Also known as: zone of danger rule · zone-of-danger rules · zone of danger · zone-of-danger test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine in tort law that permits recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the plaintiff was located in the dangerous area created by the defendant's negligence and frightened by the risk of harm. The rule limits duty to those plaintiffs within the range of reasonably foreseeable risk at the time of the negligent act. A defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff outside that range even if injury in fact occurs.
Zion Zhao stood across the street from a construction site when a crane operator dropped a beam. The beam narrowly missed a worker but caused Zion to suffer severe fright and later insomnia. Zion sues the operator for emotional distress. Because Zion was not within the range of foreseeable physical risk created by the drop, the operator owed him no duty.
Zuri Zhang watched from the curb as a car struck her child in the crosswalk. The vehicle swerved toward Zuri as well before stopping inches away. Zuri suffered lasting anxiety and physical symptoms from the near miss. Under the zone-of-danger rule her claim proceeds because she faced direct risk of impact herself.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseZeke Zhao worked at an airport terminal when a train derailment released toxic fumes nearby. He remained in the immediate area to assist passengers and later developed respiratory illness from fear-induced stress. Zeke sues the rail company for his physical symptoms. Recovery turns on whether his location placed him inside the zone of physical danger created by the derailment.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
View caseNo. The rule allows recovery for emotional distress when the plaintiff is within the zone of physical danger and frightened by the risk, even without actual contact. Courts applying the rule focus on the plaintiff's location relative to the hazard rather than on whether impact occurred.
The impact rule bars recovery unless the plaintiff suffers physical contact. The zone-of-danger rule relaxes that bar by permitting recovery when the plaintiff is close enough to face a risk of impact and experiences fright from that risk.
The plaintiff must show both presence in the area of foreseeable physical danger created by the defendant's negligence and actual fright caused by that danger. Resulting physical symptoms strengthen the claim but are not always required in every jurisdiction applying the rule.
Supporting sources
Recovery is generally unavailable under the zone-of-danger rule when the plaintiff's distress arises solely from witnessing harm to another. The plaintiff must have been personally within the zone of physical danger created by the negligence.
…that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule. In the second place, to rest upon the zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected the impact rule becomes even less defensible. We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary for…