534 U.S. 533 (2002)
In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.1 The charges alleged that their employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52.2 After petitioners refused to retire, the university reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries.3
The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights.4 The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on June 6, 1996, advising that petitioners could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the ADEA.5 The MDHR issued right-to-sue letters on July 17, 1996, advising petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the MHRA.6
On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.7 The suits were subsequently consolidated.8 Respondent filed answers to these complaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including that the suits were barred in whole or in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.9 The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation.10 According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30, 1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15, 1997.11
In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).12 The motion argued that the federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.13 On July 11, 1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims.14 Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000).15 Kimel held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.16 Given that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it was dismissed in January 2000.17
In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court.18 Respondent’s answer asserted that plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the 45-day MHRA statute of limitations.19 Respondent moved for summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were barred by the 45-day MHRA statute of limitations.20 Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while they were pending in federal court because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ ADEA claims.21 The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it.22 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.23 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claims.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.25
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolls the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds?26
When Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.27
No. The respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota is an arm of the State of Minnesota.28 Petitioners asserted their state law claims in federal court under the supplemental jurisdiction statute but those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds in July 1997.29 Petitioners refiled the claims in Hennepin County District Court after the 45-day MHRA limitations period had expired and relied on the tolling provision of § 1367(d).30 Because the statute contains no clear statement extending tolling to claims against nonconsenting state defendants dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the provision does not apply.31
Section 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for petitioners' state law claims against the nonconsenting state defendant.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg joined the Court's judgment and its opinion in principal part.33 She agreed that prevailing precedent supports the view that, in the absence of a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)'s extension of federal jurisdiction does not reach claims against nonconsenting state defendants.34 She also agreed that absent affirmative indication by Congress, § 1367(d)'s tolling provision does not reach claims asserted, but not maintainable, under § 1367(a) against nonconsenting state defendants.35
She identified Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens as the pathmarking decision.36 She would not venture further into the mist surrounding § 1367 to inquire generally whether § 1367(d) applies to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute.37
Justice Stevens dissented.38 He argued that the plain language of subsection (d) allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court. This applies whether the claim is dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under subsection (c). He contended that Minnesota consented to suit under the MHRA by agreeing to be treated in the same manner as a private employer.39
He maintained that tolling amounts to little if any broadening of the waiver and that the application of the tolling rule does not raise a serious constitutional issue.40 He noted that the federal interest in fair administration of justice can impose burdens on states, and the tolling provision imposes a lesser burden.41
Whether respondent consented to suit in federal court on petitioners' state law claims?42
A sovereign's immunity may be waived only by unequivocal expression of consent to be sued in federal court.43
No. Respondent included the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense among eight affirmative defenses in its answers filed in September 1996, which was the earliest possible opportunity after the complaints were filed in August 1996.44 Although respondent filed its motion to dismiss in July 1997, this timing was consistent with the parties' agreed scheduling plan that set dispositive motions for July 15, 1997.45 These circumstances do not demonstrate an unequivocal expression of consent to suit in federal court on the state law claims.46
Respondent did not consent to suit in federal court on petitioners' state law claims.47