Concept
The Ex parte Young Exception
Does Ex parte Young permit the officer suit and the relief sought?
The Ex parte Young Exception
A private plaintiff who cannot sue a state in federal court can often sue the officer who carries out the state’s policy. Ex parte Young holds that a federal court may hear a suit for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against a state officer, to stop an ongoing violation of federal law or to require future compliance with it, even though the Eleventh Amendment bars the same suit against the state itself.1 The doctrine rests on a legal fiction: an officer who acts unconstitutionally is treated as stripped of the state’s authority, so the suit runs against an individual and not against the state. Of the routes around immunity, this is the one a private plaintiff can take without anyone else’s permission. A state acts only through people, and a court that cannot summon the state can still order the person carrying out an unlawful policy to stop.
The exception opens only for a complaint that passes four gates, and a complaint that fails any one returns to the Eleventh Amendment bar however strong its merits. The first gate is the fiction itself, which explains why a suit against an officer is not a suit against the state. The second asks whom the plaintiff may sue: an individual officer connected with enforcing the challenged law, not the state, an agency, or an office in the abstract. The third concerns the allegations, which must describe an ongoing violation of federal law and seek relief that looks forward. The fourth limits the kind of law enforced, because the exception serves federal claims and gives a federal court no power to order state officials to follow state law. A complaint can name the right officer and plead a real federal violation, yet still fail by resting on state law or by seeking relief for past harm. One further limit, drawn in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, applies when Congress has written a detailed remedial scheme for a statutory right: the Court said a court “should hesitate” before permitting a Young action against a state officer in that setting.2 That limit and the line between prospective and retroactive relief have their own sections below.
The Stripping Fiction
Before 1908 the Court had sorted suits against state officers into two categories. A suit to compel officers “to do acts which constitute a specific performance” of a state contract was forbidden, but a suit to preclude “acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff acquired under a contract” was not. Immunity thus barred an order that a state auditor pay the holder of bonds on which the state had defaulted, but it did not bar an injunction against seizing the bonds themselves.3 A suit to stop an attorney general from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute would test which category it resembled.
Minnesota fixed railroad rates by statute and punished violations with fines and imprisonment. A railroad that doubted the rates could therefore test them only by disobeying them and risking those penalties, a burden the Court said was “to close up all approaches to the courts.”4 Shareholders of a railroad sued in federal court, alleging that the rates were too low and therefore invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the court enjoined Attorney General Edward T. Young from taking any step to compel the railway to obey the statute.5 Immediately afterward, Young began a mandamus action in a Minnesota court to compel that obedience.6 The federal court held him in contempt, fined him $100, and committed him to a marshal’s custody until he paid and dismissed the state suit.7 Young claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity and refused to submit to the federal court, and when federal marshals arrested him he petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.8
That posture made the Eleventh Amendment question decisive. If the suit against Young was in legal effect a suit against Minnesota, the federal injunction exceeded the court’s jurisdiction and was void, and the contempt order was a nullity.9 If it was not, Young had defied a valid decree. The Court held that the suit was not against the state within the meaning of the Amendment. It was brought against the Attorney General, an officer with a duty to enforce the state’s statutes, to restrain him from instituting suits to enforce a statute alleged to violate the Constitution.10 The bill asked for no affirmative relief against the state.11 The reasoning turned on the officer’s own position. An officer who proceeds under an unconstitutional enactment comes into conflict with the Constitution’s superior authority and is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.” The state, the Court added, “has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.”12 The Court also pointed to the habeas decisions, in which federal courts had long discharged prisoners held by state officers in violation of the Constitution without anyone supposing that serving the writ on the jailer sued the state.13
The relief Young sought also kept the case outside an older line of decisions. In In re Ayers, following Hagood v. Southern, the Court treated as a suit against the state a bill against officers who had no personal interest in the subject matter and defended only as the state’s representatives, where the relief sought would constitute the state’s performance of its contract.14 Young’s bill sought only to restrain the Attorney General from starting enforcement suits.15 Officers were the named defendants in both situations, so the caption cannot settle the question. What the decree would require of the officer does: an order restraining an officer from a wrongful act runs against the officer, while an order compelling him to carry out the state’s own obligation runs against the state.
The fiction rests on the Supremacy Clause. A state has no authority to violate federal law, so it cannot confer that authority on its officials. An official who violates federal law is attempting to use the state’s name for conduct the state is powerless to perform, and a suit to enjoin him is therefore not a suit against the state.16
The fiction carries a conceptual cost that fits in one sentence. The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only the state, so an official’s unconstitutional conduct must count as the state’s for that purpose, yet the same conduct is treated as not the state’s under the Eleventh Amendment.17 The Court calls this the “well-recognized irony” that an official’s unconstitutional conduct “constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment.”18 The alternative is worse. Unless officials’ conduct is deemed the state’s, it would be literally impossible for a state ever to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and if officers could borrow the state’s immunity, it would be virtually impossible to force a state to honor federal law in court.19 The stripping doctrine therefore applies only to the Eleventh Amendment and leaves state action untouched for every other constitutional purpose.20
Justice Harlan’s dissent states the opposing view. He treated the suit as one against the state in legal effect, “as much so as if the State had been formally named on the record as a party,” so that the federal order was beyond the court’s jurisdiction and wholly void.21 He added that state courts are under an obligation equally strong to enforce the Constitution, and that a party who loses there can come by writ of error to the Supreme Court.22 The majority answered that an officer enforcing an unconstitutional act uses the state’s name without the state’s authority and so does not affect the state in its sovereign capacity, and the habeas decisions showed that federal courts had long commanded state officers when the Constitution required it.23
Young changed how constitutional challenges are brought. Before it, a railroad that doubted a rate statute could get a hearing only by disobeying the law and risking fines and imprisonment.24 Afterward, litigants could routinely pursue claims against responsible state officers so long as the complaint refrained from naming the state itself as a party of record.25 The relief Young allowed looked forward, an order against threatened enforcement. Money payable from the state treasury for past wrongs falls on the other side of the line, as the section on Edelman explains.
Choosing the Proper Defendant
Ex parte Young lets a federal court of equity enjoin individuals who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty to enforce its laws and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings to enforce an act that violates the Federal Constitution.27 Two requirements sit inside that sentence, and they govern the caption: the defendant must be an individual state officer, and that officer must have some connection with enforcing the challenged law. A complaint that misses either falls back under the Eleventh Amendment bar, however strong its merits.
The first requirement follows from the fiction. Because the fiction treats the suit as one against a person who lost the state’s authority by acting unlawfully, the plaintiff must sue a named state official and not the state itself, a state agency, or a state office.28 A caption that names the sovereign or one of its arms contradicts the premise that an individual is the defendant, and the Amendment then bars the suit.29
The second requirement answers a different problem. An injunction helps only if it binds the person whose conduct would otherwise produce the violation, and an officer with no role in enforcing a statute can neither threaten anyone under it nor stop its enforcement. If general status as chief executive or chief law officer sufficed, any statute could be challenged by suing the Governor or the Attorney General, and the officer suit would become a device for obtaining an abstract ruling on any law a plaintiff dislikes. That worry comes from Fitts v. McGhee, which Justice Harlan pressed in his Young dissent: if law officers could be sued merely to test a statute, the constitutionality of every act of the legislature could be tested by a suit against the Governor and the Attorney General.30 A student who assumes that naming a state’s top officials always works has therefore skipped the requirement an exam is most likely to probe.
The Young majority found the connection in the Attorney General’s office. Under his powers at common law and by virtue of several statutes, he had a general duty that included the right and power to enforce the state’s statutes, the rate act among them if it were constitutional, and that power sufficiently connected him with enforcement to make him a proper party.31 The duty need not be declared in the challenged act itself. The material fact is that the officer by virtue of his office has some connection with enforcement, whether it arises from the general law or from the act.32 Young’s own conduct confirmed the point, since he began proceedings to compel obedience to the commodity act immediately after the injunction issued.33
A related objection holds that enforcement lies in the officer’s discretion, which a court cannot control. The majority replied that an injunction restraining an officer from taking any step toward enforcing an unconstitutional enactment directs no affirmative action. It simply prohibits an act he had no legal right to do, and it leaves his general discretion about when and how to enforce the laws untouched.34 That reasoning fits the fiction, because a prohibition on unlawful conduct is an order addressed to an individual.
Fitts marks the other side of the line. As Young described it, no state officer made a party in Fitts bore any close official connection with the act fixing the tolls, so joining one was “a simple effort to test the constitutionality of such act,” and “[a] state superintendent of schools might as well have been made a party.”35 The Fitts officers had no duty at all with regard to the act, while Young’s Attorney General held a general enforcement duty that reached the rate acts and had acted on it.36 Harlan thought the distinction too thin and believed Fitts had been frittered away, but the majority’s reading governs.37
The last pleading point concerns the capacity in which the officer is sued. A suit against an officer in his official capacity is ordinarily another way of pleading a suit against the state, and the Eleventh Amendment reaches it. A claim in his individual capacity seeks to impose personal liability for acts taken under color of state law, and the Amendment does not bar it.38 The exception to the official-capacity rule turns on the nature of the relief sought, and Young is that exception for prospective relief against an ongoing federal violation.39 Congress has also made liable any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights, and section 1983 has given a boost to officer suits.40 Plaintiffs commonly name the officer in both capacities: the individual designation preserves the fiction that an individual is being sued, and the official designation shows that the conduct was the state’s for purposes of establishing a constitutional violation.41 Personal damages are a different matter, taken up in the section on personal liability of officers.
An Ongoing Federal Violation
Young describes the officers a federal court of equity may enjoin as those who threaten and are about to commence proceedings to enforce an act that violates the Federal Constitution.43 That description fixes whom a plaintiff may sue, and it also fixes what the complaint must allege: conduct happening now or about to happen. In Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, the Court compressed the requirement into a two-part question. In deciding whether Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar, a court conducts “a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.”44 Two words carry the inquiry, ongoing and prospective. This subsection teaches the first, and the character of the relief is developed in the section on prospective versus retroactive relief.
The inquiry looks to the present because of what the fiction is for. A state has no power to authorize a violation of federal law, so an official who commits one draws on no state authority and is treated as an individual.45 An injunction against a continuing or threatened violation brings the officer’s conduct back into line with federal law, which is the fiction’s whole purpose. A suit over a wrong that has already ended asks for a judgment about past harm, and the prohibition against suits to recover money from the state is the reason the Court limited the doctrine to prospective relief, meaning relief directed toward the defendant’s future behavior, such as an injunction against a continuing violation.46 Requiring a present violation keeps the exception tied to its justification and prevents it from becoming a back door to compensation.
A violation counts as ongoing in two ways. A continuing course of conduct that the officer is carrying out when the complaint is filed qualifies. So does threatened enforcement, the posture in Young itself: the Attorney General had enforcement duties under the Minnesota rate statutes, and he threatened, and was about to commence, proceedings under acts alleged to be unconstitutional.47 The threat was the continuing violation, so the shareholders did not have to wait for penalties before seeking federal relief. Verizon shows the first form. The carrier alleged that the commission’s order was an ongoing violation of federal law to the extent that it required Verizon to continue making the contested payments, and it sought the prospective relief of an injunction against the individual commissioners.48 The suit passed the inquiry.
At the other pole stand a wrong that has ended and a practice the state abandons before relief is granted. Even a request for an injunction or declaration can fail then, because a state’s change of its regulations or practices before relief is obtained leaves the order with nothing to stop. That risk is why plaintiffs in such suits press for preliminary relief early.49
The same pleading can still fail on the second half even when the violation is real. Federal courts may order state officials to comply with federal law prospectively even when compliance costs the state money.50 A plaintiff who asks for money owed because of past violations seeks retroactive relief, which the Amendment bars when the money would come from the state treasury.51 That line is the subject of the section on Edelman v. Jordan below.
Because the inquiry reads the complaint, it screens the plaintiff’s allegations and does not try the case. The Court’s verb is alleges: the court asks whether the pleaded facts describe a violation that is continuing or threatened, and it does not ask whether the plaintiff will win. A weak federal claim pleaded as an ongoing violation clears this gate and loses later on the merits, while a strong claim about a wrong that has ended has no continuing violation for an injunction to stop.52
No Relief on State Law
Outside the officer-suit framework, the Eleventh Amendment baseline governs: the judicial power of the United States does not extend to a suit in law or equity against a state by citizens of another state or of a foreign state.54 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman applies that baseline to claims that fall outside the Young framing. The Court held there that the Eleventh Amendment bars even prospective relief against a state official if the legal basis for the relief is state rather than federal law, and that the bar applies not only when the official failed to implement state law but even when he acts contrary to it.55 Pennhurst therefore qualifies the lesson of the preceding subsection, because forward-looking relief is necessary under Young but not sufficient. The plaintiffs there had sued state officials over a range of alleged constitutional and statutory violations and also sought relief on the basis of state law,56 and the relief resting on state law fell even though it operated only on the future.57
The reason lies in what the fiction was built to do. The Pennhurst majority read Young to allow stripping only to enforce federal supremacy, a consideration absent when state law furnishes the rights the plaintiffs claim.58 In that setting the state remains the real party in interest and no federal right needs vindicating, so nothing justifies overriding the state’s immunity.59 The cases may reflect a balance among respect for state dignity, protection of the state treasury, and enforcement of federal law; when only state law is at stake, the third interest drops out and the first two prevail.60
The rule sits uneasily with the fiction’s own logic. A state has no more authorized an officer’s violation of state law than his violation of federal law, yet the officer keeps Eleventh Amendment immunity against the state-law claim even when he plainly violated that law.61 A plaintiff therefore gains nothing by arguing that the officer acted outside his authority under state law, because the argument cannot change the source of the right on which the relief rests.
Joining the state claim to a federal one changes nothing. Plaintiffs often add state-law counts to a federal complaint because supplemental jurisdiction lets a federal court decide related claims together. That doctrine answers whether the court may hear one claim alongside another; immunity answers whether this defendant can be made to answer to the claim in federal court at all. A court with power to hear the claim still cannot hear it against an immune defendant, so a state-law claim against state officials belongs in the state’s own courts, whether the relief sought is prospective or retroactive.62