Also known as: unfair prejudice · unfairly-prejudicial · prejudicial evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence whose admission would create a substantial risk that the jury will decide the case on an improper basis rather than on the evidence's legitimate probative force. The danger arises when the evidence invites the jury to rely on emotion, propensity reasoning, or other considerations outside the proper scope of the issues at trial. A court excludes the evidence only when that risk substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value.
Una Unger sued Ultrasonic Dynamics after a crane collapse killed her husband. The defense moved to exclude a video showing the crushed cab and body recovery. The court denied the motion because the footage's probative value on the failure mechanism outweighed any emotional impact on the jury.
Ulysses Usher faced conspiracy charges for a drug importation ring. The government offered evidence of Usher's earlier arrest for possessing the same controlled substance. The court admitted the evidence after finding sufficient proof that the jury could conclude the prior act occurred and that its value on intent outweighed any propensity risk.
Ursula Ung was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. The government declined her offer to stipulate to the prior felony and sought to introduce the judgment naming the offense as armed robbery. The court excluded the full record because the name and nature of the conviction created unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its marginal probative value on the status element.
Umar Usmani and Uriel Urban were tried together for bank robbery. The government introduced Urban's post-arrest statement naming Usmani as the getaway driver. The court granted Usmani's severance motion because the statement's admission against Urban would create unfair prejudice to Usmani that limiting instructions could not cure.
In June 1966, petitioner George William Bruton and codefendant Evans were jointly tried before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They faced a federal charge of armed postal robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. A postal inspector testified that during two interrogations at the St. Louis city jail on April 11 and May 4, 1966, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the robbery and that Evans had an accomplice whom he would not name. The interrogations followed an April 8 confession Evans gave to local police officers without warnings while held on state charges. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction on the ground that his oral confessions should not have been received in evidence against him. However, the court affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge had instructed the jury that Evans’ confession was competent evidence only against Evans and inadmissible hearsay against Bruton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The trial had begun one week after Miranda v. Arizona, and the Court of Appeals applied that decision to hold the confessions tainted. On retrial Evans was acquitted. The Solicitor General later submitted a memorandum stating that in light of the record the judgment as to Bruton should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Upland Industries faced charges after its manager confessed during police questioning. The trial court allowed the jury to hear the confession before ruling on voluntariness. The appellate court reversed because the procedure created unfair prejudice by letting the jury consider potentially inadmissible evidence before the court determined its constitutional admissibility.
On June 14, 1960, at about 1 a.m., petitioner Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliott entered a Brooklyn hotel where Elliott registered for both. Jackson drew a gun, took money from the room clerk, ordered the clerk and others into an upstairs room, and left. He encountered Elliott and a policeman on the street. During a struggle both drew guns, the policeman was fatally wounded, and Jackson was shot twice in the body. Jackson hailed a cab and was taken to the hospital. A detective questioned Jackson at about 2 a.m. soon after arrival. Jackson stated his name, said he had shot the colored cop and got the drop on him, and admitted the hotel robbery. According to the detective, Jackson was in strong condition despite his wounds. At 3:55 a.m. Jackson, who had been shot in the liver and lung and had lost about 500 cc. of blood, was given 50 milligrams of demerol and 1/50 of a grain of scopolamine. Immediately thereafter an Assistant District Attorney questioned him in the presence of police officers and hospital personnel. The interrogation was recorded by a stenographer. Jackson again admitted the robbery and, in response to further questions, admitted shooting the policeman and firing the first shot. The interview ended at 4 a.m. An operation began at 5 a.m. and was completed at 8 a.m. Jackson and Elliott were indicted for murder in the first degree and tried together. The statements made by Jackson at 2 a.m. and 3:55 a.m. were introduced in evidence without objection by his counsel. Jackson took the stand in his own defense. His account of the robbery and of the shooting of the policeman differed in important respects from his confession. According to Jackson's testimony, there was a substantial interval of time between his leaving the hotel and the shooting, and the policeman attempted to draw his gun first and fired the first shot. As to the questioning at the hospital, Jackson recalled that he was in pain and gasping for breath at the time. He was refused water and told he would not be let alone until the police had the answers they wanted. He knew that he had been interrogated but could remember neither the questions nor the answers. The State offered testimony from the attending physician and others that Jackson was refused water because of the impending operation rather than his refusal to answer questions. On cross-examination of the doctor, Jackson's counsel, with the help of the hospital records, elicited the fact that demerol and scopolamine were administered to Jackson immediately before his interrogation. But any effect of these drugs on Jackson during the interrogation was denied. Although Jackson's counsel did not specifically object to admission of the confession initially, the trial court indicated awareness that counsel was questioning the circumstances of the interrogation. In closing argument counsel sought a verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter rather than acquittal, stressing the interval between the robbery and the shooting and the evidence that the policeman fired first. Consistent with New York practice, the trial court submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury along with the other issues. The jury was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary it was to disregard it and determine guilt or innocence from the other evidence. If it found the confession voluntary it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. The jury found Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree and he was sentenced to death. Elliott was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, whose remittitur was amended to show that it had necessarily passed upon the voluntariness of the confession and found no violation of constitutional rights. Certiorari was denied. Jackson then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court claiming that the New York procedure for determining voluntariness was unconstitutional and that his confession was involuntary. After examining the state court record the district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding no clear and conclusive proof that the statements were extorted or given involuntarily and no constitutional infirmity in the New York procedure. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Universal Motors was prosecuted for tax fraud. The prosecutor repeatedly highlighted the defendant's failure to testify during closing argument. The court found the comments created unfair prejudice that violated the defendant's constitutional rights and could not be treated as harmless error on the facts presented.
Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were convicted in a California state court upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender. Chapman was sentenced to life imprisonment and Teale to death. At trial both petitioners chose not to testify. The prosecutor took full advantage of a provision in the California Constitution allowing comment on a defendant's failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of guilt. The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify. The trial took place before this Court decided Griffin v. California. On appeal the California Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence but affirmed applying the State's harmless-error provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to these questions: where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, can the error be held to be harmless, and if so, was the error harmless in this case.
View caseEvidence is unfairly prejudicial when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury will use it for an improper purpose, such as deciding the case on emotion or propensity rather than on the legitimate issues. The rule requires courts to weigh the evidence's legitimate value against that danger before exclusion.
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…require additional safeguards. The admission of uncorroborated hearsay statements in conspiracy cases poses a serious risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Such statements are often made by witnesses who have a strong motive to lie or exaggerate in order to obtain a better deal from the Government. Without the requirement of…
…F.2d 319. In Judge Hand’s view the limiting instruction, although not really capable of preventing the jury from considering the prejudicial evidence, does as a matter of form provide a way around the exclusionary rules of evidence
…“substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect,” Fed. Rule Evid. 703, or “the probative value . . . outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.” People v. Pasch , 152 Ill. 2d 133, 223, 604 N. E. 2d 294, 333 (1992). When this disclosure occurs, “the underlying facts” are revealed to the jury “for the limited purpose of explaining…
…litigant cannot, under Fahy , be conceived of as harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the…
…403 provides: " Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
A defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior conviction can reduce the probative value of introducing the full record of that conviction. When the only disputed fact is the defendant's status as a felon, the name and nature of the prior offense often create unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any remaining probative value.
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Even when uncharged misconduct satisfies the Rule 104(b) conditional-relevance standard, the court must still apply Rule 403. The evidence is admissible only if its probative value on a non-propensity issue is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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Graphic evidence may be excluded when its emotional impact substantially outweighs its probative value on a material fact. Courts balance the evidence's legitimate utility against the risk that jurors will decide the case on the basis of sympathy or revulsion rather than the facts.
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