Also known as: unwarranted invasions of privacy · invasion of privacy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An unjustified intrusion into an individual's personal affairs or seclusion that exposes private information without sufficient legal or public justification. The inquiry weighs the harm from the exposure against any countervailing need for the intrusion. Courts apply the standard to determine whether the conduct crosses constitutional or common-law limits.
Usha Upton discovered that a local station aired footage implying she had committed fraud. She sued claiming the broadcast placed her in a false light that a reasonable person would find highly offensive. The court examined whether the station acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard before allowing the claim to proceed.
Una Unger learned that state health officials planned to release her prescription records to researchers. She objected that the release would expose private medical choices without advancing a significant public need. Officials weighed her privacy interest against the research value before deciding whether disclosure was required.
In August 1970 the New York Legislature created a special commission to evaluate the State’s drug-control laws after determining that drugs with both legitimate and illegitimate uses were being diverted into unlawful channels. The commission found existing laws deficient because there was no effective way to prevent stolen or revised prescriptions, repeated refills by unscrupulous pharmacists, patients obtaining prescriptions from multiple doctors, or doctors over-prescribing. The 1972 New York State Controlled Substances Act classified potentially harmful drugs into five schedules and placed the most dangerous legitimate drugs, including opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone, in Schedule II. With an exception for emergencies, the Act requires every Schedule II prescription to be written in triplicate on an official form that identifies the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacy, the drug and dosage, and the patient’s name, address, and age; one copy must be forwarded to the New York State Department of Health in Albany. Approximately 100,000 Schedule II prescription forms arrive at the Department of Health each month, where they are sorted, coded, logged, and recorded on magnetic tapes for computer processing before being returned to a vault for five-year retention and eventual destruction. The receiving room is protected by a locked wire fence and alarm system, computer tapes are stored in a locked cabinet, the computer runs off-line with no external terminals, and public disclosure of patient identities is prohibited by statute and regulation with willful violations punishable by up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. At the time of trial, seventeen Department of Health employees had access to the files. Twenty-four investigators were authorized to investigate cases of apparent overuse. After twenty months of operation the computerized data had been used in only two investigations. A few days before the Act became effective, patients who regularly received Schedule II prescriptions, doctors who prescribed such drugs, and two physicians’ associations commenced this litigation challenging the patient-identification provisions. After an initial dismissal that was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a three-judge District Court conducted a one-day trial. Appellees introduced evidence that some patients declined needed Schedule II medication because of fear that the computerized records would stigmatize them as drug addicts. Two parents had taken a child off such medication for that reason. Three adult patients feared disclosure, with one now obtaining drugs out of state. Four physicians testified that patients reacted with shock and concern when informed of the central filing system and that one doctor had stopped prescribing Schedule II drugs altogether, although more than 100,000 such prescriptions continued to be filled each month without reported objections reaching the District Court. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the patient-identification provisions of the Act.
View caseUliana Ustinova alleged that federal agents entered her apartment without a warrant and examined personal documents. She asserted that the search constituted an invasion of her private affairs lacking any overriding justification. The court assessed whether the agents' conduct violated constitutional limits on such intrusions.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseUlrike Ulrich complained that prison guards searched her cell and read her personal letters without cause. She argued the search exposed intimate details with no legitimate institutional need. Officials evaluated whether the intrusion was justified by security concerns or amounted to an unwarranted exposure.
In September 1981, respondent Palmer, an inmate at the Bland Correctional Center in Virginia serving sentences for forgery, uttering, grand larceny, and bank robbery, was subjected to a shakedown search of his prison locker and cell by petitioner Hudson, a correctional officer, and a fellow officer. During the search, the officers discovered a ripped pillowcase in a trash can near Palmer's cell bunk. Charges were brought against Palmer under prison disciplinary procedures for destroying state property. Following a hearing, Palmer was found guilty, ordered to reimburse the state for the destroyed material, and received a reprimand on his prison record. Palmer then filed a pro se action in United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Hudson conducted the search and brought the false charge solely to harass him, and that Hudson intentionally destroyed some of his noncontraband personal property, including legal materials and letters, during the search, thereby depriving him of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hudson denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The court accepted Palmer's allegations as true but concluded that the destruction of property, even if intentional, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because state tort remedies were available, and that the alleged harassment did not rise to a constitutional level. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim regarding property destruction, extending the logic of Parratt v. Taylor to intentional deprivations. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the claim that the shakedown search was unreasonable, holding that an individual prisoner has a limited privacy right in his cell that could be breached by searches conducted solely to harass or humiliate. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine the purpose of the search, noting a factual dispute over whether it was routine or harassing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both the main petition and the cross-petition to address the privacy expectation in prison cells and the extension of Parratt to intentional deprivations.
View caseUri Underwood challenged the review of his archived presidential materials by government archivists. He contended that the review would reveal private communications without sufficient public justification. The court balanced his privacy claims against the historical value of the records before authorizing access.
The events leading to this litigation began on June 17, 1972, when agents of the Committee to Re-elect the President were arrested in the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate office complex in Washington, D. C. The ensuing investigation revealed that the break-in was part of a widespread campaign of political espionage and sabotage conducted on behalf of the Committee to Re-elect the President during the 1972 presidential campaign. The investigation also revealed that President Nixon had installed a secret taping system in the Oval Office and other locations in the White House that had recorded many of his conversations. In May 1973, the Attorney General appointed a Special Prosecutor to investigate the Watergate matter. A subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of certain tape recordings. This Court upheld the subpoena in United States v. Nixon. Meanwhile, the House Judiciary Committee began an inquiry into whether President Nixon should be impeached and subpoenaed additional tapes and documents. On August 9, 1974, President Nixon resigned. On September 8, 1974, President Ford granted a pardon to former President Nixon for any offenses against the United States that he might have committed while in office. Upon his resignation, appellant directed Government archivists to pack and ship the materials to him in California. This shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor advised President Ford of his continuing need for the materials. The Attorney General advised that historical practice supported ownership in the appellant, subject to a possible limited exception reflecting a public interest in the materials. On September 8, 1974, the Administrator of General Services signed a depository agreement with appellant under the authority of 44 U. S. C. § 2107. The agreement recited that appellant retained all legal and equitable title to the materials. The materials were deposited temporarily in a secure United States facility near appellant's California home. Access was restricted to appellant or persons authorized by him. The tape recordings were to be destroyed at the time of appellant's death or on September 1, 1984, whichever occurred first. Public announcement of the agreement was followed ten days later by the introduction of legislation designed to abrogate the agreement. On December 19, 1974, Congress enacted the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. The Act directed the Administrator of General Services, notwithstanding any other law or agreement, to take complete possession and control of all original tape recordings of conversations recorded or caused to be recorded by any federal officer or employee involving former President Nixon or other federal employees during the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974, in the White House or the office of the President in the Executive Office Buildings located in Washington, District of Columbia; Camp David, Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, California. The Act also directed the Administrator to take possession of all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials constituting the Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon covering the same period. The Act prohibited destruction of the materials except as provided by law. It made the materials available in response to court subpoena or other legal process or for use in judicial proceedings. It afforded appellant access subject to regulations. It provided for access by executive agencies for lawful government use. It directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations governing public access that took into account seven specified factors. The regulations were to be submitted to Congress and would take effect unless disapproved by either House. The materials at issue consist of some 42 million pages of documents and some 880 tape recordings of conversations. On December 20, 1974, appellant filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284. Because regulations governing public access had not yet become effective, the District Court limited its review to the facial constitutionality of the statute's custody and screening provisions and upheld the Act in all respects. This appeal followed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseUsman Uddin resisted a subpoena for his tax returns held by his accountant. He maintained that compelled production would expose financial details without a compelling enforcement need. The court considered whether the government's interest justified the disclosure of the private records.
On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a), seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons was directed to petitioner's accountant for the production of all books, records, bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the taxpayer. Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant. Since 1955 she had given bank statements, payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures to her accountant, Harold Shaffer, for the purpose of preparing her income tax returns. The accountant was not petitioner's personal employee but an independent contractor with his own office and numerous other clients who compensated him on a piecework basis. When petitioner surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer, she retained title in herself. During the summer of 1969, Internal Revenue Agent Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner's tax returns. After examining her books and records in Shaffer's office with his permission, Groves found indications of a substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service. Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division next commenced a joint investigation with Groves. Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her Miranda warnings as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer after the latter refused to let him see, remove, or microfilm petitioner's records. When Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2, 1969, the return day of the summons, to view the records, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request, had delivered the documents to petitioner's attorney. Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened, asserting that the ownership of the records warranted a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the privilege claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 405 U. S. 1038.
View caseThe standard requires an agency to weigh the individual's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. When privacy concerns predominate, the agency must withhold the records even if they would otherwise be subject to release. This balancing prevents unnecessary exposure of personal information contained in government files.
Yes. The phrase appears in FOIA exemption (b)(6) and governs whether an agency may release records that contain personal information. It does not directly regulate private-party conduct or state tort claims.
The requester must demonstrate that disclosure would serve a significant public interest that outweighs the individual's privacy interest. Mere curiosity or general oversight concerns are usually insufficient to justify release.
…the exercise of federal power, must be rejected. Second. The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile. Thus, we may bar the door against an unwelcome…