Concept
Northern Pipeline and Bankruptcy
Organization and relationship of state and federal courts in a federal system
Northern Pipeline and Bankruptcy
Earlier cases in this chapter asked whether a particular court counts as an Article III court. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. asks a harder question: what may Congress do when it deliberately creates a court that is not one? Article III vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in the inferior courts Congress establishes, and it gives their judges tenure during good behavior and compensation that cannot be diminished.1 Congress has built tribunals outside that scheme since the early Republic, among them courts-martial, territorial courts, and administrative agencies, and their judges often lack those protections.2 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 carried the practice into a new field. It created a bankruptcy court in each judicial district with jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11,” and it staffed those courts with judges who held neither Article III guarantee.3
The Court held that a non-Article III bankruptcy court cannot constitutionally decide a debtor’s state-law claim of the kind Northern brought, and that the invalid grant could not be severed from the rest of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction.4 No opinion won five votes, so the reasoning below belongs to a plurality. It still supplies the framework that later cases use. The plurality sorted the earlier precedents into three narrow situations in which Congress may create a court without Article III protections: courts for the territories and the District of Columbia, military tribunals, and public-rights disputes.5 It found that the bankruptcy courts fit none of them, and it rejected two further arguments for the Act, that Article I powers generally support legislative courts and that the bankruptcy courts were mere adjuncts. A dissent offered a different method, which weighs Article III’s values against Congress’s purposes. The subsections below take those pieces in order.
Facts and Holding
Congress built the new courts on purpose. Under the earlier law, a bankruptcy judge’s summary jurisdiction reached all matters concerned with administering the estate and only some disputes between the trustee and third parties, and whether a given dispute qualified turned on such questions as who possessed the property when the case began and whether the third party consented.6 In 1978 Congress decided instead to create a bankruptcy court with pervasive jurisdiction, and, apparently for political reasons, it decided that the court should not be an Article III court.7 The Act empowered each court to adjudicate both “core” bankruptcy matters and “related” matters.8 Its jurisdictional grant reached beyond matters directly tied to bankruptcy to a wide range of state-law claims that might be asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding.9
The new judges lacked both Article III guarantees. They served 14-year terms, the judicial council of their circuit could remove them for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability, and Congress could adjust their salaries.10 The plurality treated those facts as undisputed. Judges who serve fixed terms do not hold office during good behavior, and salaries that Congress may adjust are not immune from diminution.11 The plurality then stated the principle that framed the case: the Constitution “unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be reposed in an independent Judiciary,” and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence.12
Appellate review of the bankruptcy courts did not answer that principle. Appeals ran to a panel of three bankruptcy judges or, if none was designated, to the district court, and then to the court of appeals, and the parties could agree to appeal directly to the court of appeals.13 The plurality’s concern was what the bankruptcy courts themselves could do. They exercised “all of the jurisdiction” the Act conferred on the district courts and issued final judgments that were binding and enforceable even if no one appealed.14
The dispute began as a commercial quarrel. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota and then sued Marathon Pipe Line Co. in that court for damages, alleging breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved to dismiss on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power on bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, the district court reversed and dismissed the suit, and the Supreme Court affirmed.15 Justice Rehnquist described the suit in terms that explain the result. It sought damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation, “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.” The claims arose entirely under state law, no federal rule of decision governed them, and no method of adjudication was hinted other than the traditional common-law mode of judge and jury. The suit was in the bankruptcy court only because the plaintiff had earlier filed a petition for reorganization there.16
The Justices divided three ways on reasoning. Justice Brennan announced the judgment in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred only in the judgment, which means he agreed with the result without adopting the plurality’s reasoning. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissent, and Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell, filed another.17
The six Justices in the majority shared the three points summarized in footnote 40 of the plurality opinion. The 1978 Act does give the bankruptcy court power to hear Northern’s breach-of-contract claim; a non-Article III court cannot constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide such state-law claims; and that grant of authority is not severable from the remaining grant of authority to the bankruptcy courts.18 Justice Rehnquist agreed on severability and would hold unconstitutional “so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide Northern’s lawsuit over Marathon’s objection.”19 Severability asks whether a court can excise the invalid part of a statute and leave the rest in operation. Because six Justices said the invalid grant could not be separated from the rest of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction, a defect found in the claim against Marathon reached the broader grant. Justice Rehnquist also agreed with the plurality’s discussion of retroactivity and of staying the Court’s judgment, matters this unit leaves for the later discussion of the response to the decision.20
Chief Justice Burger stressed how little the judgment decides. The Court, he wrote, does not hold that Congress’s broad grant of jurisdiction to the new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Article III. The holding is limited to the proposition stated in Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence: a “traditional” state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy, must, absent the litigants’ consent, be heard by an Article III court if any court or agency of the United States is to hear it.21 That limited holding does not preclude the bankruptcy courts from adjudicating all but a relatively narrow category of claims, and Congress could comply by routing ancillary common-law actions to the district court of which the bankruptcy court is an adjunct, without radically restructuring bankruptcy adjudication.22 The plurality’s broader reasoning should therefore not be mistaken for the holding of the Court. The concurring Justices rested on the narrower ground, and a question about what Northern Pipeline decides should state that ground first.
Territorial and D.C. Courts
The plurality read the precedents as describing three narrow situations, each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that a congressional power to create legislative courts was consistent with the separation of powers, not a threat to it.26 The first situation covers courts for the territories and the District of Columbia. Its logic is geographic, and it dates from the earliest days of the Republic. The plurality understood the Framers to have intended that, in areas where no State operated as sovereign, Congress would exercise the general powers of government.27
In American Insurance Co. v. Canter, the Court said that the jurisdiction of a territorial court “is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories.”28 Within the States, admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised only by courts established under Article III, but “the same limitation does not extend to the territories,” because in legislating for them “Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.”29
The phrase “combined powers” carries the reason for the exception. A territory with no state government has no one to do the local work that state courts do elsewhere, so the entire responsibility for local regulation fell on the national government, which had to establish courts and staff them with enough judges to exercise the general jurisdiction that state courts would otherwise have exercised in large part.30 Statehood then removed the courts’ work. When a territory entered the Union, the authority of its territorial courts over matters of state concern ceased, and the national government was left with territorial judges and no place to put them. When Florida was admitted, Congress replaced three territorial courts of general jurisdiction, with five judges, by one federal district court and one judge.31 A guarantee of life tenure would have bound the government to judges whose courts had disappeared. Necessity, in other words, tied the exception to place.
The Court applied the same reasoning to the District of Columbia. In Kendall v. United States it observed that the District has “no division of powers between the general and state governments,” that Congress has “the entire control over the district for every purpose of government,” and that it is therefore reasonable to suppose that all judicial power necessary for the purposes of government would be vested in the courts Congress organizes there.32 The textual source differs from the territories, since the District Clause of Article I, Section 8, clause 17 supplies it, but the structure is the same. Congress’s power over the District “encompasses the full authority of government, and thus, necessarily, the Executive and Judicial powers as well as the Legislative,” and Congress possesses that power only in limited geographic areas.33
A court in the States stands differently. The Court has said that Article III’s concern for judicial independence “remains fully applicable at least to courts invested with jurisdiction solely over matters of national import.”34 Laws respecting bankruptcy, like most laws enacted under the national powers cataloged in Article I, Section 8, are laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern.35 A bankruptcy court that sits in a State and applies those laws therefore gets no help from the territorial rationale, because no gap exists for Congress to fill with a general local judiciary and the independence concern applies in full.
Congress keeps discretion in how it governs a place. When it organizes territories, it may create a legislative court or a full-fledged Article III court, and in the District of Columbia it has furnished both.36 The exception lets a territorial court operate without Article III protections, but it gives that court’s judge no authority in Article III proceedings. In Nguyen v. United States, the Court vacated, on statutory grounds, a Ninth Circuit judgment because the three-judge panel included the chief judge of the district court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial judge who served a ten-year term and was removable by the President for cause.37
Military Courts
Courts-martial supply the second situation. Congress has used them since the 1770s, when it first put the Continental Army into the field against the British, and they employ members of the military as judges rather than life-tenured civil judges.41 Article III courts have long reviewed the work of courts-martial, yet the Court has never suggested that courts-martial themselves must meet Article III’s requirements.42
The plurality explained the exception by comparing it with the territorial courts. The situation, it said, “strongly resembles” the one involving territorial courts, because it too “involves a constitutional grant of power that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at issue.”43 The territorial exception turns on place, and this one turns on subject matter, but the justification is the same in both: a specific textual commitment of power explains why Article III yields. Dynes v. Hoover put the point as a matter of two independent powers. Congress may provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner practiced by civilized nations, and that power is “given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States,” so that “the two powers are entirely independent of each other.”44
Because the exception rests on a textual commitment over one subject, it does not carry over to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy adjudication presents no comparable commitment; the plurality treated bankruptcy laws, like most laws enacted under Article I, Section 8’s national powers, as laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern.45 It held that none of its three situations covers the bankruptcy courts, and it rejected the broader claim that Congress may use legislative courts whenever doing so suits an exercise of its Article I power.46 Justice White’s dissent challenged the line. Congress’s power over the Armed Forces is established in Article I, Section 8, clauses 13 and 14, and he saw nothing in those clauses that creates congressional authority different in kind from the authority to legislate on bankruptcy, or any way to tell the areas of “extraordinary” congressional control from the rest.47
The exception has edges of its own. Courts-martial may try only United States military personnel, a limit the Court has applied in decisions such as Reid v. Covert and Ex parte Milligan. Military commissions, by contrast, are designed to try offenses against the law of war, so their reach can extend beyond military personnel, as the tribunals created by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 for “unlawful enemy combatants” captured during the so-called War on Terror illustrate.48
Public Rights Disputes
The third situation involves “public rights,” a doctrine first set forth in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (1856).51 There the Court looked to the law of England and of the States when the Constitution was adopted to ask whether the matter was customarily decided in the courts. It concluded that collecting a debt owed to the Government by a customs agent had not traditionally been a subject for judicial determination, and so it saw no bar to Congress’s establishing summary procedures outside Article III courts for that purpose.52 Ex parte Bakelite Corp. used the same reasoning to uphold the Court of Customs Appeals as a legislative court, because its appeals included “nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination, but only matters the determination of which may be, and at times has been, committed exclusively to executive officers.”53
Those cases show what the doctrine rests on. The public-rights doctrine is grounded in a historically recognized distinction between matters that the Executive and Legislative Branches could conclusively determine and matters that are “inherently . . . judicial.”54 A matter in the first group never required a judge, so assigning it to a legislative court or an agency takes nothing from the judicial power. The doctrine therefore carries two limits. It reaches only matters arising “between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,” and only matters that historically could have been determined exclusively by those departments.55
The plurality conceded that its precedents have not definitively explained the line between public and private rights, but it said a minimum suffices. A matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others,” whereas “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined” is a matter of private rights. Only controversies in the first category may be removed from Article III courts and delegated to legislative courts or agencies, and private-rights disputes lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.56 One account of the doctrine lists the disposal of the property of the United States, the granting of benefits such as welfare or Social Security, and the collection of taxes as public rights. In each, the dispute is between the government and a private party and involves a right or obligation Congress created, and Congress may, if it so provides, have such disputes fully resolved by non-Article III adjudication.57
Northern’s claim sat on the other side of the line. The plurality distinguished the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power and “may well be a ‘public right,’” from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages, which “obviously is not.” Northern’s right to recover contract damages to augment its estate was “one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.”58 Two facts separate that claim from the benefit cases: who stands on the other side of the dispute and who created the right.
A federal scheme does not make every claim inside it a public right. One account of the exception lets Congress authorize non-Article III adjudication as an incident of its power to establish complex regulatory schemes, and it offers the bankruptcy courts’ administration of the federal rules for liquidating and distributing assets as an example. The same account denies that authority over “the stuff of . . . traditional actions at common law,” such as a state-law breach-of-contract claim arising in connection with a bankruptcy.59 The line was also less stable than the plurality’s statement suggests. In later cases involving disputes between private parties, the dividing line between public and private rights became indistinct, and the Court upheld, for example, the EPA’s use of an arbitrator to decide how much one pesticide manufacturer should pay another for using the latter’s research data in a registration proceeding.60
No General Article I Power
The government’s broadest argument was that Congress, acting under its enumerated Article I powers, may establish legislative courts with jurisdiction over cases to which the Article III judicial power extends. Citing the precedents that uphold legislative courts, it urged that “the plenary grants of power in Article I permit Congress to establish non-Article III tribunals in ‘specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment,’” such as bankruptcy.63 The argument came with a corollary. Congress had not constituted the bankruptcy courts as legislative courts, but the government contended that it could have, and that the adjunct system Congress actually chose therefore did not impermissibly encroach on the judicial power.64 That is a greater-includes-lesser argument, and it stands only if its premise is right.
The plurality tested the premise against the precedents, which it understood to describe three narrow situations.65 It concluded that Article III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The bankruptcy courts fall within none of the historically recognized situations, and the plurality could discern no persuasive reason, in logic, history, or the Constitution, why they lie beyond Article III’s reach.66
Its central objection was that the government’s analysis “provides no limiting principle” and thus “threatens to supplant completely our system of adjudication in independent Art. III tribunals and replace it with a system of ‘specialized’ legislative courts.”67 The government had urged that Congress could act only under some specific Article I power. But Article I, Section 8 also empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to punish certain crimes, and on the government’s reasoning Congress could provide for the adjudication of those matters, and of “related” matters, by judges and courts within its exclusive control.68 The jurisdiction granted to the courts created by the Act dramatically evidenced the potential for encroachment through specialized legislative courts. Accepting the argument would have meant replacing principles rooted in history and the Constitution with a rule of broad legislative discretion that could effectively eviscerate the guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch.69
The government drew its “specialized areas” language from Palmore v. United States, a case about the District of Columbia, and the plurality read the phrase as geographic. The passage set Congress’s power over the District, which carries the full authority of government, against cases in which “laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake.” Bankruptcy laws belong to the second group. Palmore’s reference to “specialized areas having particularized needs” therefore described only geographic areas, such as the District of Columbia or territories outside the States, and nothing held or said in Palmore means that Congress may create non-Article III courts with Article III powers in every area in which it may legislate.70 Justice White read the same case differently, as an evaluation of the strength of the legislative interest, a disagreement taken up in the last subsection.71
Only four Justices joined the plurality opinion that rejects the Article I argument. Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor concurred in the judgment alone, resting on the narrower ground that a bankruptcy court could not decide Northern’s lawsuit over Marathon’s objection.73 The rejection of a general Article I power is therefore the reasoning of a plurality, persuasive but not a majority rationale. The government’s second argument, that the bankruptcy courts were mere adjuncts of the district courts, is taken up next.
Adjunct Theory Rejected
The government’s second argument was narrower. Even if the bankruptcy courts could not be legislative courts, it said, they were adjuncts of the district courts, and Congress may use adjuncts. It relied principally on Crowell v. Benson and United States v. Raddatz, in which the Court approved the use of an administrative agency and of magistrates as adjuncts to Article III courts. The plurality framed the question as whether the Act had retained “the essential attributes of the judicial power” in Article III tribunals.75
An adjunct assists an Article III court without taking its place. The Court has accepted factfinding by an administrative agency as an adjunct to an Article III court, analogizing the agency to a jury or a special master.76 In Crowell the Court weighed the limits on the compensation commission’s functions and powers and found its determinations “closely analogous to findings of the amount of damages that are made, according to familiar practice, by commissioners or assessors.” There is, it said, “no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges,” and Article III imposed no bar to the scheme.77 The court kept the legal questions: “the reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.”78 In Raddatz, the adjuncts were magistrates acting under the Federal Magistrates Act, and the ultimate decisionmaking authority respecting all pretrial motions remained with the district court. The Court stressed that “[t]he authority—and the responsibility—to make an informed, final determination . . . remains with the judge,” and it held that the Act did not violate Article III.79
Together the cases yield two principles. First, when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it has substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated, including assigning an adjunct some functions that judges have historically performed. Second, the adjunct’s functions must be limited so that “the essential attributes” of judicial power remain in the Article III court.80
The first principle carries its own limit. Congress’s discretion over adjudication is incidental to its power to define the right it has created. “No comparable justification exists . . . when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation,” and in that situation substantial inroads into functions traditionally performed by the Judiciary cannot be called incidental extensions of Congress’s power. They suggest instead unwarranted encroachments on the judicial power that the Constitution reserves for Article III courts.81 The plurality found the same sensitivity in Raddatz, where the statute delegated less than the one in Crowell yet drew far stricter scrutiny, because the adjunct played a role in adjudicating constitutional rights, and the critical fact was that the district court made the ultimate decision.82 One summary of the doctrine states the resulting balance: an adjunct’s constitutionality depends on weighing the scope of the jurisdiction vested in it against the supervisory authority the Article III court retains, and Congress has a freer hand in assigning the initial adjudication of federal statutory rights than of constitutional or even common-law rights.83
Northern’s claim sat at the demanding end of that range. It was a state-law claim that reached the bankruptcy court only because Northern had filed for reorganization, so Congress’s authority to assign historically judicial functions over it to an adjunct was at its weakest.84 Yet the Act gave the bankruptcy courts powers far beyond those of the agency in Crowell. The plurality drew four contrasts:85
- The Crowell agency made only specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations in a particularized area of law, while the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction reached traditional bankruptcy matters and “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”
- The agency engaged in statutorily channeled factfinding, while the bankruptcy courts exercised “all of the jurisdiction” the Act conferred on the district courts.
- The agency had only a limited power to issue compensation orders under specialized procedures, and its orders could be enforced only by order of the district court.
- The agency had to seek enforcement of its orders in the district court, while the bankruptcy courts issued final judgments that were binding and enforceable even without an appeal.
The first two contrasts show breadth, since the bankruptcy courts could reach nearly any related dispute and held the district courts’ whole jurisdiction. The last two show who decides finally: in Crowell the district court had to act before an order had force, and the bankruptcy courts’ judgments took effect on their own. The plurality concluded that the “adjunct” bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction “behind the facade of a grant to the district courts” and wield powers far greater than those of the adjuncts approved in Crowell or Raddatz.86 Section 1471 therefore “impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art. III district court” and vested them in a non-Article III adjunct, so the grant could not be sustained as an exercise of Congress’s power to create adjuncts.87
The phrase “behind the facade” also answers any statute that simply calls a tribunal an adjunct. The plurality looked past the label to what the courts could do, and two questions carry the analysis. Who created the right being adjudicated? And does the Article III court still hold the final decision on the law and the power to enforce the result?
Dissenting Balancing View
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, dissented. He began by asking what limits Article III places on Congress’s ability to create adjudicative institutions designed to carry out federal policy established under the substantive powers the Constitution grants elsewhere. “Whether fortunate or unfortunate, at this point in the history of constitutional law,” he wrote, that question “can no longer be answered by looking only to the constitutional text.”90
His first criticism was that the plurality’s three situations lack a unifying principle. The first is geographic, implying that Article I courts do not belong within the States, yet the other two recognize that Article I courts can operate within the States. The second depends on Congress’s “extraordinary control over the precise subject matter,” but Congress’s power over the Armed Forces rests on Article I, Section 8, clauses 13 and 14, and White found nothing in those clauses that creates authority different in kind from the authority to legislate on bankruptcy.91 The plurality’s own discussion of adjuncts, moreover, lets Congress commit the adjudication of federal rights to administrative agencies so long as judicial review is available.92 Without a unifying principle, he said, the plurality’s argument reduces to the proposition that bankruptcy courts resemble none of the three situations closely enough to be Article I courts or adjuncts. “But we need to know why bankruptcy courts cannot qualify as Art. I courts in their own right.”93
The failure, he added, is an old one. Chief Justice Marshall introduced the concept of the legislative court in an opinion that also started the theoretical controversy surrounding it.94 Justice Harlan, recognizing that there is frequently no way to distinguish Article I from Article III courts by the work they do, suggested examining the “establishing legislation” to see whether it complies with Article III. That test, White wrote, “comes dangerously close to saying that Art. III courts are those with Art. III judges; Art. I courts are those without such judges,” and a century and a half of constitutional history had led to “a simple tautology.”95
White’s answer was a balance in place of a list. A failure to articulate a principle, he wrote, does not mean the Court must always defer to Congress’s choice of an Article I court. Article III “is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities,” and the Court “retains the final word on how that balance is to be struck.”96 In his account the Court had been balancing all along. The territorial courts, the Court of Private Land Claims, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, and the consular courts each reflected an implicit judgment that the legislative interest in creating an adjudicative institution of temporary duration outweighed the values of strict adherence to Article III.97 He read Palmore the same way, as resting not on territorial or geographical control but on an evaluation of the strength of the legislative interest in pursuing one of its constitutionally assigned responsibilities in that manner.98 Practical judgments of this kind carry weight, as in Crowell’s observation that Congress could use “a method shown by experience to be essential in order to apply its standards to the thousands of cases involved.”99 As a general matter in federal-jurisdiction doctrine, though, efficiency cannot be the sole or controlling consideration.100
White did not propose to weigh Congress’s interest alone. The inquiry should focus equally on Article III’s values and ask whether and to what extent the legislative scheme accommodates them or substantially undermines them, and then measure that burden against the values Congress hopes to serve through an Article I court.101 Appellate review supplied his main concrete factor. Review by an Article III court, like review of state-court decisions, provides a firm check on the ability of the political institutions to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on their own authority.102
Applied to the 1978 Act, the review factor favored the bankruptcy courts. Every route of appeal ended in an Article III court: to the district court and then the court of appeals, to a panel of bankruptcy judges and then the court of appeals, or, if the parties agreed, directly to the court of appeals.103 White added a comparison. Had Congress assigned all bankruptcy matters to the state courts, which it clearly may do, no greater review in an Article III court would exist. He disclaimed any suggestion that Congress may create an Article I court wherever it could have relied on state courts, but he thought the comparison showed that the critical function of judicial review was being met in a manner the Constitution suggests is sufficient.104
White also attacked the remedy. Even if a bankruptcy judge could not hear a state-law claim like the one against Marathon, there was “no basis for doing more than declaring the section unconstitutional as applied to the claim against Marathon, leaving the section otherwise intact.” Striking the broader grant was “a grossly unwarranted emasculation of the scheme Congress has adopted.”106 The difference between the old Act and the new, he said, lay not in a distinction between state-law and federal-law matters but in a distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction, and the majority never explained why that distinction has constitutional implications.107 He treated the plurality’s finality point the same way. The plurality noted that bankruptcy judgments bind even if not appealed, but it was hornbook law before 1978 that the authorized judgments and orders of referees, including turnover orders, were final and binding and res judicata unless appealed and overturned, so the point described no change in practice.108
Chief Justice Burger, who joined White’s dissent, wrote separately, as noted above, to confine the judgment to a traditional state common-law action only peripherally related to bankruptcy and to point out that Congress could comply by routing such actions to the district court.109 No single theory of Article III’s limits carried five votes in the case. Four Justices joined the plurality’s categories, two concurred on the narrow ground of the state-law damages claim, and three joined White. The next part turns to how Congress restructured the bankruptcy courts after the decision and to the balancing approach in later cases.