Concept
The Eleventh Amendment Baseline
Does Ex parte Young permit the officer suit and the relief sought?
Officer Suits Under Ex parte Young
The Eleventh Amendment Baseline
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 Read literally, that sentence describes one kind of suit: a suit against a state by a citizen of a different state or by a citizen or subject of a foreign country. It says nothing about a plaintiff who sues her own state and nothing about a claim that rests on federal law rather than diversity. A reader who stopped at the text would conclude that both fall outside the Amendment. The Court has held that both fall within the state's immunity, and the reason lies in the event the Amendment was written to answer.
That event was Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), a decision that exposed states to suit in federal court by citizens of other states. The opinion caused a political uproar. The states feared the creditors they had accumulated during the war, and they objected to the general principle of being taken unwillingly into federal court. Congress swiftly passed the Eleventh Amendment, and the states ratified it in 1795.2
The principle behind the Amendment is older than the Amendment. The Court has said that “the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,” because the immunity is “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”3 The English common law of sovereign immunity remains the core principle. After the Civil War the Court issued a long series of decisions showing that this principle, and not the wording of the Amendment, controls.4 That is why the doctrine reaches suits the words omit.
Immunity Beyond the Text
The Court has carried the immunity past the Amendment's wording in three directions. Each extension rests on one idea: immunity attaches to the defendant, so nothing about the plaintiff, the claim, or the remedy removes it.
The first extension protects a state against its own citizens. Although the Amendment mentions only out-of-state and foreign plaintiffs, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana held that state sovereign immunity covers suits brought against a state by its own citizens as well, and later cases confirm that the protection extends well past the cases the text describes.5 Edelman v. Jordan states the baseline in those terms: an unconsenting state is immune from suit in federal court by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.6 A state summoned into a federal courtroom bears the same burden whether the plaintiff lives across the border or down the road, so the plaintiff's citizenship does no work.
The second extension reaches federal-question suits. Chisholm was a diversity case, yet the Court holds that the immunity also bars federal-question jurisdiction over an unwilling state defendant, and admiralty jurisdiction as well.7 Students often merge two separate inquiries here. Federal-question jurisdiction asks whether the claim is the kind a federal court may hear. Immunity asks whether this defendant may be made to answer there at all. A plaintiff with a claim arising under the Constitution has cleared the first hurdle and still faces the second.
The third extension concerns the relief sought. The Amendment's own words reach suits “in law or equity,”8 and the Court bars actions for damages, past debts, or retroactive relief of any type, whether brought in law, equity, or admiralty.9 A plaintiff who assumes that asking only for an injunction avoids the Amendment is mistaken when the state is the defendant. The equitable exception developed later in this chapter runs against state officers and looks forward, so it does not help a plaintiff who names the state.
The State and Its Arms
Because the immunity belongs to the state, every case begins with the question whether the defendant is the state. Suit is barred only when the state government is the defendant. Agencies of the state share that status, but political subdivisions such as municipal corporations, counties, and school boards do not.11 The test is financial. The basic purpose of the Amendment is to keep federal courts from issuing judgments that must be paid out of the state treasury, so a court asks whether the state is legally obligated to pay any of the entity's debts. If it is not, the Amendment is not implicated.12
Naming an individual official does not by itself escape the bar. As Edelman put it, when an action is “in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.”13 The inquiry looks to substance, not caption. A suit asking the head of a state welfare department to pay damages personally is permissible, but a suit asking him to pay past-due amounts from the state treasury is barred.14 If a caption alone could defeat the immunity, any plaintiff could avoid it by substituting the name of the treasurer for the name of the state. Officers are not always off limits, however. The circumstances in which they may be sued for prospective relief are the subject of the Ex parte Young doctrine taken up below.
Routes Around Immunity
The immunity runs against private plaintiffs. A suit against a state brought by the United States or by another state is not barred, and a state may waive its immunity and consent to be sued in federal court.16 Consent raises a puzzle. The Amendment says the judicial power does not extend to these suits, and a state would seem unable to confer jurisdiction the Constitution withholds. Courts resolve the puzzle by treating the Amendment as a personal immunity grounded in sovereign immunity, which the state may waive.17
Congress may also override the immunity. One historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to give Congress legislative power over the states, so Congress may create a cause of action against them when it legislates under that power.18 Congress's Article I powers do not carry the same authority, a limit the Seminole Tribe section develops.
The Court's decision in Alden v. Maine shows how much weight these routes carry. The majority insisted that its holding did not “bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law.” Its reasons were that individuals could still seek injunctions against state officials under Ex parte Young, that the United States could still sue unconsenting states, and that Fitzpatrick allowed Congress to authorize some suits against states under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.19
A private plaintiff with neither the state's consent nor a valid abrogation, meaning a congressional override of immunity, needs another route, and the most important one is the officer suit. In Ex parte Young the Court adopted a legal fiction: for Eleventh Amendment purposes the suit is against the officer as an individual and not against the state, even though the officer's conduct counts as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The stakes are high. Without the doctrine the reapportionment decisions would not have been possible, and the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment would have fallen on the shoals of the Eleventh.21 Brown v. Board of Education and the rest of the cases protecting individual liberty from state infringement were brought in federal court under this fiction.22 The doctrine still raises a logical dilemma, because it treats the officer as separate from the state for one purpose while counting the officer's conduct as the state's for another.23
Consent depends on the state, abrogation on Congress, and suits by the United States or another state on a government plaintiff, so each of those routes lies outside a private plaintiff's control. The officer suit is the one route a private plaintiff can choose. The rest of this chapter therefore teaches it together with its limits: who may be named, what must be alleged, which claims qualify, and what remedy the court may award.