Concept
State Waiver
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
State Waiver
A state that has agreed to be sued cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment. The Amendment withdraws from the federal judicial power any suit commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state,1 and the immunity the Court has built on that text exists for the state’s benefit. A party may give up a protection that exists for its benefit. A waiver, the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, is therefore the first of the two routes around the immunity baseline, and the right the state relinquishes is its freedom from a private suit.2
Waiver deserves the first look because it can end the inquiry. Once a state has consented, the immunity is gone and no one needs to ask whether Congress could remove it, a question that usually goes badly for the plaintiff. Seminole Tribe held that Congress, legislating under the Commerce Clause, cannot abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity, and it excepted only legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Alden then carried the rule into the states’ own courts, where Article I legislation cannot abrogate the immunity either.4 A plaintiff suing under an Article I statute therefore often has one argument left, which is that the state consented.
Three questions organize the rest of the section. What must a state say, and in what forum, for its words to count as consent? What did the states agree to by ratifying the Constitution, whatever they say when sued? And can Congress produce a waiver by attaching liability to a state’s participation in a regulated field? The answers are, in order, express consent, consent in the plan, and no constructive waiver.
Express Consent
The first limit on state sovereign immunity, as Alden v. Maine puts it, is that the immunity bars suits only in the absence of consent.5 The limit follows from whose protection is at stake. Many states have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits, so that the rigors of immunity are “mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign.”6 A state may consent gratuitously, in the interest of justice and fairness, or as part of a bargain with the federal government for other benefits. Either way, the Court insists that the consent be unequivocally expressed.7
That a state can consent at all is slightly surprising, because the Amendment is worded like a limit on jurisdiction, and ordinary litigants cannot enlarge a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction by agreement. The Court has treated the immunity as part jurisdictional bar and part waivable privilege. It lets a state raise the defense for the first time on appeal because the defense “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar,” yet it holds that a state can waive immunity when the waiver is stated in the strictest terms.8
Those terms come from Edelman v. Jordan: a waiver must be made “by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.”9 In practice the consent must be express, unequivocal, and voluntary.10 The reason lies in how a state acts. A state speaks through statutes, constitutional clauses, contracts, and the conduct of many officers, nearly all of it aimed at purposes other than exposing the treasury to federal damages suits. A court that read consent into ambiguous language would decide for the state, over its objection, that it had given up part of its sovereignty, and the demand for clarity leaves that decision with the state.
Alden asked whether Maine had waived the immunity that Article I could not take away, and the Court concluded that the State had not consented to suit.11 The probation officers, suing under the Fair Labor Standards Act, argued that Maine discriminated against federal rights by claiming immunity from their suit. The Court found no evidence that the State had manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action. A state that consents to certain classes of suits while keeping its immunity from others, the Court said, has done no more than exercise a privilege of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity from suit.12 Consent to some suits therefore supplies no consent to the next one, and the plaintiff must find the state’s own declaration covering the claim.
The declaration must also reach the forum in which the plaintiff has sued, and express-waiver disputes most often turn on this point. California’s constitution provides that suits may be brought against the state “in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law,” and the Supreme Court held that language too unspecific to show consent to suit in a federal court.13 A statute letting taxpayers sue the state for refunds received the same narrow reading: it opened the state’s own courts and no others.14 The governing rule is that “a State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts,” so a plaintiff in federal court must show that the state unequivocally agreed to be sued there.15 A state that opens its own courts has said nothing certain about the federal ones.
A state that wants to waive can do so without difficulty. If it clearly indicates that federal-court suits against it are generally permissible, or that an agency otherwise exempt may be sued in its own name, the waiver stands.16
Even a clear waiver is read narrowly, and it extends to the claims and courts its words cover and no further.17
Litigation conduct can also complete an express waiver. In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, a state had expressly waived its immunity from a state-law claim in its own courts and then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, and the Court held that the removal waived immunity in the federal proceeding.18 The Court has likewise treated a state’s decision to join other defendants in removing a case as a waiver.19 Removal is the state’s own invocation of federal jurisdiction, and a state that has agreed to answer the claim cannot then choose the federal forum and claim immunity there.
A state that is merely haled into federal court stands differently. The Court will not imply a waiver because the state appeared in federal court, and a state’s failure to plead immunity at trial is no waiver, since the Court lets the state raise the Eleventh Amendment as a bar on appeal.20 The difference lies in who chose the federal forum: the removing state chose it after consenting to the claim, while the defendant sued there chose nothing and consented to nothing.
Consent in the Plan
The states also gave one form of consent in advance, without any declaration when the suit arrives. In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Government.22 Express consent turns on what a state says in a statute or does in litigation, while consent in the plan turns on what the state accepted by joining the Union. A plaintiff in either category needs no waiver statute and no removal.
A federal system needs a lawful forum for disputes among its members, and that need explains these two categories. The Constitution contemplates suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures,23 which means that, without a federal forum, states and the federal government would be left to settle their disputes by force of arms.24
The Supreme Court accordingly keeps its original jurisdiction over suits between two states even when the defendant state does not consent, and its power to hear appeals from state-court systems in which a state is a party is not limited by the Eleventh Amendment.25
Suits by the United States rest on the same logic and on a second ground as well. The United States, as a superior sovereign, must at times sue a state, and it would be ignominious and perhaps self-defeating if it had to do so in the defendant’s own courts. It may therefore sue a state in federal court for breach of contract or to enjoin a state tax that discriminates against the federal government.26
Alden supplies the second ground, which also explains why the United States may sue when a private plaintiff may not. A suit commenced in the name of the United States by officers charged with the constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed differs in kind from an individual’s suit. Each such suit requires an exercise of political responsibility, a control absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.27 Consider who decides. An executive officer who sues a state must judge that this claim against this state justifies confronting a sovereign, and the officer answers to the electorate for the choice. A statute that lets any aggrieved person sue gives the same decision to every holder of a claim, and no one answers politically for the total. The Founders named the fear of private suits against nonconsenting States as the central reason for preserving sovereign immunity,28 so the plan withholds consent from the suits that lack the check. A statute that deputizes private plaintiffs does not turn their suits into suits by the United States, because the delegation is the feature that removes the check.
Alden itself puts both sides of the line on one set of facts. Maine probation officers sued the State for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, first in federal court and then in state court, and the State was held immune from their suit.29 The same statute authorized the United States to sue, yet the Court observed that the federal government had not found the interests important enough to send even one attorney to Maine. It concluded that under the plan of the Convention the States have consented to suits brought by the United States but not to suits brought by the employees.30 An identical overtime claim filed by the United States would have met no immunity defense. The claim, the state, and the statute were the same in both suits, and the only variable was whether the National Government itself had decided the case was worth bringing.
The consent the states gave by joining the Union has a limit on the other side. In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, the Court held that a state keeps its immunity against a suit by a foreign state.31 The consent that inheres in accepting the constitutional plan runs to the other states that accepted the plan and to the United States as the sovereign the Constitution creates, and the foreign state lies outside the structure of the Union. No consent by a State of the Union has run in favor of a foreign state, so its suit stands on the same footing as an individual’s.32
The distinction between a suit by the United States and a private suit also shows how much federal law survives Alden. A state’s privilege to assert sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer a right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law, and the States and their officers remain bound by the obligations those sources impose.33 The immunity governs who may enforce federal law against a state for damages, and the suit by the United States is the enforcement channel the plan leaves open.34
No Constructive Waiver
A constructive waiver is consent that the law attributes to a state because of what the state does, such as entering an activity Congress regulates, in place of consent the state declares. The Court now rejects it. Seminole Tribe signaled the problem when it said that Eleventh Amendment immunity “may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it will be replaced by grant of some other authority,” and it cited Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon for the point that “the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.”36 Both sentences expose the flaw: Congress offers a benefit, announces what accepting it means, and treats the state as having agreed, although Congress is the only party that has spoken.
The Court once accepted the theory. In Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, Alabama took over a railroad that federal law already regulated extensively, and the Court held that the state-owned railroad could be sued in federal court by individuals claiming benefits under the federal employees’ compensation laws.37 The reasoning ran in a straight line. Federal law had set conditions for operating railroads, and a state that knowingly entered the field was taken to have accepted the conditions then in place, including the employees’ right to sue.38 Parden thus treated the decision to operate the railroad as an implied waiver of immunity.39
Later decisions chipped away at Parden, and the Court formally overruled it in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.40 The decision rests on two separate reasons. The first concerns what a waiver is for. The point of requiring a clear declaration from the state is to be certain that the state in fact consents, and “there is little reason to assume actual consent based upon the State’s mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation.”41 A state that runs a railroad or employs workers has said nothing about answering damages suits in federal court, and a waiver is the relinquishment of a known right, so conduct that says nothing about the right cannot relinquish it.42
The second reason concerns Seminole Tribe itself. A congressional power to exact constructive waivers through Article I would, as a practical matter, let Congress circumvent the rule that Article I cannot abrogate, and the Court concluded that “[f]orced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the same coin—they are the same side of the same coin.”43 The mechanism is simple. If a statute could declare that any state engaging in some activity consents to suit, Congress could attach that sentence to nearly any Article I statute, because states take part in a great many regulated fields. The result would be a private damages suit against a nonconsenting state, which is exactly what Seminole Tribe forbids when Congress abrogates directly. A ban that holds under the label abrogation and vanishes under the label waiver would have no content, and the Court rejected constructive waiver as inconsistent with the no-abrogation rule.44
Congress does keep one legitimate way to obtain consent, and it works because it supplies what constructive waiver lacks. When Congress uses the spending power to attach conditions to the receipt of voluntarily accepted federal money, it may require a state to waive immunity as the price of eligibility. The receipt of funds amounts to a waiver, however, only if Congress clearly required the waiver and made clear that it was explicitly granting individuals a federal-court right of action.45 A state’s participation in a federal program, or its accompanying agreement to obey federal law, is not enough by itself.46 The condition must be “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,” the standard of Atascadero, where a state’s receipt of funds under the Rehabilitation Act did not without more waive its immunity.47 Conditions take legal effect only if they give the states clear notice of what is attached to the grant, and that notice is what makes a state’s acceptance an informed choice.48
Sossamon v. Texas shows the standard at work. The statute there allowed a person to sue “for appropriate relief against a government” that accepts funds under the program and defined “government” to include states, and the Court held that this language did not so clearly and unambiguously waive immunity to private damages suits that the state’s consent could be certain.49 The provision came from the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the defect was one of notice: a state weighing the grant could not tell from the words that accepting it meant exposure to damages suits.50 A waiver that does succeed shows what the Court wants to see. In Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, the Port Authority’s bi-state compact contained consent-to-suit provisions and a venue provision referring to judicial districts established by the United States, and the Court held that the agency had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.51 What separates Feeney from Atascadero, Sossamon, and Parden is who spoke. The Port Authority’s consent came from provisions in the compact that created it and located suit in the federal courts, while in the other three cases the only source of consent was a federal statute reaching a state because it took money or entered a field.
A fact pattern that describes a state as having impliedly consented by operating a business or by joining a federal program is describing a constructive waiver, and the answer is that no waiver occurred. Ask instead whether the state itself declared consent to suit in federal court, or whether a funding statute stated a condition unmistakably and the state knowingly accepted the money. Because forced waiver and abrogation are the same move, every limit on abrogation also limits any attempt to manufacture consent. When waiver fails, the plaintiff’s remaining route is abrogation, and the next section on Seminole Tribe shows how narrow that route is.