Also known as: veto powers · veto · right of veto
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A conditional power held by an executive or other designated authority to reject or prevent a proposed measure from taking effect.
After Congress passed and the President signed the National Vehicle Data Privacy Act, the President issued an executive directive canceling specific grant awards for facial recognition technology. Urban Stack, a qualifying startup, lost its earmarked funding. The directive exceeded authority because the veto power permits only approval or rejection of an entire bill.
An unmarried biological father learned of his newborn child's proposed adoption. He had visited regularly, admitted paternity, paid support, and expressed willingness to assume custody. Because he manifested parental responsibility, his veto of the adoption was effective and consent could not be bypassed.
The Tech Bureau granted Ridge Systems a cybersecurity waiver under the Digital Safety and Cybersecurity Act. Sixty days later the House passed a simple resolution overturning the waiver without Senate concurrence or presentment to the President. The resolution was invalid because any legislative alteration of rights must satisfy bicameralism and presentment.
A state statute granted a review board composed of legislators authority to veto executive decisions on bond issues. Challengers argued the arrangement improperly assigned governmental power. The scheme violated separation of powers because legislators may not retain control over execution of the laws.
A statute required spousal notification before an abortion but did not grant the husband power to block the procedure. The provision was invalidated because the notification requirement imposed an undue burden by granting one spouse a de facto veto right that could override the other's decision.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseA referendum measure required a sixty percent supermajority for passage of certain bond issues. Opponents claimed the rule gave a minority improper veto power. The requirement was upheld because supermajority thresholds do not violate equal protection merely by allowing a minority to block proposals.
The President's veto power permits only approval or rejection of a bill in its entirety. It does not authorize unilateral cancellation of specific statutory provisions after enactment. Such action constitutes an impermissible amendment of duly passed laws.
The father must demonstrate actual manifestations of parental responsibility, including living with or visiting the child, admitting paternity, paying support, and showing willingness to assume custody. Mere biological status without these actions does not confer veto power.
Any exercise of legislative power that alters the rights or duties of persons outside Congress must satisfy bicameral passage and presentment to the President. A single-house veto bypasses these requirements and therefore violates separation of powers.
No. Requiring more than a simple majority for certain measures does not violate equal protection. The rule merely sets a higher threshold for passage and does not improperly concentrate veto authority.
…to look far beyond the language of the Ninth Amendment to find that the Framers vested in this Court any such awesome veto powers over lawmaking, either by the States or by the Congress. Nor does anything in the history of the Amendment offer any support for such a shocking doctrine. The whole history of the adoption…