Concept
The Clear Statement Requirement
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
The Clear Statement Requirement
Seminole Tribe's first question is whether Congress has "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity."1 The Court answers that question from the face of the statute. Congress satisfies the test only when its intention is "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," a standard the Court calls "simple but stringent."2 The inquiry is a reading exercise: do the words Congress enacted tell a reader that a nonconsenting state may be sued by a private party? Silence or ambiguity leaves the immunity in place, because federal statutes are presumed not to abrogate state sovereign immunity.3
A federal cause of action does not carry the state along with it. In Hans, the plaintiff alleged that Louisiana had violated the Contracts Clause and entered federal court through the federal-question door, and the Court dismissed the suit anyway.4 A statute that is to overcome that result must speak to states, and the Court insists that it speak plainly for two reasons.
The first reason is political. The clear statement rule helps to activate the political safeguards of federalism by making the consequences for state sovereignty evident to members of Congress and state lobbyists alike.5 A state that reads in a bill's text that it will answer private suits can oppose the bill while it is pending, whereas a state facing only general words gets no such warning. The second reason is structural: the Court keeps the test stringent out of regard for the Eleventh Amendment's role as "an essential component of our constitutional structure."6
The rule is a clear statement canon, not an avoidance canon. It cannot rest on a wish to avoid serious constitutional questions, because the Court conceded that a statute written with the requisite clarity would be constitutional. The canon instead treats state immunity as a constitutional norm that the Court will not enforce to its limits, which leaves Congress some discretion to alter the traditional balance between federal and state power, provided Congress says plainly that it is doing so.7 Whether Congress has the power to do it is a separate, second question.
Seminole Tribe itself supplies a model of a sufficient statement. The Court counted the numerous references to the "State" in the text of § 2710(d)(7)(B) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and concluded that they made it "indubitable" that Congress intended to abrogate.8 The remedial provisions explain why. They place the burden of proof on the State, order the State to negotiate, and send the mediator's submission to the State, and none of those remedies makes sense against anyone but a state that is a party to the suit.9 The conclusion needed nothing outside the statute's words, which is what it means for intent to be unmistakable in the language of the statute.
Other statutes clear the same hurdle by putting states in the operative text. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act spoke clearly when it subjected states to its provisions and abrogated their Eleventh Amendment immunity.10 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Family and Medical Leave Act authorized damages suits against employers, expressly including public agencies, a term the Act defines to reach state governments, and the Court found Congress's intent clear. In each statute, no reader has to infer that Congress had states in mind.
The statute that authorizes suit in general terms sits at the opposite pole. Atascadero held that "[a] general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."11 The Rehabilitation Act there prohibited employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds and authorized federal suits against those recipients, yet that general authorization did not let a person denied state employment sue the state hospital in federal court.12 As the Court put it, "[w]hen Congress chooses to subject the states to federal jurisdiction it must do so specifically."13 A bare jurisdictional grant fares no better, because "[t]he fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated all defenses to that claim."14 The notice rationale explains both results. General words sweep in a state along with every other recipient, employer, or defendant, and a legislator who votes for a bill that never mentions states has no reason to think the vote exposes them to suit.
A statute can also fail by saying nothing at all about states. In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, a claim against a state was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds and refiled in state court after the limitations period had run. The Court held that the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), could not save the claim, because that text mentioned neither claims against states nor dismissals premised on the Eleventh Amendment. Hibbs, Raygor, and Atascadero fall on either side of one line: whether the enacted words identify the state as a party that can be made to answer.
Because the test looks to "the language of the statute," material outside the statute cannot fill a gap in it.15 The enacted text is what every member votes on and what a state's representatives can read while the bill is pending. A committee report records only what some members expected the text to do, and a court that relied on it would be finding abrogation after the fact instead of in the law Congress enacted.
Satisfying the first inquiry settles only what Congress meant to do. Seminole Tribe makes the point at once: after finding an unmistakably clear statement in the gaming statute, the Court turned to whether the Act was passed "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."16 The Act failed there because the Commerce Clause could not supply the authority, even though the intent to abrogate was clear.17 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act took the same path in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents: it satisfied the first inquiry, then failed the second because the abrogation exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Failure of the first inquiry ends the argument without any need to reach power, which is why Atascadero could acknowledge that Congress may abrogate when it acts under the Fourteenth Amendment and still hold the Rehabilitation Act's general authorization insufficient.19 A plaintiff therefore needs both inquiries answered favorably, while a state defendant needs only one answered against the plaintiff. The next sections take up the second inquiry, beginning with the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of power and then turning to the reasons Article I cannot serve.