosecution, into affirmative claims brought in federal court to restrain enforcement of state criminal laws.3 The railroad's shareholders brought their suit before any state proceeding had begun, and the case depended on that fact.4 The state attorney general held a general duty to enforce the state's statutes, including the act in question if it was constitutional. That duty connected him closely enough to enforcement to make him a proper defendant.5
The Court's reasons were practical. To test a rate statute the traditional way, the company would have to find someone willing to break it and then raise the constitutional defense in the prosecution. A ticket agent who sold a single ticket above the statutory price risked a felony charge, a $5,000 fine, and five years in prison. The company could pay the fine, but the agent would have to serve the sentence himself. “The wonder would be that a single agent should be found ready to take the risk.”6 A defense that can be raised only by courting that exposure is a poor substitute for a suit that asks the court to decide the statute's validity directly.
The Court also tied its exception to the order in which the cases were filed. Where an indictment or proceeding enforces an allegedly unconstitutional statute that is the subject of a suit already pending in federal court, the federal court that first obtained jurisdiction may keep it, in civil and criminal cases alike, to the exclusion of other courts until its duty is fully performed.7
The same opinion set the boundary that Younger would later enforce. The Court said that a federal court cannot interfere where proceedings were already pending in a state court.8 It also said that the power to enjoin an individual state official from commencing suits does not include power to restrain a court from acting in any case before it, civil or criminal, or to stop a grand jury, because an injunction against a state court would violate the whole scheme of our Government.9 Had a state prosecution been pending in Young, the federal court might well have declined jurisdiction under the long-standing rule that federal courts of equity do not enjoin pending criminal proceedings.10
Restraint toward state governments has not always been a matter of doctrine alone. The bondholders' suit in Hans was decided after the North had ended military Reconstruction in the South and no longer had the means to compel compliance with a decree directing the state legislature to honor the bonds, and Congress had done little to support the bondholders' claims.11
The Anti-Injunction Act
Congress limited federal remedies against state courts early. The Anti-Injunction Act, passed in 1793, sets the default that federal courts should not enjoin state-court proceedings, and the Court reads its three exceptions strictly. The first covers injunctions that Congress expressly authorizes. The second covers injunctions “necessary in aid of” the federal court's jurisdiction, which the Court has confined to in rem cases in which the federal court has attached property that a state court later tries to adjudicate. The third covers injunctions that protect or effectuate a federal judgment, as when the judgment is preclusive and a state court tries to relitigate.12 Whether the suit enforces public or private rights, a party seeking to enjoin a pending state proceeding must bring the application within one of those exceptions.13
The abstention rules have two sources. Some come from federal statutes, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, is one of them. Others rest on “our federalism,” the slogan that animates Younger.14 Younger therefore rests on judge-made restraint rather than on the statute.
The Act has two features that matter here. First, it reaches only injunctions against proceedings that are already pending. It does not bar an injunction against the initiation of state proceedings in the future, a rule that was enough to avoid any § 2283 problem on the facts of Dombrowski.15 Second, whether a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 satisfied the exception for injunctions that Congress expressly authorizes remained unsettled. It was not until 1972 that the Court held it did, in Mitchum v. Foster.16
Mitchum is not a blank check. The federal plaintiff must still show likely success on the merits and irreparable harm, and must still get through the procedural hurdles of equitable restraint. Mitchum is best read as a formal statement of judicial authority that Younger v. Harris, decided a year earlier, had already regulated.17
Dombrowski and Chilling Effect
In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), plaintiffs who feared prosecution under a state law that they said violated the First Amendment as overly broad and vague sued under § 1983 to enjoin future state criminal cases. They filed in federal court before the state criminal case began, and the Court allowed the suit.18
Two obstacles stood in the plaintiffs' way, and the Court cleared both. The first was the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act applies only to pending proceedings, and nothing was pending when the plaintiffs sued.19
The second was the usual rule that a person charged under an unconstitutional statute has an adequate remedy at law in the constitutional defense available in the state proceeding. That rule had never been stated as absolute, and statements of it recognized departures when necessary to prevent irreparable injury.20 The Court found the necessary injury in the chilling effect on First Amendment rights, which “may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospect of its success or failure.” It held that the substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression that would occur if the plaintiffs had to await disposition of the state criminal actions was sufficient irreparable injury to justify equitable relief.21
Criminal defendants then tried to widen the rule. Defendants who had not sought federal review before being charged now filed federal suits after the state prosecution had begun, asking for the relief Dombrowski had allowed only in advance. The Court took a firm stance against that move.22 Dombrowski became a short-lived rule, cut back six years after it was announced, when the Court held in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that a speculative First Amendment chilling effect does not justify federal-court intervention in state affairs.23
Two speakers challenging the same vague ordinance show the line the cases drew. Ana files a § 1983 suit in federal court before anyone has charged her. Nothing is pending in state court, so the Anti-Injunction Act poses no obstacle, and her suit follows Dombrowski's original pattern. Ben speaks first, is charged, and files his federal suit afterward. His suit asks the federal court to stop a pending prosecution, which is the move the Court resisted. If § 1983 gets him past the Act under Mitchum, he must still satisfy equitable restraint, and after Younger a speculative chilling effect does not do that.