Also known as: zones of physical danger · zone of danger · zone-of-danger rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The area within which a person is exposed to a foreseeable risk of physical injury from a defendant's negligent conduct. A defendant owes a duty of care only to plaintiffs situated inside that area at the time of the negligent act. Plaintiffs outside the area are unforeseeable and therefore receive no protection even if they suffer actual harm.
Railroad guards helped a passenger board a train while he carried a package of fireworks. The package fell and exploded, causing scales to topple onto Mrs. Palsgraf who stood on the platform. She could not recover because she stood outside the zone of physical danger created by the guards' negligent assistance to the passenger.
Consolidated Rail Corp. negligently allowed a chemical spill that forced evacuation of a nearby airport. People Express Airlines, located outside the immediate spill zone, lost business when flights were canceled. The airline could not recover because it stood beyond the zone of physical danger created by the derailment.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
View caseA driver negligently struck a child in the street while the child's mother watched from the sidewalk. The mother suffered severe emotional distress but sustained no physical impact. Recovery was permitted because the mother remained inside the zone of physical danger created by the driver's negligent driving.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseYes. Courts following the Cardozo view in Palsgraf deny recovery to plaintiffs who stand outside the zone because they are unforeseeable victims. The zone therefore functions as both a duty limitation and a boundary on emotional-distress claims that lack physical impact.
Supporting sources
The zone of physical danger focuses on foreseeability of risk at the time of the negligent act rather than on whether the plaintiff actually suffered physical contact. Some jurisdictions relax the zone requirement when a special relationship exists between the parties, but the core test remains whether the plaintiff was situated where injury was reasonably foreseeable.
No under the traditional Cardozo approach. The defendant owes no duty to such a plaintiff, so neither physical nor emotional harm is compensable even if the distress is severe and genuine.
Supporting sources
…that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule. In the second place, to rest upon the zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected the impact rule becomes even less defensible. We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary for…