430 U.S. 651 (1977)
In January 1971, former students James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the Dade County School Board, principal James T. Ingraham, assistant principal Willie J. Wright, and other school officials.1 The action sought damages for individual paddling incidents and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
On October 6, 1970, Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks with a wooden paddle while held over a table in the principal's office after being slow to respond to a teacher's instructions.3 The paddling caused a hematoma requiring medical attention and keeping him out of school for several days.4 On December 1, 1970, Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions in the school auditorium, with strikes to his arms, back, and neck that caused him to lose the full use of his arm for a week.5
In the 1970-1971 school year many of the 237 schools in Dade County used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant to Florida legislation and a local School Board regulation.6 The authorized punishment consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick.7 The normal punishment was limited to one to five licks or blows with the paddle and resulted in no apparent physical injury to the student.8 Teachers often administered the punishment without first consulting the principal, contrary to the procedural requirements of the statute and regulation.9 The evidence, consisting mainly of the testimony of 16 students, suggests that the regime at Drew was exceptionally harsh.10
The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss after the close of the plaintiffs' case, finding no constitutional violation.11 A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, but upon rehearing the en banc court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the questions of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process.13
Whether the paddling of students in the public schools is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment?14
No. The history of the Eighth Amendment and the decisions of this Court leave no doubt that the cruel and unusual punishments clause was designed to protect those convicted of crimes from torturous or barbaric forms of punishment.17 The clause has never been applied in the school context.
The paddlings administered to Ingraham and Andrews occurred in the public school setting for disciplinary purposes.18 The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects persons convicted of crime.19
The paddling of students in the public schools is not proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, And Justice Stevens
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is not limited to criminal punishments.21 The Amendment speaks broadly of punishments, and there is no reason to believe that the framers intended to exclude the punishment of schoolchildren from its protections.22 The historical evidence suggests that the framers were concerned with all forms of governmental infliction of pain and suffering that were disproportionate to the offense or otherwise shocking to the conscience.23
The record in this case shows that the corporal punishment inflicted on respondents was severe enough to cause physical injury requiring medical attention.24 Such punishment is inconsistent with the dignity of the individual that the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect.25
Whether the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment must be satisfied before inflicting such punishment?26
No. Although corporal punishment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.29 Under Florida law the teacher and principal of the school decide in the first instance whether corporal punishment is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to discipline a child who has misbehaved.30 If the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive, the school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties.31 The risk of error is minimized by the fact that the teacher or administrator who imposes the punishment has personally witnessed the misconduct.32
The common-law remedies available to students and their parents provide adequate protection against arbitrary or excessive corporal punishment.33
The procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied by Florida's preservation of common-law constraints and remedies.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, And Justice Stevens
The interest of the student in avoiding the infliction of physical pain is entitled to due process protection.35 The school has an interest in maintaining order, but that interest can be accommodated by providing the student with a minimal opportunity to explain his version of the incident before the punishment is inflicted.36 The Court's reliance on common-law remedies is misplaced.37
A damages action after the fact cannot adequately protect the student's interest in avoiding the punishment in the first instance.38 I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.39
The constitutional prohibition of state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not, by its express language, require that a hearing be provided before any deprivation may occur.40 When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater likelihood that a damages award will make a person completely whole than when an invasion of the individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has occurred.41 In the property context, therefore, frequently a postdeprivation state remedy may be all the process that the Fourteenth Amendment requires.42