48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989)
On December 8, 1980, John Thing, a minor, was struck and injured by an automobile driven by defendant Jose La Chusa while riding his bicycle.1 His mother, Maria Thing, was nearby but did not witness the accident.2 She heard the impact and came upon the scene within moments.3 Maria saw her son unconscious and bleeding in the roadway and believed he was dead.4
Maria suffered emotional distress as a result of these events.5 John's father and sister were not at the scene of the accident.6 They learned of the accident from Maria and also suffered emotional distress.7
The plaintiffs brought this action against defendant La Chusa alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs were not present at the accident scene.9 The trial court granted the motion.10 The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.11 The Supreme Court of California granted review to reconsider the parameters of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.12
Whether a mother who did not witness an automobile accident in which her child was struck and injured, but who arrived at the scene moments later and observed the child's injuries, may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress?13
A plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person only if the plaintiff satisfies three requirements.14 The plaintiff must be closely related to the injured victim.15 The plaintiff must be present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and aware that it is causing injury to the victim.16 Finally, the plaintiff must suffer serious emotional distress as a result.17
Yes. Maria Thing arrived at the scene moments after the accident and observed her son's injuries, satisfying the requirements of presence and contemporaneous awareness.18 The father and sister learned of the accident only after it had occurred from Maria.19 Therefore Maria may recover while the father and sister may not.20
Maria Thing may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but the father and sister may not.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Arguelles
Justice Broussard dissents from the majority's adoption of a strict presence requirement at the exact moment of injury.22 He argues that the majority's new rule is overly restrictive and will deny recovery to many plaintiffs who have suffered serious emotional distress as a result of observing injury to a close relative.23 The Dillon factors have served well and should not be replaced by the rigid requirements announced today.24
The majority's approach leads to arbitrary results that frustrate justice for victims of negligent acts.25
Justice Kennard dissents from the majority's imposition of strict presence and contemporaneous awareness requirements.26 She contends that the majority's decision represents a step backward in the development of tort law.27 The court ignores the reality that emotional distress can be just as severe when one learns of the injury to a loved one through indirect means.28
The new rule fails to account for the genuine trauma experienced by close relatives who arrive shortly after an accident.29
Whether the "guidelines" enunciated by this court in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 are adequate, or if they should be refined to create greater predictability in this area of the law?
The Dillon guidelines have led to inconsistent and arbitrary application and should be replaced with strict requirements to limit liability and provide predictability in bystander recovery cases.30
Yes. The court concludes that the Dillon rule has created more problems than it has solved.31 It has led to arbitrary results and has been difficult to apply in a consistent manner.32 The new requirements provide clear limits on recovery for emotional distress in bystander cases by converting flexible guidelines into mandatory elements.33
The factors should be refined into strict elements for recovery.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kaufman concurs in the judgment but writes separately to emphasize the need for a wholesale reappraisal of bystander liability.35 He argues that Dillon's flexible guidelines have led to confusion and inconsistency of result over two decades of adjudication.
The situation therefore calls for a wholesale reappraisal of the wisdom of permitting recovery for emotional distress resulting from injury to others.36 Kaufman contends that the interest in freedom from emotional distress caused by negligent injury to a third party is simply not an interest which the law can or should protect. While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. The risks of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or another. It is enough that the law establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed.37
He would overrule Dillon v. Legg and reinstate Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. as the law of this state to avoid the arbitrary results that have plagued the Dillon framework.38
Justice Mosk concurs in the judgment and in the opinion of the court.39 He writes separately to emphasize that the rule announced today is consistent with the principles of tort law and will lead to more predictable and just results.40 Mosk notes that the majority properly limits recovery to those plaintiffs who satisfy all three required elements of the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.41
This limitation ensures that only those who meet the strict criteria can recover, providing clarity in an area previously marked by uncertainty from expansive interpretations of the Dillon guidelines.42